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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Human societies are dependent on natural resources such as forest, land, and water for their 
livelihoods. As the population continues to grow, demand for natural resources also 
increases, thus putting growing pressure on providing these necessities. Therefore, “the 
management of increasingly scarce natural resources is perhaps the most important 
governance challenge facing humanity today” (RAGHUNANDAN, 2010, p. 57). During the 
past decades, collaboration between the public and non-public sector has been accepted 
widely as a means to take on this challenge (FISHER, WAKJIRA, WELDESEMAET, & 
ASHENAFI, 2014; KOONTZ & THOMAS, 2006; WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, 2000). This study 
explores a collaborative effort for managing water resources, i.e. the river basin committee 
(RBC), which is implemented currently in Thailand. 
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Thailand became a democratic country in 1932, after abolishing absolute monarchy. 
However, democracy in the country has been far from fully realized, and could be 
described as only a ‘minimal democracy’ (FERRARA, 2011, p. 513). Furthermore, the Thai 
administration continues to be characterized by strong centralization, which was first 
introduced in the late 19
th
 century to secure macroeconomic stability and consolidate 
territorial control over the Thai vassal states (MANEETHORN, 2008; WONGPREDEE & 
SUDHIPONGPRACHA, 2014). This centralization approach has deep impacts not only on the 
country’s administrative structure, but also on natural resource management policies and 
practices. As reviewed by SANTASOMBAT (2000), the Thai state has monopolized natural 
resource management whereby rules, laws and policies as well as management and control 
measures are being applied grossly throughout the country, with no consideration given to 
variations such as resource conditions and local practices. 
Nevertheless, in 1997, promulgation of the so-called ‘People’s Constitution’ brought about 
significant changes in the Thai administrative system. Fundamentally, it opened up the 
administrative system to participation from the non-public sector; in other words, 
collaborative governance (e.g. CARLSON, 2007 cited in EMERSON & MURCHIE, 2010) 
became a guiding principle for the government and its public agencies in formulating 
policies and carrying out public works. Major laws and national policies have been 
amended or introduced to support this movement. For example, the State Administration 
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Act of 1991 was amended in 2002, stipulating that in their operations, public agencies must 
allow, among other things, for participation and information disclosure; while the current 
public sector development plan (2013-2018) includes collaborative governance as one of 
the strategies to improve the Thai public sector (OPDC, 2013b). In addition, the 1997 
Constitution also paved the way for the improvement of local government (e.g. more 
autonomy and direct election of the mayor and council members), and the decentralization 
project, which started in 1999. 
With non-public sector participation becoming a standard requirement for public sector 
operations, changes started to take place in ways of natural resource management. For 
example, 7,761 community forests have been established by the Royal Forest Department 
(RFD) and local communities concerned since 1999 (RFD, online; as of 2014), when the 
latter were involved in forest conservation and allowing the use of non-timber products 
from community forests1. 
Over the last decade, collaboration with the non-public sector in water resource 
management also has been promoted. In 2004, the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
adopted non-public sector participation in its irrigation management and operation 
(KUMNERDPET & SINCLAIR, 2011). A Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC), 
comprising representatives of irrigation water user groups, an irrigation office, local 
government organizations (LGOs) and other public agencies concerned, was established in 
this scheme for a given irrigation system with mandates including planning for its 
modernization and maintenance and irrigation water allocation (KUMNERDPET & SINCLAIR, 
2011; OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATORY PROMOTION, 2009). 
Attempts have been made in the wider context of Thailand’s water resource sector to 
manage water resources using a collaborative approach. Therefore, the government 
implemented the river basin committee (RBC) framework. First introduced in 2002, and 
subsequently revised in 2007, the framework is basically about water resource management 
by a RBC using a river basin as a managerial unit. Like the JMC mentioned above, non-
public sector participation also is emphasized in the RBC framework. The Office of the 
Prime Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resources Management of 2007 [The 2007 
                                                          
1
 Due to a long conflict between the RFD and local communities over forest resource management and use, 
skepticism remains regarding the RFD’s sincerity in its move toward the community forest project, and 
whether ‘community forest’ is used by the RFD as a new technique for managing forest resources (e.g. 
ONPROM, 2011). 
 3 
Regulation], which has a legal basis underlying the current RBC framework, expressly 
indicates that representatives from water user organizations and LGOs, as well as local 
experts, be part of the RBC members together with members from the public agencies 
concerned. The RBC is charged with mandates such as water resource management 
planning, water allocation, and conflict mediation (see Box 4.2 for details). 
Given the long legacy of strong centralization and minimal recognition of local 
communities in natural resource management in Thailand, the idea of having water user 
organization representatives take part in making decisions on important issues, like water 
resource management plans and water allocation prescribed in the RBC framework, is 
innovative and promising. The general direction of the RBC framework and its 
implementation, as outlined by the government, also suggests that the framework would 
not be approached in an ad hoc manner, i.e. instead of pilot projects being implemented in 
selected areas and possibly discarded later, they would be meant to stay and become new 
institutions for water resource management. For example, the 2007 Regulation expressly 
indicates establishment of the RBCs for all 25 main river basins located in the country, 
with a four-year general term of service, while the Department of Water Resources 
(DWR), as a public agency, is assigned to support the RBCs. 
From the Thai administration’s perspective, the RBC framework can be seen as part of a 
broader effort to open up for non-public sector participation and move toward collaborative 
governance, which can be viewed as ‘collaborative water governance’ (BAKKER & COHEN, 
2011). Furthermore, the framework seen from the water resource sector’s perspective also 
reflects an international trend in integrated river basin management (IRBM), where water 
resources are managed at the river basin level with stakeholder participation (JASPERS, 
2003). Water resource management in this manner, albeit with limited non-public sector 
participation, was suggested in the water bill during the early 1990s (THE FACULTY OF 
LAW, THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY, 1993)2, but it has never been implemented. Nevertheless, 
the IRBM could be realized potentially through the RBC framework. 
Apparently, the RBC framework is a recent major development in Thailand regarding its 
administration and water resource sector. More importantly, it could serve as an effective 
                                                          
2
 A river basin commission may be established in this water bill for a river basin, and charged with mandates 
such as planning for water use schemes, issuing water permits, and setting up water use priority. However, 
three of 21 seats in the commission may be allocated to representatives of water user organizations or non-
governmental organizations (THE FACULTY OF LAW, THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY 1993, pp. 95-96). 
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mechanism for managing increasingly scarce water resources in the country, where water 
use conflicts already occur (e.g. CHAROENMUANG, 1994) and may intensify in the future, 
especially in areas not covered by the irrigations systems3. 
 
1.2 Research questions and objectives 
 
The RBC framework is relatively new in the Thai context. The RBC pilot projects were 
first implemented in 1999 (e.g. PATTANEE, 2003a), three years before the RBC framework 
was introduced officially in 2002. The current RBC framework only started in 2007. At the 
same time, it could be envisioned to achieve both normative and practical aspects of non-
public sector participation (REED, 2008). The former is reflected in the administrative 
reform mentioned earlier, where collaborative governance is promoted; while the latter is 
indicated by the mandates that the RBC is expected to achieve; for instance, a water 
resource management plan, water use priority and water allocation measures (see Box 
4.2)4. Against these backdrops, this study aims to explore the RBC framework with the 
guiding research questions of how it is implemented on the ground and what outcomes 
does it generate. 
To answer the two research questions, this study pursues three objectives as follows:  
1) To explore the implementation process of the river basin committee framework5. 
The 2007 Regulation only prescribes establishment of the RBC for each main river basin, 
with the requirement that representatives of water user organizations, LGOs and local 
experts are to be included. No further details in this regard are provided. Thus, this study 
explores how the RBC framework is translated and carried out on the ground. Specifically, 
it examines how the river basin committee was formed and managed.  
2) To analyze collaborative processes and participation in the RBC. It is apparent that 
the RBC framework attempts to include the non-public sector. Yet, collaborative 
governance goes beyond a mere inclusion of non-public sector representatives into the 
RBC, and involves various other aspects; for instance, face-to-face dialogue and shared 
                                                          
3
 The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2016; p.100) 
4
 For some authors, a collaborative approach should be viewed as a means to an end (e.g. IMPERIAL, 2005; 
WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, 2000); and valued on a basis that it yields better results compared to other 
approaches (IMPERIAL 2005, p. 311). 
5
 In the context where a collaborative approach is well established and extensively used (e.g. in the U.S.A), a 
call has been made for research to focus on its outcomes rather than its process (KOONTZ & THOMAS, 
2006). 
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decision making power (e.g. ANSELL & GASH, 2008; MOSTERT, 2006). Therefore, this 
study also investigates collaborative processes and participation taking place in the RBC. 
3) To examine the functions of the RBC and its outcomes. The RBC is envisioned to 
be a new mechanism for managing water resources, and charged with various mandates. It 
is thus imperative to study whether the RBC functions and delivers those outcomes. 
 
1.3 Research outcomes and contributions 
 
This study set out to examine the implementation process and outcomes of the RBC 
framework. The empirical results derived provide insights into the way by which the RBC 
framework was translated into practice and its effectiveness as a new mechanism for water 
resource management in the country. 
Regarding the implementation process, this study provides a comprehensive account on the 
actual arrangement of the RBC, i.e. the RBC structure and steps taken to form its 
governing bodies. This would help in a better understanding of how the RBC framework 
was interpreted and implemented in the Thai context (and for that matter, in the Thai 
administrative context); and, whether or how the non-public sector was included into the 
scheme. As this study looked into the management, collaborative processes and 
participation in the RBC setup, it exposed the extent to which the parties are involved, 
especially the non-public sector representatives, who played a role in this arrangement; 
and, its underlying factors.  
The outcomes generated by the RBC, as compared to its mandates, also are reported in this 
study. The result in this regard would help to shed some light on the effectiveness of the 
RBC in managing water resources. In addition, based on empirical results, this study offers 
policy recommendations for improving the RBC framework, with due consideration given 
to the Thai administrative context in which it is embedded. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is arranged into seven chapters that cover the study on the RBC framework 
outlined above. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 discusses concepts and issues on 
collaborative governance and river basin governance, and presents a brief overview of the 
Thai administrative system in order to provide theoretical and contextual backgrounds for 
this study. Chapter 3 then deals with a conceptual background and the research 
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methodology applied to collect and analyze data. It also explains the Ping RBC framework, 
which was used as an illustrative case in this research. 
Empirical results are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 is concerned with 
recent water policies in Thailand, and options for the RBC framework arrangement, as 
found in the water bill. This chapter also reports on water governance practices existing in 
the study area, and the roles of LGOs in this regard. In addition, it discusses in detail the 
RBC framework that was introduced in 2002, and the current one adopted in 2007. This 
part sets the scene for Chapter 5, where empirical evidence observed from the Ping RBC 
arrangement is presented, with reference to a theoretical background previously described 
in Chapter 2. Thus, Chapter 5 covers the issues of formation, management, collaborative 
processes and participation as well as functions and outcomes of the Ping RBC and its 
governing bodies. 
Chapter 6 provides discussion of the empirical results derived in relation to the Thai 
administrative system. This discussion offers an explanation as to why the Ping RBC 
arrangement ended with the result presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 7 draws a 
conclusion to the RBC framework examined, and suggests policy recommendations for 
future improvement of this framework 
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2. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 
 
The Thai government has initiated and implemented a collaborative effort for water 
governance for over a decade by establishing river basin committees. In theory, this 
exhibits a change from ‘government to governance’ (BOWORNWATHNA, 2001, p. 422), 
where both public agencies and organizations outside of the public sector are involved in 
conducting public work. Thus, this chapter reviews the concepts and issues concerning 
collaborative governance by drawing mainly from public administration discipline. As the 
collaborative effort in this study is concerned with the river basin committee, issues 
regarding river basin governance are also discussed. Furthermore, this chapter extends to 
include the topic of Thai administrative reform, which has significant implications for 
implementing the collaborative effort in question.  
 
2.1 Governance 
 
The term ‘governance’ has gained its currency over the past 30 years and appeared in 
various academic disciplines such as development studies, economics, international 
relations, political science, public administration, anthropology and geography (BEVIR, 
2011; CHHOTRY & STOKER, 2009; ROBICHAU, 2011). The governance concept, briefly 
reviewed in this section, is drawn from public administration discipline in order to illustrate 
the changing role of government in governing processes.  
According to BEVIR (2009), the contemporary usage of the term ‘governance’ can be 
distinguished into two meanings. The first one associates governance with notion of the 
changing role of the state by following the public sector reform of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Governance is then referred to as “any pattern of rule that arises either when the state is 
dependent upon others or the state plays little or no role” (p.3). In the other meaning, the 
term ‘governance’ simply refers to ‘all patterns of rule’ that existed before the public sector 
reform just mentioned (p.3). According to LYNN JR. (2010, p. 3), the term ‘governance’ in 
the second meaning is perceived as a generic term for ‘ordered rule’, in which governance 
refers to “how actors are organized and managed in order to accomplish purposes on 
which they agree or they have in common,” while the first meaning can be referred to as 
‘new governance’. This ‘new governance’ consists of ‘governance beyond government’ 
and/or ‘governance not government’ (LYNN JR., 2010, pp. 2-3; emphasis is original):
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  “Governance “beyond government”, meaning in addition to government, that is, 
governance as an emerging model of societal direction in which guidance of 
resource allocation and service delivery is provided by civil society institutions with 
or without the authorization and influence of government […] 
 Governance “not government”, meaning contexts wherein government is being or 
has been replaced by decentralized networks, partnerships, and markets (i.e., 
customer-driven governance) not subject to the imposed authority of government.” 
 
Indeed, a popular academic use of the term ‘governance’ generally refers to the concept of 
‘new governance’, as presented above (LYNN JR., 2010, p. 3). STOKER (1998, p. 17) is in 
line with this view when explaining that governance indicates a governing style where the 
boundaries ‘between and within public and private sectors' are no longer clear-cut, and “the 
essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse 
to the authority and sanctions of government.” The governing mechanisms have moved 
from the authority of government to rely more on markets and networks6. This has resulted 
from the promotion of markets and corporate management, and later networks or 
partnerships in the public sector reform movement since the 1980s (BEVIR, 2009). It is 
viewed that partnership and joined-up governance can promote social inclusion, civil 
society and efficiency (BEVIR, 2009).  
With a strong emphasis on networks or partnerships, one prominent definition of the term 
‘governance’ thus refers to “self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by 
interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the 
state” (RHODES, 1997, p. 15). This also is known as the ‘governance without government’ 
concept (RHODES, 1996; 1997). STOKER (1998, p. 23) states that governance networks not 
only influence government policy, but also take over ‘the business of government.’ From 
this point of view, government significantly loses its authority to govern, and government 
organizations only remain as members, with the same degree of dependency as others of 
the respective networks involved (PETERS & PIERRE, 1998). 
However, some scholars maintain that government still plays a major role in governing. 
PIERRE and PETERS (2000; 2005) stress that the most important role for government in 
governance is to provide a set of goals for governing, which seems to be difficult for both 
                                                          
6
 In other words, a mode of governance (LOWNDES & SKELCHER, 1998) or form of organizing (PROVAN & 
LEMAIRE, 2012), has shifted from hierarchy (the authority of government) to market and network. 
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the market and network. They explain further that apart from goal setting, the government 
also plays a role in other activities of governance, namely, coherence (to make the goals 
consistent and coordinated); steering (to find ways to achieve the goals); and accountability 
(means to hold those involved accountable for their actions). Of these four activities, it is 
argued that the market and network might only be able to perform steering better than the 
government (PIERRE & PETERS, 2005). In any case, however, the state, and by extension, 
the government and its agencies “are not at the mercy of non-state actors and can govern. 
They may not always govern alone, but they can govern” (PETERS & PIERRE, 2006, p. 214). 
Thus, from what BELL and HINDMOOR (2009, p. 2) refer to as a ‘state-centric relational’ 
perspective to governance, governance is defined simply as “the tools, strategies and 
relationships used by government to help govern.” 
 
2.2  Collaborative governance 
 
The term ‘collaboration’ has been used widely in public management. HUXHAM (2000, p. 
339) observed more than a decade ago that several terms were “used to describe 
governance structures that involve cross-organizational working,” such as ‘partnership’, 
‘collaboration’ and ‘network’. Recently, KOLIBA, MEEK, and ZIA (2011, p. 56) indicated 
that ‘network’ is a frequently used term for ‘interorganizational arrangements’, and for 
some scholars networks are similar to ‘collaborative arrangements’ or ‘partnerships’. In 
this study, the author follows HUXHAM’s suggestion that the terms ‘collaboration’ and 
‘collaborative governance’ “are taken to include all forms of, and labels for, governance 
that involves people in working relationships with those in other organizations” (HUXHAM 
2000, p. 339)7. As such, terms like ‘collaboration’ and ‘network’ are more or less viewed 
as the same here, in the sense that they all involve ‘cross-organizational working.’ 
Variations in scopes and approaches to collaborative governance exist in public 
management, which for example, refers to a policy making process where all relevant 
stakeholders participate in face-to-face discussion (BEVIR, 2009; see also VAN BUUREN & 
EDELENBOS, 2007), or a particular form of public-private collaboration where both public 
and private partners possess a degree of discretion (DONAHUE & ZECKHAUSER, 2006). 
BINGHAM (2011, pp. 387-388) provides a recent account on collaborative governance, 
suggesting that it includes four aspects:  
                                                          
7
 The term ‘collaborative governance’ has also been used in the field of business administration, for example 
by RASCHE (2010).  
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1) ‘Collaboration with the broadest definition of partners within and outside 
government’, for example national, regional and local government agencies, non-
profit organizations, and businesses.  
2) ‘Collaboration across the broadest scope of government work in the policy 
process,’ including establishing laws and rules as well as managing and 
implementing them.  
3) Collaboration “through any method, model, or process that is deliberative and 
consensual as distinguished from adversarial or adjudicative” (p. 387), e.g. 
dialogue, collaborative public management, and consensual-building.  
4) Collaboration can be done both ‘in-person’ and online.  
 
According to BINGHAM (2011, pp. 387-388), collaborative governance “may occur at any 
stage of the policy process” defined as “any action in developing, implementing, or 
enforcing policy.” To view collaborative governance along the policy process, BINGHAM 
(2011, p. 388) suggests a metaphor of the flowing stream, where a policy is developed 
‘through more legislative or quasi-legislative activity’ upstream, while ‘implementing, 
managing, and evaluating policy’ in midstream, and ‘enforcing policy through quasi-
juridical or juridical action’ downstream. There are also different types of collaboration 
and participants involved in different parts of the flowing stream: ‘dialogue and 
deliberation’ with broad public participation are pursued upstream; ‘collaborative public 
management and public policy dispute resolution’ may occur in midstream with ‘targeted 
stakeholder groups’; and downstream, ‘conflict resolution’ is involved with ‘fewer 
participants’, who normally have “a legally cognizable stake in the outcome and shared 
decision-making authority” (BINGHAM, 2011, p. 388). 
Taking into account the nature of the collaborative water governance effort in this study 
(see Section 2.3 and Chapter 4.4), it can be placed in the midstream of BINGHAM (2011)’s 
policy process, as it is concerned with implementation of the collaborative effort. 
Regarding the collaboration types, the collaborative effort concerned can be seen to 
involve ‘collaborative public management’ rather than ‘public policy dispute resolution’, 
which may as well take place in the midstream. This is because the implementation of this 
effort has focused so far on forming collaboration in the form of the river basin committee, 
where a ‘public policy dispute resolution process’ has not played a role as yet. 
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2.2.1 Collaborative public management 
 
Generally, collaborative public management or network governance can be viewed as 
‘collaboration with and among organizations’ in contrast to public participation, public 
involvement, and civic engagement, which is perceived as ‘collaboration with the public’ 
(BINGHAM, 2011, p. 387). 
According to BINGHAM, O’LEARY, and CARLSON (2008, p. 3), collaborative public 
management is defined as “a concept that describes the process of facilitating and 
operating in multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or 
easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common 
goals, often working across boundaries and in multisector and multiactor relationships. 
Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity.” In addition, the authors also emphasize 
that ‘the role of the public and citizens’ must be included into this process as well 
(BINGHAM et al., 2008, p. 3).  
There are variations in collaboration ascribed under collaborative public management; for 
example, collaboration within or across organizations, collaboration within and across 
sectors, and mandated, emergent or voluntary collaboration (BINGHAM, 2011). Various 
terms, such as cross-sector collaborations, collaborative networks and organizational 
networks, are also attributed to collaborative public management. Several issues attached 
to it have been a focus of studies, for instance, a process of collaboration, legitimacy, 
management or coordination, network control, and performance (e.g. ANSELL & GASH, 
2008; BRYSON & CROSSBY, 2008; HERRANZ JR., 2008, 2010a, 2010b; KENIS & PROVAN, 
2006, 2009; MCGUIRE, 2011; PROVAN & KENIS, 2008; PROVAN & MILWARD, 2001; 
PROVAN, KENIS, & HUMAN, 2008; THOMPSON & PERRY, 2006; THOMPSON, PERRY, & 
MILLER, 2006, 2009). In the following section, three issues relating to collaborative public 
management, i.e. a collaborative process and its management as well as legal infrastructure 
for collaboration, are explored to help in understanding the collaborative effort for the 
water governance under study. 
 
2.2.2 A process of collaboration 
AGRANOFF (2006, p. 56) states that “it is time to go beyond heralding the importance of 
networks as a form of collaborative public management and look inside their operations.” 
Indeed, scholars have developed models to understand the process of collaboration better. 
THOMPSON and PERRY (2006) attempt to look into ‘the black box’ of collaboration 
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processes by developing a multidimensional model consisting of five dimensions, from 
which the authors suggest, “public managers must know these five dimensions and manage 
them intentionally in order to collaborate effectively” (p. 21). These five dimensions 
include: 1) the governance dimension, involving joint decision making processes on the 
rules and structure governing behavior, and relationships of partners and their collaborative 
activities and goals; 2) the administration dimension, involving administrative structures 
‘to move from governance to action’ (p. 25); 3) the autonomy dimension, indicating the 
tension between the interest of individual partners and that of the collaborations; 4) the 
mutuality dimension, suggesting mutual benefits rooted in interdependence and shared by 
the partners; and 5) the trust and reciprocity dimension, involving reciprocal exchanges and 
trust among the partners.  
An empirical test of this model proves that the five dimensions are useful in measuring 
collaboration (THOMPSON et al., 2009). Certain indicators associated with each dimension 
also provide insights that are useful for collaboration in practice; for example, ‘clarity of 
roles and responsibilities’, ‘effective collaboration meetings’, ‘goal clarity’, and ‘well-
coordinated tasks’, which are valued in terms of ‘the structural elements of 
implementation’ under the administration dimension (THOMPSON et al., 2009, p. 42). Also, 
the study indicates that in the autonomy dimension, higher tension faced by the partners 
regarding their own interest and that of the collaborations will hinder collaboration 
(THOMPSON et al., 2009, p. 43). 
Based on review of the case studies of collaborative governance, ANSELL and GASH (2008) 
also propose a collaborative governance model8, which puts the collaborative process at the 
core, with starting conditions [e.g. power/resource imbalance and prehistory of antagonism 
and cooperation], institutional design [e.g. access to collaboration and its exclusiveness], 
and leadership considered as either ‘critical contribution to or context for the collaborative 
process’. According to the authors, the collaborative process is cyclical or iterative, and 
involves five factors: 1) face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders, 2) trust building, 3) 
commitment to the process associated with trust among stakeholders and confidence in ‘the 
procedure of deliberation and negotiation’, a sense of ‘ownership of the process’, and 
                                                          
8
 Although the authors use the term ‘collaborative governance’, their explanation about the term makes clear 
that it can be considered as ‘collaborative public management’ following BINGHAM (2011, p. 387), 
especially when they state that ‘public policies and issues’ are the focus of collaborative governance, 
thereby distinguishing it from ‘dispute resolution or mediation’ which concerns ‘strictly private conflicts’ 
(ANSELL & GASH, 2008, p. 547).     
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interdependence, 4) shared understanding, regarding what can be achieved collectively, 
and agreements on ‘a definition of the problem’, or on knowledge required to solve 
problems, and 5) immediate outcomes gained from collaboration; also referred to as 
‘small-win’, e.g. joint fact finding (ANSELL & GASH, 2008, pp. 557-561). 
Models of collaborative processes, as presented above, are a useful guide for understanding 
the elements or factors that influence a process of collaboration in general. However, there 
are at least two issues that should be noted when considering collaboration in the public 
sector, as implied by RODRÍGUEZ, LANGLEY, BÉLAND, and DENIS (2007): collaboration is 
not always voluntary or emergent9, and a mode of governance in this arrangement is not 
only confined to network, but also hierachy and market.       
HERRANZ JR. (2009, p. 371) observes that the development of public networks are often 
viewed as based on ‘the internal self-organizing logic of network members’, i.e. voluntary 
collaboration, which is influenced partly by ‘studies of business partnerships and strategic 
alliances’. However, the author explains further that “[…] unlike for-profit networks, 
public networks are often characterized by additional legal, procedural, and political 
accountability relationships that constrain a public network’s capacity to flexibly form, 
expand, contract, or disband” (HERRANZ JR., 2009, p. 371). SPAN, LUIJKX, SCHOLS, and 
SCHALK (2012) also point out that local public networks are predominantly mandated, 
where participating organizations are either dependent on financial resources provided by 
the local government, or forced by laws to participate in its networks. 
Following RODRÍGUEZ et al. (2007, pp. 152; 157-158), in a situation where collaboration is 
mandated, i.e. “collaboration is imposed on separate organizations by a third party”, not 
only the clan-based mechanism (i.e. a network mode of governance), but also the 
bureaucratic or hierarchical and market-based mechanisms (i.e. hierarchy and market 
modes of governance, respectively) are needed, as the former can, for example, ‘bring 
partners to the table and establish rules of engagement’, and in the case of the latter, 
incentives may create ‘a perception of interdependence’. Indeed, LOWNDES and SKELCHER 
(1998) found that all three modes of governance (hierarchy, market, and network) were 
employed in UK urban regeneration partnerships, but at different stages of their life cycle. 
For example, a network mode of governance was used during the pre-partnership 
collaboration (‘networking between individuals/organizations’), while a hierarchy mode of 
                                                          
9
 O’TOOL JR. (2010) also makes a similar observation. 
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governance was employed during the creation and consolidation of the partnership (e.g. 
‘formalization of authority in the partnership board and associated staff’) (LOWNDES & 
SKELCHER, 1998, p. 321).             
Insights provided by AGRANOFF (2006) about public management networks comprising 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations (both for-profit and nonprofit) shed 
some light on the reality of collaborative public management at work. For one thing, public 
managers still work ‘within the hierarchy’ and their work is “largely business as usual 
most of the time, dealing with internal POSDCORB10 matters, along with increasing 
collaborative pressures” (p. 58). The author also indicates that networks do not seem to 
replace ‘public bureaucracies’ (see also O’TOOL JR., 2010). Two caveats given by partners 
involved in the networks clearly support this point: 1) public institutions mostly make ‘the 
ultimate call’ regarding policy decisions, and they are also the ones implementing these 
policies, and 2) it is public officers who are ‘the core or among the core actors in the 
networks’, and “are able to inject legislative, regulatory, and financial considerations 
right into the network mix, which hardly marginalizes them” (AGRANOFF, 2006, p. 62).  
 
2.2.3 Management of collaborative networks 
 
According MCGUIRE (2011, p. 441), network management refers to “the strategic activity 
meant to influence the interaction of the nodes (actors). The purposes of the interactions 
may include achieving the goals of the individual actors (and their ‘home’ organizations) 
while simultaneously achieving network-level results.” Different management tasks 
required for network managers have been suggested by various scholars. For example, 
MILWARD and PROVAN (2006) indicate that accountability, legitimacy, conflict, design 
(governance structure), and commitment are the areas that need to be addressed by 
managers of and in the network (‘individuals who represent their organizations within the 
network’) (p.18). Specific managerial roles such as ‘identifying possible partners’, 
‘bringing stakeholders to table’, and ‘analyzing current operations’ also have been 
recommended (GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, 2004 cited in HERRANZ JR., 2008, p. 6). However, 
the network governance structure outlined by PROVAN and KENIS (2008), indicates 
‘management of networks themselves’, and deems it useful to inform the collaborative 
water governance effort under study in terms of governance form laid out in relevant 
                                                          
10
 POSDCORB stands for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. 
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regulations (Section 4.4) and water bills (Section 4.2), as well as the actual governance 
form implemented at the ground level (Section 5.2). 
Focusing at the network level or whole network perspective, PROVAN and KENIS (2008) 
propose three forms of network governance, based on whether they are brokered and 
‘participant governed’ or ‘externally governed’. These three forms are (PROVAN & KENIS, 
2008, pp. 233-236):  
1) Participant-governed network, with no broker, as all participating organizations 
take part ‘to govern the network’. It is ‘a dense and highly decentralized form’ and 
thus ‘participant-governed’.  
2) Lead organization-governed network, with one participating organization that 
takes a leading role. Thus, this form is ‘highly centralized and brokered’, but it is 
still considered as ‘participant-governed’.  
3) Network administrative organization (NAO), with ‘a separate administrative 
entity’ [i.e. NAO] established to govern the network and its activities. This form is 
‘centralized’ and brokered by an NAO that is not a member of a given network, 
which makes it ‘externally governed’. 
 
As described by PROVAN and KENIS (2008), different forms of network governance entail 
varied management tasks. For the participant-governed networks, participating 
organizations take part in all decisions and network activities in a given network, and their 
power in the network is relatively symmetrical regarding ‘network level-decisions’. In 
contrast, a lead organization in lead organization-governed networks plays a central role in 
coordinating ‘all major network-level activities and key decisions’ in a given network, 
suggesting ‘asymmetrical power’. It also performs tasks regarding administration and 
facilitation of the network as well as those concerning its costs and funds. For the NAO 
model, the tasks to govern the network are pertained to a NAO as described above. 
However, the authors explain that a NAO can be simply a single individual or formal 
organization, which can take the form of a nonprofit or for-profit government entity. When 
an NAO is in the form of a formal organization, a board structure is normally applied and 
represented by ‘all or a subset of network members’. In this setup, the board is responsible 
for ‘strategic-level network concerns’, while the NAO leader deals with ‘operational 
decisions’. 
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According to PROVAN and KENIS (2008), there are four ‘critical contingencies’ underlying 
whether the three forms of network governance are to be effective. These critical 
contingencies include trust, number of network participants, network goal consensus, and 
need for network level competencies. From a network level perspective, the authors 
explain that an issue about trust in this context concerns ‘the distribution of trust’ and the 
mutuality among network members. In this regard, adopting a particular form of network 
governance based on ‘a general level of trust density’ in the whole network has been 
suggested. High density of trust relations refers to a situation where trust is ‘widely 
distributed across members’, while low density of trust relations refers to circumstances in 
which trust is ‘only narrowly distributed, [with this] occurring differentially within 
individual dyads or cliques’ (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008, p. 238). Thus, the participant-
governed form is generally suitable for networks with high density of trust, while the lead 
organization-governed form is appropriate for those with low density of trust, and the NAO 
form is for situations with moderate density of trust. 
PROVAN and KENIS (2008, p. 238) stress that “a fundamental problem with governance of 
any network is that the needs and activities of multiple organizations must be 
accommodated and coordinated.” As such, numbers of network participants also play a 
role in determining effectiveness of the network governance form adopted. In this regard, 
the participant-governed form is recommended as suitable for networks with small 
numbers of participants because ‘full and active face-to-face participation by partners’ can 
still be organized to solve problems. The authors point out that large numbers of 
participants make coordination difficult; thus, the lead organization-governed or NAO 
form is more effective in this situation, “since the direct involvement of all organizations is 
no longer required for many network decisions” (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008, p. 238), and the 
NAO form seems more suitable for networks with the largest number of participants due to 
‘its own unique administrative structure’.  
PROVAN and KENIS (2008, p. 240) recommend that the participant-governed form is 
appropriate for networks in which members have high network goal consensus, while in 
those networks where members have ‘moderately low [network] goal consensus’, the lead 
organization-governed form can govern effectively, and the lead organization can maintain 
‘a broad, network-level focus’, albeit only in the short term. The NAO form is more 
suitable for networks where the members have a ‘moderately high range [of network goal 
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consensus]’, as this form still requires involvement from some network members (normally 
NAO governing board members as indicated by the authors) to be effective.  
The last contingency, which underlies effectiveness of the network governance form, is the 
need for network-level competencies. Following PROVAN and KENIS (2008), this aspect 
concerns the tasks, and external demands and needs of the network. For the former, the 
participant-governed form is less suitable if ‘interdependent task requirements’ of the 
network are high because the network members may lack skills for the tasks (e.g. ‘grant 
writing’ or ‘conflict resolution’), while the lead organization-governed and NAO form can 
address this issue. For the latter, these two governance forms are also more appropriate 
than the participant-governed form in dealing with external demands and needs, for 
instance, managing ‘environmental shocks’ involving ‘shifts in funding’ or ‘new 
regulations’. However, the authors indicate that the lead organization, in the lead 
organization-governed form, may not have, or be willing to develop, the skills needed, 
while ‘network-level staff’ in the NAO form have to develop skills for ‘network-level 
action’.    
 
2.2.4 Legal infrastructure for collaboration 
 
From the amount of literature on collaboration and collaborative governance, it is clear that 
progress has been made on various fronts. For example, models for collaboration as well as 
tasks and recommendations for practitioners have been detailed by scholars, as discussed 
above. However, the legal framework underlying the involvement of public agencies in a 
given collaboration has been virtually omitted by public management scholars when 
looking at the collaborative endeavor, which is ‘legal infrastructure’ for collaboration (e.g. 
BINGHAM, 2008).  
As previously discussed, collaborations or networks in the public sector are not always 
voluntary; instead, they are mandated largely by laws (O’TOOL JR., 2010; RODRÍGUEZ et 
al., 2007; SPAN et al., 2012). Apparently, the role of government regarding collaboration or 
networks is “to force, or at least press toward, networked forms of administrative action” 
(O’TOOL JR., 2010, p. 8).   
Based on the US administrative context, BINGHAM (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011) 
argues that a lack of legal infrastructure still exists, where ‘legal infrastructure’ is defined 
as “a combined system of constitutional, statutory, decisional, and administrative law, 
taken together with the available institutional enforcement and support mechanisms” 
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(2011, p. 398) - to accommodate emerging collaborative governance. According to the 
author, the existing legal infrastructure (i.e. key federal and state statutes) is designed 
largely for ‘unilateral, command-and-control, hierarchical, and individual agency action’, 
while issues such as ‘the structure of collaborative public management’ or ‘models for 
collaborative governance in agency policymaking’ are not addressed (BINGHAM, 2011). 
It should be noted that law for public administration is very essential because it 
“empower(s) authorities to do things which would otherwise be unlawful” (FELDMAN, 
2012, p. 347). Furthermore, ‘implementing laws’ is the principal role of public 
administration (PETERS & PIERRE, 2012; ZILLER, 2012). As ZILLER (2012, p. 326) explains, 
most public agency decisions concerning public policy implementation have ‘legally 
binding consequences’; thus, law is needed as ‘a tool’ for ‘policy making and 
implementation’ by following the Rechtsstaat and legality principle. Also, as an 
administrator11, a public agency must follow administrative law strictly - “the body of 
regulatory law that generically regulate public administration” (ROSENBLOOM & 
O’LEARY, 1997, p. 51), such as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (USA) and the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1996 (Thailand). It must also observe subordinate 
legislation (e.g. royal decrees and ministerial regulations) relating to its operations; for 
example, the Ministry of Finance’s Regulation on Official Trip Allowance of 2007 
(Thailand)12.  
Thus, collaborative governance as a public policy needs both specific laws (e.g. water law) 
to sanction a public agency concerned about its effective implementation, and legal 
elements from administrative law to facilitate such implementation. To readdress a lack of 
legal infrastructure for collaborative governance, BINGHAM (2011, p. 398) suggests that 
“public law [administrative law included] needs to provide a framework that authorizes 
collaboration, facilitates broader and more effect use, and preserve accountability to the 
rule of law and transparency in government.”      
                                                          
11
 Administrators in the Thai administrative system include, for example, public agencies and their personnel 
under the central, provincial, and local administration (PAKEERUT, 2011; see Figure 2.1).     
12
 CHRISTENSEN, GOERDEL, and NICHOLSON-CROTTY (2011, p. i125) observe that tension between ‘a 
legalistic approach’ and ‘a managerialistic approach’ to public administration has always existed, where the 
former relies on “law-based priorities and processes to balance discretion/innovation and accountability,” 
and the latter on “innovation and efficiency to do the same.” However, PETERS and PIERRE (2012, p. 8) 
argue that public organizations are meant for ‘a uniform and unbiased implementation of law’, not 
maximization of ‘efficiency, flexibility, and customer friendliness’. They also point out that the critique on 
‘rigidity and inertia’ in public organizations, albeit with justification, considers only ‘the service producing 
side’ of modern bureaucracy, while neglecting its other side – ‘the exercise and implementation of law’.  
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BINGHAM (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011) puts forth arguments on legal infrastructure 
for collaboration, and despite being based on the US administrative context, they are 
relevant as a starting point in understanding the legal infrastructure in general for 
collaboration in the Thai administrative context and that in particular for regulating the 
collaborative water governance effort directly.  
There has been much discussion in Thailand about how the 1997 Constitution paved the 
way for public participation in various aspects of governmental work, including natural 
resource management. For example, TAN-KIM-YONG, BRUNS, and BRUNS (2005, p. 227) 
state that “Thailand’s 1997 Constitution mandated that communities be involved in 
managing local natural resources.” This quote is based on Section 46 of the 1997 
Constitution, which ends, however, stating, “Persons so assembling as to be a traditional 
community shall have the right to conserve […] and to participate in the management, 
maintenance, preservation and exploitation of natural resources and the environment in a 
balanced fashion and persistently as provided by law” (emphasis added). The implication 
for the last words, ‘as provided by law’, is a law must exist to sanction the involvement of 
local communities ‘in managing local natural resources’13. There had been no such a law, 
however, until the 1997 Constitution was abolished by the coup in September 2006. 
Indeed, it took a long time to promulgate laws following the provisions stipulated in the 
1997 Constitution (BORROMMANAN, 2006)14.  
The topic of legal framework also has been discussed in connection to water governance, 
but with different emphases. TARLOCK (2004, p. 120) claims “national water codes are the 
cornerstones of sustainable water use.” Similarly, FISHER (2009, p. 1) explains that “in the 
absence of appropriate and effective legal arrangements, the sustainable use and 
development of water resources are unlikely to be achieved.” SALETH and DINAR (2005 
citing SALETH & DINAR, 2004), include water law as one of three components in the water 
institutional structure they propose. ALLAN and RIEU-CLARKE (2010) indicate how law can 
play an important role in ensuring accountability, transparency and participation, which are 
the three key characteristics of good governance for integrated water resources 
management (IWRM). KUMNERDPET and SINCLAIR (2011) also note that legal support 
                                                          
13
 cf. in the case of the public consultation law, its text has similar wording to that argued by BORROMMANAN 
(2006). 
14
 The same situation was repeated regarding the promulgations of laws in pursuant to the 2007 Constitution, 
when the law for establishing the Legal Reform Commission was passed in 2010, and the constitution itself 
was repealed and replaced by the interim constitution in July 2014.  
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(policies and legislation) is identified as one of the critical factors contributing to good 
outcomes for participatory irrigation management (PIM). In addition, legal framework is 
recommended as a possible solution in water resource governance. For example, 
BANDARAGODA and BABEL (2010, p. 223) suggest that ‘a clear water policy and related 
water laws’ are needed for a collaborative arrangement involving IWRM. According to 
LAUTZE, DE SILVA, GIORDANO, and SANFORD (2011, p. 7), rule of law can be viewed as a 
characteristic of ‘good water governance qualities’ together with others such as openness 
and transparency.  
A legal framework underlying the collaborative water governance effort in Thailand (i.e. 
the river basin committee) has not been explored, particularly from the view of legal 
infrastructure. Indeed, a Thai legal system is complex, and an overview is lost easily when 
various types of laws and regulations intersect. For example, a representative of the river 
basin organization (RBO) gave an opinion on the water bill yet to be passed, as follows, 
“We don’t need the Water Law. We already have the authority through local government 
representatives,” and based on this opinion, LEBEL, GARDEN, SUBSIN, and NA NAN (2009, 
p. 146) state that “the impacts of policy inertia in the Upper Ping15 were modest.” An RBO 
as an entity really needs a comprehensive legal framework to authorize its existence and 
functions (see ZILLER (2012) as discussed above). Also, the authority of local government 
representatives is sanctioned by the local government laws concerned and restricted to the 
jurisdiction of a given local government organization. Furthermore, this authority cannot 
be enforced upon other public agencies that are represented in the RBO because they are 
regulated by other sets of laws and regulations. Thus, ‘policy inertia’ not only impacts on 
the RBO mentioned in the Upper Ping, but also RBOs located nationwide, as they are 
currently regulated by the same legal framework (see Section 4.4).  
A seemingly straightforward issue regarding the current state of water bills has also been 
confused. As presented above, LEBEL et al. (2009) report that as of mid-2009, a water bill 
had not been passed. However, according to UNGER and SIROROS (2011), it was passed on 
December 20, 2007, but later overturned by the Constitutional Court. KUMNERDPET and 
SINCLAIR (2011, p. 283) explain that a water bill for 2010 is still in ‘the process of 
enactment by Parliament’. In fact, these two authors probably refer to water bills submitted 
by some members of the House of Representatives (OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, 
2010; GUNJANAPHURK, n.d.), but they were only in the initial process of submission (a 
                                                          
15
 The Upper Ping is part of the Ping River Basin, and also the study area of this study, see Section 3.2 
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normal practice in the legislative branch), and not in ‘the process of enactment’ involving 
Parliament (the House of Representatives and Senate). Furthermore, the National 
Legislative Assembly (NLA) did not pass the water bill, as indicated by UNGER and 
SIROROS (2011), only agreed to adjourn its reading until the next NLA meeting, in which it 
still was not passed.  
Collaborative governance in public management has gained increased currency in how 
various government agencies conduct their public work. Discussions presented above 
suggest different views regarding collaborative governance, as put into practice by public 
agencies. In a way they reflect a broader, ongoing debate as to whether governments and 
their agencies have lost a central role in governing to society or non-public sector (e.g. 
ROBICHAU, 2011), which would be a move from government to governance. From the 
literature, it is probably safe to state that in general, governments and their agencies still 
play a role in implementing public work, albeit a changing role. This insight helps as a 
reminder that in order to understand the collaboration efforts better between public 
agencies and the non-public sector, further understanding also is needed about the nature of 
these agencies, as regulated by the legal infrastructure, which may or may not facilitate 
collaboration (BINGHAM 2008, 2011). 
 
2.3 Collaborative governance in the water sector 
 
Collaborative governance, as discussed above, entails the involvement of public agencies 
and organizations from the non-public sector in implementing public work. In the water 
sector, collaborative governance also has been applied where the public agencies 
responsible increasingly involve those representing the non-public sector in managing 
water sources. Thus, this section explores collaborative governance as applied in the water 
sector.  
 
2.3.1 Collaborative water governance 
 
According to BAKKER and COHEN (2011, p. 7), collaborative water governance broadly 
refers to “the involvement of non-state actors in decision making for water management.” 
The authors explain that this is based on two key principles of stakeholder involvement and 
shared decision-making power, instead of decisions being made by one stakeholder (i.e. 
government). Collaborative water governance may entail the following aspects (BAKKER 
and COHEN (2011, p. 7): 
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 “the devolution of decision-making to lower scales of governance such as the 
watershed, municipality, or region; 
 participation of a wide variety of non-state actors; 
 the use of hydrographic boundary, such as the watershed, rather than political 
boundaries; 
 collaborative decision-making processes, often emphasizing consensus and trust-
building; 
 evidence-based decision-making, often requiring extensive fact-finding.” 
 
Based on the delegation of decision-making power (minimal delegation to significant 
delegation) and participation (single stakeholder, usually government to multiple 
stakeholders, including non-governmental ones), BAKKER and COHEN (2011) suggest four 
approaches to collaborative water governance. These include traditional, multi-level, 
consultative and delegated governance. A brief description of these approaches is provided 
in Box 2.1, which indicates that the last two approaches lean more towards the involvement 
of non-state actors.  
 
Box 2.1 Approaches to collaborative water governance 
Traditional governance 
- Single stakeholder (usually government) controls decision-making; 
- Limited participation of non-state actors 
Multi-level governance 
- Distribution of decision-making between state actors; 
- Limited participation of non-state actors 
Consultative governance 
- Single stakeholder (usually government) controls decision-making; 
- Extensive participation of non-state actors 
Delegated governance 
- Significant delegation of decision-making to multiple stakeholders; 
- Including non-state actors 
Source: Adapted from BAKKER and COHEN (2011, p. 8; Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 23 
Collaborative water governance is also referred to by NOWLAN and BAKKER (2007, p. 19) 
as ‘delegated water governance partnerships’, which cover largely consultative and 
delegated governance approaches (Box 2.1). Water governance partnerships are seen to 
occur in four different types, based on two key characteristics: duration (short vs. long 
term) and decision-making power (advisory vs. authoritative) (NOWLAN & BAKKER, 2007). 
These four types include: collaborative engagement processes (short-term, advisory), 
collaborative watershed partnerships (long-term, advisory), collaborative panels (short-
term, authoritative), and collaborative agencies (long-term, authoritative). Description of 
each type of deregulated water governance partnership is shown in Box 2.2. 
 
Box 2.2 Types of delegated water governance partnerships 
Collaborative engagement process (short-term, advisory) 
- Employ techniques for conflict resolution among diverse stakeholders, e.g. collaborative learning 
and conflict resolution and mediation 
- Consist of project-specific planning exercises of relatively limited duration 
Collaborative watershed partnerships (long-term, advisory) 
- Involve a range of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders over a relatively long period  
- Provide a forum for information sharing and discussion and negotiation of management actions; 
formal government agencies retain decision-making power 
- Intend to complement (and perhaps transform) rather than replace traditional governmental 
activity 
Collaborative panels (short-term, authoritative) 
- Usually short-term (one to two years) 
- Expert-dominated, problem-focused governmental initiatives, intended to supply specific inputs to 
policy reform 
- Characterized by more limited consultation than other types 
Collaborative agencies (long-term, authoritative) 
- Formalized bodies with implementation power for water management decisions; autonomous and 
in need of large budgets 
- A range of governmental and private stakeholder groups are represented typically 
Source: Rearranged based on NOWLAN and BAKKER (2007, p. 19) 
 
Collaborative water governance, as presented above, helps to illustrate how the concept of 
collaborative governance is applied in the water sector, and how it is operationalized as 
expressed in different types of collaborative efforts (Box 2.2). Collaborative water 
governance came into play in the Thai context when the government formally introduced 
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the concept of river basin management in 200216 by promulgating the Office of the Prime 
Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management (No.2) of 200217. A 
similar framework regarding collaborative water governance is provided also by the Office 
of the Prime Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management of 2007, 
which replaced the 2002 Regulation (see Section 4.4). 
 
2.3.2 River basin governance 
 
As collaborative water governance in Thailand is operationalized in the form of a river 
basin committee, viewing it from a river basin governance perspective would help in 
understanding the collaborative effort under study better. So far, this review has only 
emphasized collaborative governance or ‘public governance perspective’ (BRESSERS & 
KUKS 2004, pp. 2-3). Thus, this section discusses concepts and issues concerning river 
basin governance.   
 
2.3.2.1 Integrated river basin management 
According to HOOPER (2005), integrated river basin management (IRBM) is an application 
of integrated water resources management (IWRM) on the river basin scale. Based on this 
author, IRBM is defined as “an integrated and coordinated approach to the planning and 
management of natural resources of a river basin, one that encourages stakeholders to 
consider a wide array of social and environmental interconnections, in a 
catchment/watershed context” (HOOPER, 2005, p. 9). 
While the IRBM definition of HOOPER (2005) focuses on ‘natural resources of a river 
basin’, other scholars emphasize explicitly on managing water resources in respective river 
basins. For example, JASPERS (2003, p. 79) proposes that IRBM be referred to as, “the 
management of all surface and subsurface water resources of the river basin in its entirety 
with due attention to water quality, water quantity and environmental integrity. A 
participatory approach is followed, focusing on the integration of natural limitations with 
all social, economic, and environmental interests.” MOSTERT et al. (2000, p. 27) simply 
                                                          
16
 The current movement regarding river basin governance in Thailand, as implemented by the DWR, was 
induced by the Asian Development Bank as part of the Agriculture Sector Program Loan (ASPL) provided 
to the country in 1999. ASPL was canceled, however, by request of the Thai government on May 2, 2002, 
with the undisbursed loan amount of 150 million $US, from the original allocation of 300 million $US 
(OTSUKA, 2003). 
17
 It was effective on August 22, 2002. 
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define river basin management (RBM) as, “the management of water systems as part of the 
broader natural environment and in relation to their socio-economic environment.” 
SVENDSEN, WESTER, and MOLLE (2005, p. 3) point out that ‘a key element’ of IWRM and 
RBM is “that planning and management units almost always cut across other divisions 
more traditionally used to manage resources, such as sectors, provinces or even nations 
…”. The authors also explain that apart from a common understanding of ‘integration 
across use sectors’, the term ‘integrated’ can be extended to cover other divisions 
including, for example, administrative jurisdictions, upstream and downstream reaches, 
land and water use, and trans-boundary use (SVENDSEN et al., 2005, p. 3).  
According to HOOPER (2005, pp. 13-14), ‘the expert group’ advocates that IRBM should 
have five elements: basin-wide planning, participation in decision making, demand 
management, compliance, and human and financial capacities. Descriptions for each 
element are provided in Box 2.3.  
 
Box 2.3 Elements of integrated river basin management 
1. Basin-wide planning. Basin-wide planning should balance all user needs for water resources, in 
the present and long-term, and should incorporate spatial developments. Vital human and 
ecosystem needs have to be given special attention.  
2. Participation in decision making. Local empowerment and public and stakeholder participation 
in decision-making will strengthen river basin management. 
3. Demand management. Demand management has to be part of sustainable water management. 
Managing the demand for water rather than continual expansion of water supplies is more likely 
to achieve sustainable use. 
4. Compliance. Compliance monitoring and assessment of commitments under river basin 
agreements and arrangements need to be developed.  
5. Human and financial capacities. Long-term development of sufficient human and financial 
capacity is a necessity. 
Source: ANONYMOUS (1999, cited in HOOPER 2005, p. 14) 
 
2.3.2.2 River basin organizations: functions, forms and governance 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) defines river basin organizations (RBOs) as, “specialised 
organizations set up by political authorities, or in response to stakeholder demands. RBOs 
deal with the water management issues in a river basin, a lake, or across an important 
aquifer.”18 According to GWP, RBOs perform various functions, e.g. water allocation, 
                                                          
18
 Tool B1.04 River basin organisations (the web-based IWRM toolbox: www.gwptoolbox.org)    
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resource management, consensus building, facilitation and conflict management
19
. 
Similarly, HOOPER (2005) indicates ‘an array of functions’ for RBOs such as regional 
natural resource management planning; coordination mechanisms; social assessment, 
social impact assessment and public involvement; natural resource and regional economy 
inventory; legislative instruments and policy review; decision support infrastructure; and 
information management system infrastructure.  
From a two-layer RBO perspective (river basin and sub-basin organizations), JASPERS 
(2003) explains that RBO activities can be viewed as ‘collective choice functions’ at the 
river basin level, while those carried out by sub-basin organizations at the sub-river basin 
level could be seen as ‘operational functions’. Functions that may be performed by both 
RBOs and their sub-basin organizations are given in Box 2.4. The author stresses further 
that the regulations and by-laws closely related to these functions should cover the 
following aspects of water governance: water resource planning; allocation and registration 
of water rights; tariff structures and fee collection; fund development and application; 
monitoring arrangements; penalties and sanctions; conflict resolution and appeal 
procedures (JASPERS, 2003). In a way, it can be seen that a comprehensive ‘legal 
infrastructure’ is needed to regulate and sanction the aspects mentioned (cf. Section 2.2 - 
Legal infrastructure for collaboration). 
RBOs exist in various forms. For example, HOOPER (2005) suggests nine types of RBOs 
such as an advisory committee with action planning function; a commission “delegated to 
consider natural resources management matters and/or take action on those matters” 
(p.30); or, a tribunal with ‘formalised procedures and quasi-judicial powers’ that can act as 
a special court on water issues. MOLLE et al. (2007) propose four broad types of RBOs: 
basin authorities, basin commissions or committees, coordinating councils, and 
international river commissions (cf. Box 2.2). Descriptions for each type of RBO are 
provided in Box 2.5. 
Following MOLLE et al. (2007, pp. 611-612), there are four models of basin governance or 
institutional arrangements based on whether they are ‘state-driven’ or ‘stakeholder-driven’; 
and if they are based on ‘centralized’ or ‘decentralized’ mode. These models include a 
unicentric model (state-driven, decentralized), deconcentrated model (state-driven, 
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decentralized), coordination model (stakeholder-driven, centralized) and polycentric model 
(stakeholder-driven, decentralized) (cf. Box 2.1). 
 
Box 2.4 Functions performed by river basin organizations (RBOs) and sub-basin 
organizations (SBOs) 
RBO functions SBO functions 
1. Developing a strategic river basin plan 1. Co-developing a strategic sub-basin plan 
2. Developing an operational river basin plan 2. Co-developing an operational sub-basin 
plan 
3. Contributing to river basin protection 
plans/measures 
3. Contributing to sub-basin protection 
plans/measures 
4. Allocating water rights or a water permit 4. Advising on water/discharge permits 
5. Allocating an effluent discharge permit 5. Monitoring and enforcing drainage 
responsibilities  
6. Allocating drainage permits or drainage 
responsibilities 
6. Monitoring water abstractions, water 
pollution 
7. Coordinating between sub-basins 7.Monitoring drainage processes 
8. Collecting water charges 8. Enforcing water rights, discharge permits 
9. Organizing fund administration and 
development 
9. Enforcing drainage responsibilities 
10. Implementing an appeal function (first layer) 10. Enforcing legal action against defaulters 
11. Creating awareness, and capacity building 11. Resolving the first layer of conflict 
 12. Collecting charges and levies 
Source: JASPERS (2003, pp. 86-87) 
 
However, the two major contrasting models are unicentric and polycentric (see also 
SVENDSEN et al., 2005). Based on MOLLE et al. (2007, p. 612), the unicentric model 
follows a centralization approach as, “[the model] implies a degree of centralization of 
data, water allocation decisions, and decision making power in order to internalize third-
party effects and to address interactions between users across the basin,” while the 
polycentric model involves a decentralization approach with ‘decentralization’, 
‘involvement, and participation of users and stakeholders’, ‘local community management 
of upper watersheds’, and ‘the principle of subsidiarity’. Although the polycentric model 
may be able to address the shortcomings of the unicentric model, i.e. state control 
reinforcement and state influence on ‘the integration of the values and interests of all 
stakeholders’, it also faces challenges, where such issues as the balance between water 
availability and its use, and power asymmetries need to be addressed (MOLLE et al., 2007). 
While more responsive governance processes and improved intersectoral linkages can be 
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achieved through the polycentric model, it also poses some burdens including difficulty in 
making decisions, high cost of coordination, and agreements overturned due to political 
changes in ‘participating jurisdiction’ (MOLLE et al., 2007). 
 
Box 2.5 Types of river basin organizations (RBOs) 
1. Basin authorities are autonomous organizations with extensive mandates for their river basin, 
undertaking most water-related development and management functions. They are regulator, 
resource manager, and service provider all in one.  
2. Basin commissions or committees focus on policy setting, basin wide planning, water allocation, 
and information management, with varying degrees of stakeholder participation. They are 
usually endowed with authority to manage water resources (allocating permits, defining 
taxation, negotiating water allocations, defining effluent standards) and sometimes plan future 
development, except for operation or construction involvement. 
3. Coordinating councils are deliberative decision making bodies that incorporate public and 
private stakeholders and integrate policymaking across different policy areas. They are not 
organizations in the strict sense, but rather stakeholders from various agencies and water-use 
sectors brought together. Their role is coordination, conflict resolution, and review of water 
resources allocation and management. 
4. International river commissions may be set apart because coordination is achieved between 
countries rather than among stakeholders, and because political dimensions are pervasive. They 
were established frequently as part of a treaty signed between riparian countries or to manage 
dams on shared rivers […]. They not only mediate in water conflicts through consultation and 
cooperation, but also may manage common databases, and their work may lead to concrete 
agreements.  
Source: adapted, based on MOLLE et al. (2007, pp. 609-611) 
 
2.3.2.3 Participation in river basin governance 
As discussed in Section 2.2, a collaborative governance perspective separates collaborative 
public management or network governance from public participation, public involvement, 
and civic engagement, as the former focuses on organizational collaborations, and the latter 
on ‘collaboration with the public’ (BINGHAM, 2011). However, participation from the non-
public sector is fundamental for collaborative governance in the water sector and river 
basin governance (see BAKKER & COHEN, 2011; JASPERS, 2003). 
MOSTERT (2006, p. 154) defines public participation from a water governance perspective 
as, “direct involvement of the public in decision making.” He indicates further in his 
definition that ‘public’ includes ‘all non-governmental stakeholders’, be they individuals, 
groups, organizations, or associations, given that they have “an interest or ‘stake’ in an 
issue, either because they will be affected or because they may have some influence on its 
outcomes, or simply because they are interested” (MOSTERT 2006, p. 155). In his 
conception of public participation, MOSTERT (2006) also proposes levels of participation 
 29 
that range from information supply to self control, where ‘decision making by the public’ 
takes place; thus, viewed as ‘the most complete form of participation’ (see Box 2.6 for 
description). 
According to MOSTERT (2003), public participation provides various benefits such as 
better-informed decision making and its greater acceptance, social learning, awareness 
raising, and ‘enhanced democracy’. Similarly, a review by HOPHMAYER-TOKICH and 
KROZER (2008) indicates that local priorities and data, awareness raising, improved 
participant relationships, and ‘a feeling of engaging in fair and democratic process’ can be 
achieved during public participation processes, while ‘improved quality of decisions’, and 
‘successful implementation’ can be their expected outcomes (see also ÖZEROL & NEWIG, 
2008). However, public participation also faces several problems including government 
unwillingness in public participation, which results in disappointment and ‘less public 
acceptance of decisions’; limited and no representation as well as low quality response 
from the public; inconsistent decision making; and high costs and much time required for 
the process (MOSTERT, 2003). 
 
Box 2.6: Levels of public participation 
1. Information supply 
The public is provided with or has access to information. On its own this is not genuine public 
participation, but it is a prerequisite for it.  
2. Consultation 
The public can react to plan or their views are actively solicited. 
3. Co-thinking 
Real discussions take place between the public and government. 
4. Co-design 
The public actively contributes to policy development, for example, through design workshops. 
5. Co-decision making 
The public shares decision making powers with government. 
6. Self control 
The public performs tasks independently, for example, through water users’ associations. 
Source: MOSTERT (2006, p. 154) 
 
2.3.2.4 Challenges of river basin governance 
For advocates, “it is at present virtually impossible not to organise water resources 
management in an integrated manner and on hydrological boundaries” with strong 
emphasis on stakeholder participation believed to enhance decision-making effectiveness, 
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the measures decided and their enforcement (JASPERS, 2003, p. 80; emphasis is original). 
When put into practice; however, challenges are involved regarding the unicentric and 
polycentric basin governance models presented above (MOLLE et al., 2007). Besides, a 
river basin governance approach has been criticized increasingly, particularly regarding use 
of a river basin as a water resource managerial unit, and the issues of participation in, and 
accountability of, the RBOs (e.g. MOLLINGA, MEINZEN-DICK, & MERREY, 2007; WARNER, 
WESTER, & BOLDING, 2008; WESTER & WARNER, 2002).  
In a recent account, COHEN and DAVIDSON (2011) identify five challenges faced by a 
watershed (or river basin) approach to water governance, which also cover the concerns 
raised above. The first challenge concerns a boundary choice (of a watershed) for selection 
or demarcation. This selection is not always straightforward, when based on a natural or 
hydrologic boundary, but other factors such as a political (administrative) boundary are 
also involved. The second challenge involves accountability of ‘watershed-scale decisions 
and decision making bodies’, which relates to the fact that watershed boundaries are not 
generally aligned with political or administrative boundaries; as such, ‘watershed-scale 
organizations’ (i.e. RBOs) or governmental participants may not be responsive or held 
accountable.  
The third challenge covers the public participation and empowerment aspect. According to 
the authors, “arguments about the benefits of the inclusion and empowerment of local 
actors in environmental decision-making are often promulgated through arguments in 
favor of decentralised decision making” (COHEN & DAVIDSON, 2011, p. 3). The watershed 
approach involves ‘re-scaling’, which is considered as ‘one of decentralization’, especially 
when scaling down from ‘nations, states, and provinces’ (to watersheds). Drawing on 
various studies, the authors conclude, however, that local actors are not empowered by ‘re-
scaling to the watershed’ approach, and “there does not appear to be anything inherently 
participatory or empowering about re-scaling” (p. 4).  
The fourth challenge is indicated as ‘asymmetry between watersheds and ‘problem-sheds’’, 
which essentially explains that a watershed boundary does not match with a ‘problem-
shed’: “watershed boundaries […] rarely encompass all of the physical, social, or 
economic factors impacting upon the area within its borders” (p. 4). The last challenge is 
‘asymmetry between watersheds and ‘policy-sheds’’. The authors define a policy-shed as 
“a geographical area over which a governmental entity has legislative authority such as a 
nation, state, province, county or municipality” (p. 4). This challenge occurs not only due 
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to a mismatch between a watershed boundary and policy-shed (i.e. ‘conventional 
administrative scales’), but also because of ‘policy gaps and overlaps between the different 
policy-sheds themselves’.  
The five challenges above illustrate real world situations that the RBOs are likely to face. It 
seems that a mismatch in this study between a watershed and an administrative scale (the 
last challenge as discussed above) could be an ultimate challenge encountered by the Thai 
RBOs, given the fact that the Thai administrative system is very complex (see Section 2.4; 
Figure 2.1). However, it is evident, as presented in later chapters, that the Thai RBOs are 
not well established or fully functional (cf. the RBO functions above); thus, are far 
removed from the extent of the last challenge as well as the other four challenges described 
by COHEN and DAVIDSON (2011).  
 
2.3.3 River basin organizations in Thailand 
 
A river basin organization (RBO) in Thailand is officially referred to as ‘a river basin 
committee’ (RBC). As discussed earlier, this RBC can be viewed as collaborative 
governance in the water sector (see Section 2.3.1). It is relatively new in the Thai water 
governance context as it was introduced officially for the first time in 2002 through the 
Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management of 
2002. The current form of the Thai RBO (RBC) is presented in Section 4.4.2. 
Based on the context of a participatory watershed management project, implemented in the 
Ping River Basin, THOMAS (2005) recommends five types of SRBOs, which he refers to as 
‘river sub-basin organizations’ (RSBOs). They include: a focused government, broader 
government, central-local partnership, local-central partnership, and local non-government 
model. A brief description of each model is provided in Box 2.7. 
None of these SRBO models were implemented, but they were devised, taking into account 
the Thai administrative system, particularly the roles of central (ministries and 
departments) and provincial administration (especially the provincial governors). 
Therefore, these models show from a collaborative governance point of view, that a Thai 
public agency could find ways to engage in a collaborative water governance effort. Of 
course these ways would also assume that a legal infrastructure is in place to accommodate 
such an effort, which does not seem to be the case in Thailand at the moment (see the 
following section and Section 6.3). Two models (the focused government and central-local 
partnership model), with selected characteristics on roles and responsibilities, main sources 
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of authority and legal identity, and representation are presented in Box 2.8. The possible 
roles of public agencies in the collaborative governance effort can be observed in these two 
models. 
The concept of collaborative governance, as applied to the water sector, was discussed in 
the above sections. Issues concerning river basin governance also have been outlined from 
a Thai context viewpoint, where collaborative water governance is expressed in the form of 
a river basin committee. From a collaborative governance perspective, the river basin 
committee framework in Thailand indicates a move in which the non-public sector and 
local government are involved in managing water resources. Furthermore, this effort also 
suggests involvement of the various public agencies concerned. The next section, therefore, 
provides an overview of the Thai administrative system and its recent development. 
 
Box 2.7 River sub-basin organization (RSBO) models  
1. Focused government model: focus on efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing government 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms, and implementing activities in the mandates of a single 
ministry - Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). 
Mandate: issues related to water use, forest land use, pollution, and solid waste and waste disposal. 
2. Broader government model: focus on efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing government 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms, and implementing activities in mandates of multiple 
ministries – MNRE, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives.      
Mandate: issues related to water use, forest land use, pollution, solid waste and waste disposal, 
agricultural production and public health. 
3. Central-local partnership model: focus on creating a real partnership among groups and 
organizations from the central to local level, with emphasis on central and provincial government 
agencies. 
Mandate: water use, forest land use, agriculture, pollution, solid waste and waste disposal, public 
health, education, infrastructure, livelihoods and/or any other issues of local relevance and 
importance for management at the sub-basin level. 
4. Local-central partnership model: focus on creating a real partnership among groups and 
organizations from the central to local level, with emphasis on local government and civil society 
groups and institutions. 
Mandate: water use, forest land use, agriculture, pollution, solid waste and waste disposal, public 
health, education, infrastructure, livelihoods and/or other issues of local relevance and importance 
for management at the sub-basin level.  
5. Local non-government model: focus on effectiveness in mobilizing non-governmental groups 
and civil society institutions to formulate, advocate and monitor activities within the mandate of the 
RSBO. 
Mandate: water use, forest land use, agriculture, pollution, solid waste and waste disposal, public 
health, education, infrastructure, livelihoods and/or any other issues of local relevance and 
importance for management at the sub-basin level; which can be regrouped and repackaged 
according to local analyses and needs. 
Source: Based on THOMAS (2005, pp. 175-182) 
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Box 2.8 Two river sub-basin organization (RSBO) models with selected characteristics 
Focused government model:  
Roles and responsibilities: to provide advice and assistance to MNRE agencies, e.g. problem 
identification and project planning, and assist the agencies in public awareness and training 
activities. 
Main source of authorities and legal identity: the MNRE provides the status of a regional office in 
a central agency, with no need for an independent legal status. 
Representation: all relevant departments and MNRE agencies are represented by provincial (district 
officers, sub-district chiefs, village headmen) and local administration (i.e. TAO leaders*) by 
invitation; the non-public sector** is nominated, selected and appointed by the MNRE. 
 
Central-local partnership model:  
Roles and responsibilities: a leadership mode for tasks such as problem analysis and identification, 
planning, and public awareness activities may have a stronger role in implementation and directly 
receiving and managing funds; and playing a leading role in monitoring environmental conditions 
and program impact. 
Main source of authorities and legal identity: provided by the MNRE and participating ministries, 
provincial administration and local government in the sub-basin; RSBOs are established under 
provincial governors and may seek an independent legal status when appropriate and useful, with 
consideration given to regulatory roles and funding channels that might be affected.  
Representation: the MNRE and relevant ministries are represented by provincial (province, district, 
sub-district) and local government (TAO leaders or their representatives); representatives for the 
non-public sector** are invited and selected by vote or consensus in the RSBO assembly; with a 
balance between governmental and local representatives. 
Source: Based on THOMAS (2005, pp. 175; 178) 
 *TAO - tambon (sub-district) administrative organization 
 **‘Non-public sector’ is used to reference groups the author specifies as ‘relevant 
livelihood, business and/or industry’ in the first model, and “business, industry, livelihood 
groups, civil society and local communities” in the second one.  
 
2.4 The Thai administrative system: an overview 
 
Thailand is a unitary state with a strong centralized administrative system, which is a 
legacy from administrative reform during the reign of King Rama V (r.1868-1910) 
(MUTEBI, 2004; SANGSTAM, 2010). The current administrative structure, under the State 
Administration Act of 1991, consists of the three administrative levels of central, 
provincial and local administration (Figure 2.1). This administrative structure was first laid 
down in the State Administration Act of 1933, which according to MUTEBI (2004, p. 37), 
helps to continue ‘the centralized arrangements’ initiated by King Rama V, and has served 
as a basis for the central-local arrangements in Thailand up until the present time. 
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Figure 2.1: The Thai administrative structure 
Legislative Branch   Executive Branch  Judiciary Branch 
       
       
 
Central Administration 
(Centralization) 
  Provincial Administration 
(Deconcentration) 
 Local Administration 
(Decentralization) 
        
Ministry   Province  BMA  Pattaya City 
        
Department   District  PAO  Municipality 
        
   Sub-District   TAO  
        
   Village     
 
Note: PAO – Provincial Administrative Organization; TAO – Tambon (sub-district) Administrative 
Organization; BMA – Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Currently, arrangement of the central administration is based on a centralization approach 
(RANGSIYOKRIT, 2003), consisting of 20 ministries and more than 100 departments20. 
Central administrative agencies that are based mainly in Bangkok, Thailand’s capital city, 
oversee the operations of Thai public organizations at the policy level. However, some 
agencies have regional offices established in the provinces. With regard to the 
collaborative water governance effort (i.e. the river basin committee framework), the 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MNRE) is the responsible central administrative agency. The DWR also has 
regional offices, namely, the Water Resources Regional Office 1-10, which are located 
nationwide. 
Provincial administration is organized based on a deconcentration approach 
(RANGSIYOKRIT, 2003), where the central administrative agencies concerned delegate 
certain authorities to their line units in order to carry out their policies in the provinces. 
                                                          
20
 Based on the Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act of 2002. See Appendix I 
for a list of the Thai ministries. 
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Currently, there are 76 provinces with provincial governors
21
 acting as heads of all public 
agencies assigned to the provincial administration located in the respective provinces.  
A decentralization approach is applied (RANGSIYOKRIT, 2003), regarding local 
administration, where local government organizations have authority regarding social and 
economic development in their jurisdictions. Currently, there are three main types of local 
government organizations: provincial administrative organization (PAO), municipality, and 
tambon (sub-district) administrative organization (TAO), with a total number of 76, 2,283, 
and 5,492 organizations, respectively22. In addition, there are two special local government 
organizations: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and Pattaya City.      
Thailand has tried constantly to reform its administrative system, in which public agencies 
are embedded. However, large parts of the reform started during the late 1990s 
(BOWORNWATHANA & POOCHAREON, 2005; MUTEBI & SIVARAKS, 2007). The reform 
efforts in the past decade or so can be seen as ‘a process of change from government to 
governance’ (BOWORNWATHNA, 2001, p. 422). It has been said that this process of change 
was triggered by both market reasons (e.g. high public expenditure for personnel costs and 
inefficiency of the system) and non-market reasons (e.g. needs for more accountability and 
more participatory management of public affairs) (MUTEBI & SIVARAKS, 2007), while 
BOWORNWATHNA (2001) attributes it to promulgation of the 1997 Constitution and the 
economic crisis in 1997. 
According to BOWORNWATHANA (2000), administrative reform is not a new phenomenon 
in Thailand; but what has been ‘novel’ in recent reform efforts is basing these efforts on the 
‘principles of governance paradigm and new public management’. These principles  were 
inspired by the 1997 Constitution and also pushed by international funding agencies such 
as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank after the 
economic crisis of 1997 (BOWORNWATHANA, 2000). Already, in the early stage of recent 
reform efforts, BOWORNWATHANA (2000) points out that the government reformers did not 
pay adequate attention to the wider aspects of governance such as accountability, 
transparency and fairness; and instead focused more on the efficiency aspect derived from 
new public management, which suited well with the assumption that administrative reform 
was a managerial problem.  
                                                          
21
 Provincial governors are senior officers under the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior, 
and appointed by the Cabinet. 
22
 As of July 27, 2013 (DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, 2013). 
 36 
Major reforms took place during the Thaksin administration (February 2001 - September 
2006). Two key laws were promulgated in order to pursue good governance as the target of 
administrative reform: the Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments 
Act of 2002 and State Administration Act (No.5) of 2002 (MUTEBI & SIVARAKS, 2007). 
The former act resulted in the reorganization of central administrative agencies, of which 
some were dissolved or transferred to other agencies, and also new ones were created
23
. 
The latter laid down a number of provisions considered to constitute good governance 
practices; for example, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability of 
public agencies, and public participation.  
The ‘CEO provincial governor idea’ also was promoted during this period by the Thaksin 
government, with it seen to ‘reinforce the strong state tradition’ (BOWORNWATHANA, 2005, 
p. 47), because power is concentrated on provincial governors who are viewed as the CEO 
of their respective provinces. This idea was put forth and implemented together with the 
decentralization process that started in 1999, in which various tasks, personnel, and 
budgets were transferred from the central and provincial administration to the local 
administration. With the so-called ‘CEO governor system’ (MUTEBI, 2004), a 
‘recentralizing while decentralizing’ situation unfolded.    
The ‘CEO governor system’24 (MUTEBI, 2004) was phased out in 2006, after a coup ousted 
the Thaksin government. However, its original idea has lived on and was institutionalized 
further by the Royal Decree on Integrated Provincial and Provincial Cluster 
Administration, promulgated in 2008. The ‘CEO governor system’ has been transformed 
into the integrated provincial administration. The key point in this 2008 Royal Degree, 
which derives from the State Administration Act (No.7) of 2007, is that provinces are 
authorized to create and propose their own annual budget plan. The government is then 
obliged to allocate the budget requested, given that the required procedures in preparing 
such a plan are observed. In any case, all of these factors strengthen provincial 
administration and enhance empowerment for provincial governors, who already have 
extensive authority that derived mainly from the State Administration Act of 1991, and its 
various amendments. Thus, provincial administration inevitably affects the DWR river 
basin committee framework, as the effort is implemented in its administrative area [or the 
administrative scale following COHEN and DAVIDSON (2011)]. Furthermore, although this 
                                                          
23
 The DWR was established following the 2002 Reorganization Act. 
24
 For details on the ‘CEO governor system’, see, e.g. MUTEBI (2004) and PAINTER (2006) 
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very same administrative area is also shared by the local administration (i.e. local 
government organizations), the provincial administration is still more powerful by far 
(HAQUE 2010).  
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has outlined various issues and concepts concerning collaborative governance, 
collaborative water, and river basin governance. Topics relating to the Thai administrative 
system have been explored as well. The insights collectively helped to inform this study 
better on implementation of the river basin committee framework by the DWR. From the 
collaborative governance (collaborative public management) perspective, public agencies 
increasingly involve the non-public sector in their work, which also happens in the water 
sector. Hence, collaborative water governance comes into being. However, this perspective 
also reminds about the nature of these agencies, which are still bound ultimately to 
structures of laws and regulations (HEINRICH, 2011). This is also the case for Thai public 
agencies; several of which are involved in implementation of the river basin committee 
framework. From the river basin governance perspective, RBOs are seen to come in 
different forms with varied functions. There also are several challenges in implementing 
the river basin governance approach, particularly in using a river basin as a managerial unit 
(e.g. MOLLINGA et al., 2007). 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology employed by this study. It begins with a 
conceptual background used to guide data collection and data analysis processes. Then, the 
course of the river basin committee framework, and background information of the case 
study (i.e. the Ping River Basin Committee) are discussed. Data collection and data 
analysis are explained in the following sections, and critical evaluations of the methods 
used in this research are provided as well. 
 
3.1 Conceptual background 
 
This study attempts to explore the collaborative water governance effort in Thailand, which 
has been implemented in the form of a river basin committee (RBC). To operationalize the 
study, a whole network perspective (PROVAN, FISH, & SYDOW, 2007) was adopted.  
According to PROVAN et al. (2007, p. 512), “collaboration through an interorganizational 
network is an approach that is increasingly utilized” by ‘government and private groups’ 
for various issues such as improving the economy, health and well-being of citizens. Their 
focus is “on large-scale outcomes that can be accomplished through the collective efforts 
of multiple organizations. In other words, emphasis is on the whole network and not on the 
specific relationships that any one or pair of organizations maintains.” Furthermore, the 
‘whole network’ here is defined as “a group of three or more organizations connected in 
ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal” (PROVAN et al., 2007, p. 482). 
Following this line of thinking, the RBC under study could be viewed as focusing on the 
‘large-scale outcomes’ of water governance in its respective river basin. In principle, the 
RBC also relies on multiple participating organizations to achieve these outcomes, thereby 
emphasizing on the whole network25. 
In viewing the RBC as ‘a whole network’, this study placed emphasis on its formation, 
which was essentially the legal framework concerned (see Section 4.4.2) translated into the 
action of creating this committee. Additionally, this study examined RBC management, as 
to whether it was managed by following the guideline prescribed in the legal framework 
concerned (see Section 2.2.3). The collaborative process and participation in the RBC also 
were analyzed (see Section 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). These examinations addressed the research
                                                          
25
 See Section 4.4.2 for the RBC mandates, and organizations and individuals involved in this committee. 
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question of how the RBC framework was implemented on the ground. In addition, this 
study also examined functions that the RBC had performed and their outcomes, which is 
also an important issue regarding all of ‘the whole networks’ (PROVAN et al., 2007, p. 509). 
That being explained, organizational level issues were not explored, such as what effects 
participating organizations and individual involvement had on the ‘actions and outcomes’ 
of the RBC (PROVAN et al., 2007, p. 483).  
 
3.2 The course of the RBC framework and the Ping RBC 
 
The RBC framework was first introduced in Thailand by the Office of the Prime Minister’s 
Regulation on National Water Resources Management (No.2) of 2002. At this time, there 
were 29 river basins located across the country. By 2006, 29 river basin sub-committees 
were appointed for these river basins, and other governing bodies, such as river basin 
working groups and provincial river basin working groups, were appointed as well (DWR 
2006). Against this background, this study initially planned to select one of the 29 river 
basin sub-committees: the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee, as a study case. 
The Upper Ping River Basin (UPRB) consists of 14 sub-river basins, covering the 
provinces of Chiang Mai and Lamphun (Figure 3.1 and 3.2). In the fiscal year 2007 
(October 2006-September 2007), the Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and 
Management Section (URCMS)26, which was  responsible for the UPRB, selected the Mae 
Rim sub-river basin (one of the 14 UPRB sub-river basins) to conduct a pilot study, which 
was chosen initially as a focused study area. The Mae Rim Sub-river Basin Working Group 
also would be examined, together with the UPRB Sub-Committee, as this Working Group 
could be observed from the start of the setup.  
Unfortunately, there was a long delay in implementing the pilot project of the Mae Rim 
sub-river basin. Its initial meeting was held on July 19, 2007 and the framework of the Mae 
Rim Sub-river Basin Working Group was discussed. It was agreed that the Mae Rim sub-
river basin be divided into three parts: upper, middle and lower. Each part would also have 
its own working group, nested under the Mae Rim Sub-river Basin Working Group. The 
meetings were organized in September 2007 - the last month of the fiscal year - to discuss 
the working group framework for the above three Mae Rim sub-river basin parts, but 
implementation of any activities had to wait for the new fiscal year. 
                                                          
26
 URCMS is a division under the Water Resources Regional Office 1 (WRO 1) of the DWR. 
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Figure 3.1: The Ping River Basin and its components 
 
Source: The Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (2008); 
Compiled by Sureeporn Sri-ngam, The Uplands Program-SFB564 
 
Figure 3.2: The Upper Ping River Basin with its 14 sub-river basins 
 
Source: The Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (2008); 
Compiled by Sureeporn Sri-ngam, The Uplands Program-SFB564 
 
 
 41 
It was found later that the label of ‘pilot project’, given to the Mae Rim sub-river basin, did 
not reflect the general meaning of this concept; which is, “water managers regularly use 
pilot projects as instruments for testing innovations and implementing policies on a 
restricted scale. Pilot projects are the means of applying new approaches in a confined 
field setting to learn about the innovation-context interaction or adjusting management 
practices and policies” (VREUGDENHIL, SLINGER, THISSEN, & RAULT, 2010, [online]). 
Rather, it was only a label given to a sub-river basin being selected as a target to setup a 
sub-river basin working group by the DWR line agencies responsible, for example, the 
URCMS. Additionally, there was in fact a directive requiring these line agencies to 
establish at least one ‘pilot sub-river basin’ in their jurisdiction within one fiscal year. 
Consequently, the URCMS also implemented ‘a pilot sub-river basin’ in the Mae Klang 
and Mae Khan sub-river basins during the following fiscal years, using the same procedure 
as that in the Mae Rim sub-river basin by setting up the sub-river basin working group, 
with no other particular activities.  
Concurrently, there was also development concerning the overall RBC framework in the 
fiscal year 2007. The government issued the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation on 
National Water Resources Management of 2007, which came into effect on July 14, 2007. 
This Regulation required the appointment of a new National Water Resources Committee 
(NWRC), and new river basin committees to replace the existing 29 River Basin Sub-
Committees (See 4.4.2). This time, there was 25 river basin committees (RBCs), 
corresponding to 25 main river basins (BUREAU OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 
HYDROLOGY, 2009; see Appendix II).  
Therefore, the UPRB Sub-Committee was dissolved and official appointments of the 
‘pilot’ sub-river basins mentioned above were suspended. With the new demarcation of 25 
main river basins, the UPRB was merged with the Lower Ping River Basin (LPRB) to form 
the Ping River Basin (Figure 1). The LPRB covers three provinces: Tak, Kampaengphet 
and Nakhonsawan, with 6 sub-river basins. The UPRB extends across two provinces 
(Chiang Mai and Lamphun), and the Ping River Basin covers an area of 34,499.39 km
2
, 
making it the fifth largest river basin in Thailand, with 20 sub-river basins in total 
(BUREAU OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND HYDROLOGY, 2009, p. 1-1)27. It should be 
noted that although the Upper and Lower Ping River Basins were merged, their former 
agencies - the URCMS and Lower Ping River Basin Coordination and Management 
                                                          
27
 See Appendix III for a list of sub-river basins in the Ping River Basin. 
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Section (LRCMS), respectively – still exist, and both are responsible for the new Ping 
RBC. 
The RBC framework was essentially back to square one in the fiscal year 2008 (October 
2007-September 2008). However, it was started again by appointing the new NWRC and 
25 new RBCs, with appointment of RBC non-public sector members made in the following 
fiscal year (see Section 4.4.2 and Section 5.1). The first meeting for each of the 25 new 
RBCs was scheduled for early 2009 by the Bureau of Mass Promotion and Coordination 
(BMPC) of the DWR. The first meeting of the new Ping RBC was held on February 6, 
2009. 
The situation described above changed the course of activities in the UPRB, thereby 
affecting the original research plan for this study. As the UPRB Sub-Committee and its 
structure no longer existed, this study took the Ping River Basin Committee as an 
illustrative case for examining the RBC framework. However, focus on the study area 
remained in the upper part of the Ping River Basin (the former UPRB), particularly the 
Mae Rim sub-river basin, where water governance practices were observed at the local 
level. This gave examples of how water resources were managed in an area where the RBC 
framework was being implemented. 
As mentioned earlier, Thailand is a unitary state with strong centralization (Section 2.4). 
Consequently, there is little room for discretion from the public agencies concerned when it 
comes to implementing a certain policy. In the context of RBC framework implementation, 
the DWR agencies responsible would be duly expected to follow directives from the DWR 
or other superior authorities, and indeed this was the case, as indicated by the ‘pilot sub-
river basin’ directive presented above. Thus, selecting the Ping RBC (or any other RBC) as 
an illustrative case of RBC framework implementation was not far-fetched. 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
3.3.1 Data collection methods 
 
In order to obtain the data for this study, three data collection methods were employed: 
semi-structured interview, informal interview, and non-participant observation. 
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3.3.1.1 Semi-structured interview  
A semi-structured interview was conducted with members of the Ping RBC and Ping River 
Basin Sub-Committee. The main aim was to obtain data concerning their knowledge and 
opinions about the RBC framework and their participation in the Ping RBC setup. The 
same interview approach was employed as well with senior officers of the URCMS, in 
order to gain information about their operations regarding the RBC framework. 
To collect data on local water governance practices in the Mae Rim sub-river basin, several 
key informants were interviewed with a semi-structured approach. These included heads of 
selected local water user groups (muang fai groups) and the executives and staff of selected 
Tambon (Sub-district) Administration Organizations (TAOs), located in the sub-river basin 
concerned. In addition, the semi-structured interview also was conducted with leaders of 
the Mae Tang Irrigation Water User Association, with its irrigation area partly located in 
the sub-river basin.      
All interviews were recorded and conducted in the Thai or northern Thai language 
depending on the background of the interviewees. An interview list and interview topics 
are presented in Appendix IV. 
 
3.3.1.2 Informal interview  
An informal interview was employed to obtain specific information, particularly regarding 
the RBC framework. Thus, the informants were generally URCMS staff members 
responsible for specific tasks or projects in connection with the RBC framework. Notes 
were taken while the informants gave their information, which provided insights into the 
framework concerned, and occasionally led to accessing official documents that were not 
easily or publicly available. The informal interview was conducted also with other key 
informants in order to obtain related information, for example, from an officer of the 
Chiang Mai Provincial Office on the issue of provincial strategic development plans. 
 
3.3.1.3 Non-participant observation 
 
Activities concerning the RBC framework were observed. They were organized in an 
official meeting format, including meetings of the Ping RBC and those of their governing 
bodies: the Sub-Committee for River Basin Management and Information, provincial river 
basin working groups, and sub-river basin working groups. Discussions were recorded 
during the meetings, with photographs taken. Notes on the general atmosphere of the 
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meetings were taken to complement the recordings. It should be noted that the meetings 
were very formal, and the same procedure was repeated in each one. Thus, there was 
actually little to observe, for example, in terms of interaction among the participants or 
issues being discussed or decided. However, observations at these meetings provided 
access to the only forum in which members of the Ping RBC and those of its governing 
bodies came together; and they also provided access to meeting material. A list of the 
meetings observed is provided in Appendix V.   
Apart from the meetings previously mentioned, other activities related to the RBC 
framework, or work of the URCMS, were observed; for instance, a seminar on 
participatory river basin management, where the representatives of 25 RBCs attended, and 
a meeting on river basin management planning. In addition, observations were made on 
activities of the Mae Tang Irrigation Water User Association (MWUA) (e.g. a water 
allocation meeting). Discussions during the meetings were recorded and photographs taken 
from these observations. Notes also were taken to complement the recordings. 
This author was present at all of the meetings and activities observed, except for those of 
the MWUA, which were acknowledged by the URCMS. These meetings and activities 
were attended by the participants concerned, which included several 
supporting/accompanying staff. Thus, this author’s presence at these meetings and 
activities did not affect their course or participants’ actions. This author was introduced to 
the MWUA by a responsible irrigation officer. As ‘a student’ collecting information for his 
study, he was notified about the activities and his presence did not affect the course of 
MWUA activities or the actions of MWUA leaders.   
 
3.3.2 Documentary data 
 
Apart from data obtained by the three methods discussed above, documentary sources were 
relied upon heavily in this research, particularly for issues relating to the RBC framework 
and state administration (e.g. laws and policies). Documents collected were as follows: 
 
3.3.2.1 Documents on the RBC framework 
The documents were collected mainly from the URCMS office. These included, for 
instance, reports on activities of the RBC framework under the Office of the Prime 
Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resources Management (No.2) of 2002; 
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handbooks (e.g. on coordination of water management at the local level); policy directives 
for the Ping RBC; and meeting presentation files (in a PowerPoint form). 
Meeting material also was collected when observing meetings of the Ping RBC and its 
governing bodies, as mentioned above. It generally contained a detailed meeting agenda, 
meeting report and other attachments, e.g. official appointment documents or plans. 
Information on activities of the other RBCs was collected also from the DWR website 
(www.dwr.go.th). In addition, documents such as NWRC meeting reports and their orders 
also were obtained from the above mentioned website. 
 
3.3.2.2 Legal documents 
The legal documents included water bills and related legal opinions of the Council of State; 
and, rules and regulations observed by the DWR and its line agencies in implementing the 
RBC framework. Also, public law documents were gathered such as the State 
Administration Act of 1991, Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries, and 
Departments Act of 2002, and Administrative Procedure Act of 1996.     
 
3.3.2.3 Policy documents 
The policy documents included the Water Policy, Five-Year National Economic and Social 
Development Plans, government policy statements, and four-year DWR action plans. 
Furthermore, Cabinet resolutions related to water issues were collected as well.   
 
3.3.2.4 Other related documents 
Apart from the documents mentioned above, the following ones also were gathered for this 
study: DWR policy directives, DWR executive meeting reports, DWR annual reports, 
research reports or handbooks on water governance in Thailand, and documents on the 
integrated provincial administration.  
 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
 
According to BERNARD and RYAN (2010, p. 109), “analysis is the search for patterns in 
data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place.” This 
study aimed to explore the collaborative water governance effort in Thailand, which was 
implemented through the RBC framework. Based on preliminary readings of some 
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documentary data gathered, and observations on activities in the Ping RBC setup; it was 
apparent that implementation of the framework concerned followed a top-down approach, 
with detailed prescriptions and policy directives for the public agency responsible - the 
URCMS in this case. Governing bodies in the RBC framework (i.e. the Ping RBC, and its 
sub-committee and working groups) do not exist or function with authority as independent 
bodies. Additionally, participation in the river basin committee framework is marginal. As 
such, data analysis here showed little concerning ‘the search for patterns in data’, but more 
in searching for ‘ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place’.  
To this end, a qualitative content analysis was applied to construct an account of RBC 
framework implementation arranged through the Ping RBC, as well as an explanatory 
account of the phenomena evidently observed, as mentioned above. The intention here is 
not to search primarily for patterns from the data collected, but rather to be concerned with 
their manifest content, which is “visible at the surface level or literally present in the text” 
(KONDRACKI, WELLMAN, & AMUNDSON, 2002, p. 225)28. Thus, only certain steps for 
qualitative content analysis, as outlined by BERG (2007), were followed as a guide. The 
data analysis processes, therefore, covered only the steps of developing analytic categories, 
establishing objective criteria for selection (of the data) and sorting the data into analytic 
categories. For normal analysis processing, a further step to identify patterns from the 
sorted data was performed, and ‘an explanation (analysis)’ given with reference to the 
related literature (BERG, 2007). However, the manifest contents of the sorted data for this 
study were extracted and summarized instead; then, the descriptive and explanatory 
accounts were constructed, based on these manifest contents. In a similar fashion to the last 
step of BERG’s (2007) analysis process, explanations and discussions with reference to the 
related literature were given for the accounts constructed. The following paragraphs 
explain in more detail the steps of qualitative content analysis used in this research. 
As a step to determine analytic categories, key aspects of the RBC framework 
implementation outlined in Section 3.1 were relied upon and used as analytic categories. 
They included the RBC formation as well as its management, collaborative process, 
participation, and outcomes, which were derived from the literature review in Chapter 2. In 
                                                          
28
 As compared to latent content referred to as “having a deeper meaning implied in the text” (KONDRACKI et 
al., 2002, p. 225). 
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a way, this method leaned toward ‘deductive category application’ of qualitative content 
analysis (MAYRING, 2000, [online]).         
In terms of criteria for data sorting and the sorting process, the analytic categories 
mentioned above were used also as ‘keywords’ for sorting through the data (BERG, 2007). 
That is to say, the collected data were sorted into respective categories if they contained 
information that related to them. For example, sections on ‘the National Water Resource 
Committee’ and ‘the River Basin Committee’ in the water bill were included under the 
RBC management category, as they provided information about the composition and 
management of the RBC. Likewise, key performance indicators of the URCM were sorted 
into the participation category, because some indicators referred to public participation in 
Ping RBC activities (i.e. meetings), while some others involved organization of the 
meetings themselves. Regarding documentary data, some interpretations were carried out 
as well in order to understand their contents in relation to the RBC framework, particularly 
when it came to dealing with legal and policy documents. With regard to the records of 
interviews and meetings, only the parts containing data related to the categories mentioned 
were transcribed (cf. BRYMAN, 2008). 
Information was extracted and summarized from the sorted data, and then interpreted and 
synthesized in the sense of ‘developing ideas about the information found in the various 
categories’ (BOGDAN & BILKEN, 2003 cited in BERG, 2007, pp. 307-308), as various pieces 
of information from different sources and contexts were sorted out and put together in 
respective categories. For example: an interpretation was made regarding a link between 
the RBC and state administrative structure, or status of the 2007 Regulation as a 
subordinate legislation, and its implications on the authority pertaining to the RBCs and 
their decision making power. In a way, ‘an explanation (analysis)’ of this information was 
given (BERG, 2007, pp. 326-327).  
As a result, comprehensive accounts were composed for the RBC framework and its key 
aspects, as outlined in Section 3.1. These accounts were also discussed with reference to 
the concepts and issues presented in Chapter 2 and other related literature, such as those 
concerning water policy implementation (e.g. ABERS, 2007; LAUBE, 2010; TANKHA & 
FULLER, 2010). These accounts are presented in the following chapters.  
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3.4 Critical evaluation of the methods applied 
 
This research set out to examine the collaborative water governance effort in Thailand, 
using the Ping RBC as an illustrative case. Three methods were used to collect data: semi-
structured interview, informal interview, and non-participant observation (Section 3.3.1). 
In addition, related documentary data were gathered (Section 3.3.2). In a way, ‘a validity 
strategy’ in terms of data source triangulation was applied (CRESWELL, 2009, p. 191). The 
three methods used for data collection in this study also yielded reliable information. The 
following paragraphs discuss the data collection methods concerned, and information 
gained in the context of research on the RBC framework implementation undertaken.   
It can be said in retrospect that core findings on the Ping RBC implementation were 
derived mainly from observations into its activities (i.e. the meetings), informal interviews 
with the URCMS staff responsible, and documentary data on the RBC framework. The 
data gathered from semi-structured interviews with members of the Ping RBC and its 
governing bodies were then used largely to explain and elaborate on their findings.  
The situation mentioned above can be explained best with reference to the course of the 
RBC framework (see Section 3.2). With introduction of the new RBC framework, the 
DWR agencies responsible (e.g. URCMS and LRCMS in the case of the Ping River Basin) 
were given priority to follow the procedure of establishing new RBCs, where their 
governing bodies could be established in sequence later (see Section 5.1). It was found 
over time that a meeting was the only activity organized for the Ping RBC framework, 
which was also the case for the other RBCs. In addition, it should be noted that these 
meetings were not intensive, for example, two Ping RBC meetings per (fiscal) year, which 
became the primary sources of data, while observations were a crucial means for collecting 
information. With limited information about the RBC framework and its implementation, 
the URCMS staff responsible became the main data sources accessed through an informal 
interview. They also provided main documents on the framework concerned and its 
implementation. 
Non-participant observations of the meetings had noted that they were of formal format 
(see Figure 3.3), where the same procedure was repeated in each one. Also, there was 
virtually no interaction or deliberation between the participants. Furthermore, the meetings 
duly followed respective meeting agendas. Thus, no complications occurred during 
sessions, and misinterpretations of what was observed were then unlikely.      
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The informal interview yielded reliable data from the URCMS staff responsible, and it 
always fell in line with the information collected from the other two methods as well as 
related documentary data (e.g. policy directives). Indeed, the informal interview reduced 
stress on the staff. This kind of ‘chat’ also helped to establish a good rapport with them 
over time, and led to access of various documents on the RBC framework, Ping RBC, and 
operations of the URCMS. Although these documents were unrestricted, they were not 
easily or publicly available. Thus, without these ‘gatekeepers’, various insights about 
implementation of the RBC framework in general, and Ping RBC in particular, may not 
have been gained. 
 
Figure 3.3: Meeting of the Mae Rim Sub-River Basin Working Group (15.06.2010) 
 
   Source: Own photo  
 
A semi-structured interview with members of the Ping RBC and Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee did not yield solid data on the RBC framework, partly because they were new 
to the framework and partly due to the low intensity of activities connected to it. However, 
the critical opinions gained about the RBC framework were valuable in confirming what 
was observed during the meetings, as was the information given from the interviews by the 
URCMS staff.  
In all, it could be ascertained that validity of the data and insights was gained from the  
data collection methods concerned, which had a high degree of independence from 
‘accidental circumstances of the research’ (KIRK & MILLER, 1986 cited in PERÄKYLÄ, 
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2004, p. 285). Inference was made to other issues based on these data and insights as well 
as other related documents (e.g. legal documents) in order to juxtapose the RBC 
framework and its implementation into the wider context of the Thai administration 
(Chapter 6). Thus, it could be claimed that the results of this research are valid in 
representing collaborative water governance in Thailand.  
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter explains the research methodology of this study. A conceptual background 
was based on a whole network perspective, where the RBC was viewed as a whole network 
and analyzed as such regarding its formation, management, collaboration, participation, 
and outcomes. The course of the 2007 RBC framework led to establishment of 25 new 
RBCs, including the Ping RBC, which was used as an illustrative case in this study. Three 
data collection methods were employed by following the conceptual background 
mentioned, which included a semi-structured interview, informal interview, and non-
participant observation. In addition, various types of documentation also were included 
such as documents on the RBC framework, and legal documents. The collected data were 
analyzed by means of a qualitative content analysis. With data source triangulation, 
uncomplicated nature of the activities observed, and insights gained through interviews 
with the URCMS staff responsible, as well as members of the Ping RBC and Ping River 
Basin Sub-Committee, the research results are assuredly valid. 
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4. WATER GOVERNANCE IN THAILAND: POLICIES AND 
CURRENT PRACTICES 
 
This chapter discusses recent policies concerning water resources and current water 
governance practices taking into account the year 2000, when the National Water Policy 
was issued as a starting point. Regarding recent water resources-related policies, apart from 
the one already mentioned, this chapter provides an overview of other main policy 
documents, including Policy Statements and Five-Year National Economic and Social 
Development Plans. In addition, discussion on the water bill focuses on its provisions 
regarding the structure and function as well as management of the River Basin Committee 
(RBC). Current water governance practices and the roles of local government organizations 
(LGOs) in water governance observed in the Mae Rim sub-river basin are also presented. 
The last issue covered in this chapter concerns the RBC framework, deriving from the 
Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management of 
2002 and 2007.  
 
4.1 Recent water policies 
 
4.1.1 The national water policy 
 
The National Water Policy of 2000 was the first of its kind in Thailand. It was developed 
as part of the loan conditions of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the Agriculture 
Sector Program made by the Thai government in 1999. The drafting process of this policy 
started with development of the National Water Vision in 1999, based on the concept of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), and led by the then Office of National 
Water Resources Committee (ONWRC)29, and Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
(KAOSA-ARD et al., 2001a). The vision reads as follows (SETHAPUTRA, THANOPANUWAT, 
KUMPA, & PATTANEE, 2001, p.87): 
“By the year 2025, Thailand will have sufficient water of good quality for all users through 
efficient management and an organizational and legal system that will ensure equitable 
and sustainable use of water resources, with due consideration for the quality of life and 
the participation of all stakeholders.” 
                                                          
29
 Dissolved by the Reorganization of Ministry, Sub-Ministry, and Department Act of 2002, and the 
staff were transferred to the DWR.  
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Consequently, the National Water Vision was translated into the National Water Policy 
through a brainstorming workshop held by the ONWRC in March 2000, and the drafted 
water policy was submitted to the National Water Resources Committee in July 2000 
(SETHAPUTRA et al., 2001). The cabinet finally endorsed the policy (Box 4.1) in October 
2000. The national action plan also was developed as part of the National Water Policy, 
where strategies, actions, agencies responsible and timeframes were outlined. For example, 
in order to achieve a policy component on water resource management with a sound legal 
framework, a draft water law was planned for submission to the government by June 2001, 
with the ONWRC being the agency responsible (SETHAPUTRA et al., 2001, Appendix 1). 
 
Box 4.1: The National Water Policy 2000  
1.  Accelerate promulgation of the draft Water Act to become the framework for national water 
management by reviewing the draft and implementing all necessary steps to make the Act 
effective, including reviews of existing laws and regulations. 
2.  Create water management organizations at the national and river basin level together with 
supportive laws. The national organization will be responsible for formulating national policies, 
monitoring and coordinating activities to fulfill the set policies. The river basin organizations 
will be responsible for preparing water management plans through a participatory approach. 
3.  Emphasize suitable and equitable water allocation for all water use sectors, and fulfill basic 
water requirements of agriculture and domestic use. This will be accomplished by establishing 
efficient and sustainable individual river basin water-use priorities under clear water allocation 
criteria, incorporating beneficiary cost sharing based on ability to pay and level of services.     
4.  Formulate clear directions for raw water provision and development compatible with basin 
potential and demands, and ensure suitable quality while conserving natural resources and 
maintaining the environment. 
5.  Provide and develop raw water resources for farmers extensively and equitably in response to 
water demand for sustainable agriculture and domestic use, in a similar fashion to deliveries of 
other basic infrastructure services provided by government.   
6.  Include water-related topics at all levels of the educational curriculum in order to create 
awareness of water value, and understand the importance of efficient water utilization, as well 
as the necessity and responsibility for maintaining natural and manmade water sources.  
7.  Promote and support participation, including clear identification of procedures, and concise 
guidelines on the rights and responsibility of public, non-government and government 
organizations. Water management includes water utilization, water source conservation, and 
monitoring and preserving water quality. 
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Box 4.1: The National Water Policy 2000 (continued) 
8.  Accelerate preparation of flood planning and drought protection, including warning, damage 
control and rehabilitation, efficiently and equitably with proper utilization of land and other 
natural resources. 
9.  Provide sufficient and sustainable financial support for action programs in line with the national 
policy, including water-related research, public relations, information collection and technology 
transfer to the public. 
Source: Adapted from WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION (2005, Annex I)       
 
The National Water Policy was criticized for its lack of wider public participation and 
independence from the ADB in the drafting process (CHANTAWONG, 2005). Concern was 
also raised in that its implementation would affect the general public adversely. With 
economic instruments intended to improve water allocation, water could become 
commoditized, and only those with greater economic power would gain access to it 
(CHANTAWONG, 2005). However, KAOSA-ARD et al. (2001a) observed that the policy 
would not be realized in the near future because of the broad nature of its measures and 
action plan, as well as the need for information, e.g. prioritizing water use in such sectors 
as agriculture and industry.  
Indeed, the National Water Policy has not been implemented probably because water law 
promulgation indicated clearly as the first priority in this policy is yet to be achieved (see 
Section 4.2.1). Furthermore, instead of using the water policy as a framework to devise 
water resources-related programs and projects, government policies and agendas mainly 
devised them (Section 4.1.3). 
 
4.1.2 The five-year national economic and social development plans 
 
Thailand’s development over the past five decades has been directed by the Five-Year 
National Economic and Social Development (NESD) Plans, which are currently in their 
Eleventh Plan (2012-2016). According to LORSUWANNARAT and BURACOM (2010, p. 108), 
these plans “actually set agenda and budget priorities for the governments to follow.” With 
regard to water resource management, Plans under sections on agricultural development, or 
natural resources development and management, always indicate that water source 
development meets the country’s needs of water, in which the RID plays a central role. 
Water source development reached its peak in the Fifth NESD Plan (1982-1986), during 
which 14 large-scale and 121 medium-scale irrigation projects were constructed (RID, 
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2010). However, water source development continues to feature in NESD Plans. For 
example, the Eleventh Plan (2012-2016) is targeted to increase an irrigation area by 
200,000 rai30 per year31.  
According to SETHAPUTRA et al. (2001), the issue of coordinated water resource 
management was not suggested during the First to Fifth NESD Plans (1961-1986), 
although there were (and still are) a number of public agencies involved32. However, a 
policy guideline was introduced for the first time during the Sixth NESD Plan (1987-1991) 
in order that the public agencies concerned could prepare their water resource 
management-related plans, based on a river basin (SETHAPUTRA et al., 2001). Since then, 
systematic or integrated water resource management at the river basin level always has 
been recommended in the NESD Plans, with an emphasis on public participation.  
Currently, the Eleventh Plan (2012-2016) is set as a target to ‘improve efficiency of the 
entire water management system’. It also outlines various ‘development guidelines’ 
including integrated river basin management plan; water allocation systems e.g. for 
agricultural use33; and legislations to empower local government organizations (LGOs) and 
local communities to manage river basins.   
However, it can be seen that the NESD Plans have not been realized regarding integrated 
water resource management at the river basin level, as presented in the following sections. 
Viewing this from the NESD Plan perspective, the trend may reflect that it has lost its 
significance increasingly in setting up a development direction for governments, because 
political parties adhere to their policies, while public agencies operate according to the 
government administrative plans, which are developed based on government policies 
(KOEBERLE, 2005; ONESDB, 2011). Thus, the following section turns to explore water 
resources-related policies, as prescribed in these government policies.   
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 1 hectare = 6.25 rai 
31
 The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2016; p.108) 
32
 According to the OFFICE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD - ONESDB (2004), 
there are 30 agencies including state owned enterprises under ten ministries involved in water resources 
management.    
33
 The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2016; pp.108, 110-111) 
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4.1.3 The government’s water resource-related policies 
 
There have been seven governments in Thailand during the past thirteen years (2001-
2013). Apart from Policy Statements, the government also has had to prepare the 
Administrative Plan since 2005, which “is used as a means to translate the political will of 
the elected government into administrative actions” (LORSUWANNARAT & BURACOM, 
2010, p. 108). Details of the Plan such as policy objectives, measures and indicators for 
achieving these aims are outlined.  
It has been observed from the Policy Statements that water resources have always been on 
government agendas. For example, the Samak government (February 2008)34 and Yingluck 
government (August 2011)35 indicated that irrigation area expansion and irrigation system 
improvement were two of their urgent policies36; the latter of which also included 
‘promotion of integrated water management’ as a pressing policy. The measures to address 
this policy included, for instance, the construction of small-, medium-, and large-scale 
irrigation projects, and small-scale irrigation canal systems at the farm level. The Abhisit 
government (December 2008)37 outlined its urgent policies such as rejuvenation of the 
economy and enhancement of investments for, among other things, stimulating the 
country’s development. Regarding the economy rejuvenation policy, part of its measures 
was to develop natural sources of water, while investments in water management and 
irrigation systems formed activities in a section of the investment enhancement policy.  
In addition, water resources also were addressed under the land use policy, natural 
resources, and the environment, which is part of the general policies developed to pursue 
directive principles of fundamental State policies, as prescribed in Chapter 5 of the 2007 
Constitution. These directive principles cover such topics as national security, the 
economy, administration of state affairs, and foreign affairs as well as land, natural 
resources, and the environment. For example, the Abhisit government (December 2008) 
outlined the protection and conservation of water and other natural resources (e.g. forest 
and wildlife) as part of its policy on land use, natural resources, and the environment. 
Likewise, the Yingluck government (August 2011) indicated promotion of ‘comprehensive 
water management’ in its policy to address the water resource issue. 
                                                          
34
 The Samak government’s Policy Statements presented to the National Assembly on February 18, 2008. 
35
 The Yingluck government’s Policy Statements presented to the National Assembly on August 23, 2011. 
36
 Urgent policies are those to be implemented during the government’s first year.   
37
 The Abhisit government’s Policy Statements presented to the National Assembly on December 29, 2008. 
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Details from the government’s Administrative Plans, which were developed from the 
Policy Statements, provided more concrete pictures of how those policies and measures 
would be translated into ‘administrative actions’. For instance, to achieve the policy on 
expansion of irrigation areas and irrigation system improvement, the Samak government 
set indicators in its Administrative Plan for adding 558,000 rai to irrigation areas, 
increasing the development of water and groundwater sources, and rehabilitating water 
sources38. This reflected well in projects implemented by the RID during the 2009 fiscal 
year: 6 large-scale, and 57 medium-scale irrigation projects (both new and continuous); 
and 246 projects for small-scale water source development and water distribution systems 
(RID, 2009).         
The Abhisit government suggested water source development and rehabilitation, 
establishment of the clean water standard, and a mechanism for integrated water resource 
management and public participation for measures in part of its Administrative Plan39 to 
achieve water resource protection and conservation, as outlined in its policy on land use, 
natural resources, and the environment. The Department of Water Resources (DWR)’s 
budget plan for the 2010 fiscal year40 was a good example of how the policy concerned was 
implemented. It had two key measures for water resource protection and conservation: 
those being an improvement of water resource management mechanism; and, water source 
development and rehabilitation. For the former, a total budget of 106.9 million Baht was 
allocated41; of which, 59 million Baht were provided for the management of the RBCs in 
25 river basins. For the latter, a total budget of 3,778.6 million Baht was allocated for 
1,771 projects on water source conservation and rehabilitation.           
Overall, it is evident that water resource-related policies have placed an emphasis on the 
supply-side management of water resources (water provision), focusing on water source 
development. However, far less attention has been paid to the demand-side management 
(water use) or integrated management of water resources at either the national or river 
basin level, which is perceived as the main issue for water resource management in the 
country (ONESDB, 2004). 
                                                          
38
 The Samak government’s Administrative Plan (2008-2011) approved by the Cabinet on March 11, 2008.  
39
 The Abhisit government’s Administrative Plan (2009-2011) approved by the Cabinet on January 13, 2009. 
40
 The Budget Act of the 2010 Fiscal Year for the DWR (compiled by Bureau of Water Resource Policy and 
Planning, DWR)   
41
 1€ = 41 Baht (approximated, as of December 2014) 
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4.2 Water bill and the river basin committee frameworks 
 
4.2.1 Water bill: a background 
 
Thailand has a number of laws on some provisions for water resources. According to THE 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF EFFECTIVE WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
THAILAND (2003), there are 35 water-related laws, covering such areas as water use, water 
resource conservation and water pollution control. Of this number, 32 laws are still in 
effect and one is replaced by a new version (as of December 2014). However, there has 
never been a water law in which water resource issues are dealt with comprehensively. 
Thus, various aspects of water resource development and management are covered by 
varied laws with different public agencies concerned42. For example, water use for 
agriculture within the state irrigation area is under the State Irrigation Act of 1942, with the 
RID acting as the responsible agency, while the use of groundwater resources is regulated 
by the Groundwater Resources Act of 1977, and the Department of Groundwater 
Resources is the agency responsible. 
Nevertheless, efforts have been made to promulgate a water law. The first attempt took 
place in 1992 when the National Research Council of Thailand drafted a first water bill. 
However, this bill and its subsequent revisions were never approved by the Cabinet, and 
they therefore failed to make it through to the promulgation process of the National 
Assembly (THE LEGAL AFFAIRS GROUP, 2010). With establishment of the DWR in 2002, a 
new round of attempts was made to pass this law because a reform of water-related laws 
and water bill preparation were two of its strategic goals (THE LEGAL AFFAIRS GROUP, 
2010). Thus, the DWR together with the Thammasat University Research and Consultation 
Institute (TURCI) started to draft a water bill in 2003, formally entitled the Water 
Resources Bill (TURCI, 2004).  Its revised version was endorsed by the Cabinet in May 
2007 and subsequently sent to the Office of the Council of State (OCS) for vetting. Finally, 
the Cabinet submitted the bill for promulgation to the National Legislative Assembly 
(NLA) in October 2007. However, it was not passed43.  
Although the water law is not yet in place, and there is no possible way to predict when 
there will be one, the drafted water bill does provide a proximate direction in which public 
                                                          
42
 See also footnote no. 32. 
43
 During this time, a group of NLA members submitted another water bill with the same title: Water 
Resources Bill, to the NLA for consideration. 
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agencies concerned need to pursue when it comes to water resource-related issues. This is 
reflected in various provisions such as those for water management organizations, water 
resource development and conservation, and flood control. In fact, the Office of the Prime 
Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management of 2007, which regulates 
the RBC framework under study, also was prepared based on provisions for ‘water 
management organizations’ in the Water Resource Bill mentioned (THE LEGAL AFFAIRS 
GROUP, 2008). Thus, to provide a comparative picture of the current RBC setup, the 
following section presents RBC frameworks envisioned by varying water bill versions, 
prepared in connection with the promulgation effort of 2007. 
 
4.2.2 The RBC frameworks in the water bill 
 
Throughout the promulgation process in 2007, the Water Resources Bill, which was 
drafted by the DWR and TURCI in 2003-4 (TURCI 2004) and approved by the Cabinet in 
2007, was subsequently revised (hereafter called the Cabinet Bill). There were then two 
more drafts based on the Cabinet Bill: the Water Resources Bill vetted by the OSC in 2007, 
and the revised Water Resources Bill by the NLA Ad Hoc Committee on Water Resource 
Bill, which was the final version considered by the NLA for promulgation (hereafter 
known as the OSC Bill and the NLA Bill, respectively). Among other things, the three 
water bills contained provisions for water management organizations planned for creation 
at both the national and river basin level. A group of NLA members also submitted another 
water bill to the NLA44, but it contained no provision regarding water management 
organizations. 
In general, the three bills suggested establishing a water management organization at the 
national level (Figure 4.1), namely the National Water Resources Committee (NWRC), 
chaired by the Prime Minister or designated deputy prime minister, with NWRC members 
comprising ministers of the ministries concerned, such as the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (MNRE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
(MOAC); senior officers from the public agencies concerned, e.g. the DWR and RID; 
representatives of the RBCs; and experts. The main tasks of the NWRC would include 
developing water policies and water management plans, and supervising their 
implementation. In addition, the NWRC would also supervise the operations of a water 
management organization at the river basin level (e.g. providing an operational directive).  
                                                          
44
 See footnote no. 43 
 59 
In supporting the NWRC, the Cabinet Bill and NLA Bill included provisions to establish a 
new government agency - the Office of National Water Resources Committee (ONWRC). 
The former indicated that the ONWRC was established as a DWR division to serve as the 
NWRC secretariat. The latter prescribed establishment of the ONWRC as a department 
under the MNRE within three years from the water law being enforced, and it would 
replace the DWR as the NWRC secretariat. The OSC Bill contained no such provision. 
The three water bills, at the river basin level, indicated the establishment and demarcation 
of a river basin. In principle, they all envisioned a water management organization, i.e. a 
river basin committee (RBC), to be established for each river basin (Figure 4.1). 
Nevertheless, differences in details concerning the RBC framework stipulated in each bill 
can be observed; for example, the number of RBC members and the RBC term (e.g. a two-
year term in the OSC Bill, or four-year term in the NLA Bill). All the designed 
frameworks, however, share a similar feature in terms of composition of the RBC members 
(Table 4.1). That is to say, the members represent the public sector (i.e. public agencies 
concerned) as well as water user organizations, and local government organizations 
(LGOs) that exist in respective river basins. These members assume their position by 
appointment, but a selection procedure will be applied to identify those individuals who are 
to be nominated. In addition, a certain number of experts are also nominated and appointed 
as RBC members. All of the bills also indicate that RBCs are authorized to appoint sub-
committees for sub-river basins located in respective river basins by following the selection 
and appointment procedure set by the NWRC. This essentially creates a river basin 
organization with a two-layer structure, as described by JASPERS (2003) – the RBCs at the 
river basin level, and the sub-river basin sub-committees at the sub-river basin level. 
The main tasks of the RBCs, as prescribed in the three bills, are to develop a water 
management plan for the respective river basin; and deal with water use issues, such as 
determining water use priority, and approving water permit requests. However, a notable 
distinction regarding the RBCs’ mandates can be found in the Cabinet Bill, in which the 
RBCs are authorized to comment on water resource-related plans and projects proposed by 
provinces located in respective river basins before submitting for a national budget 
allocation. Furthermore, upon approval of the ministers concerned, the RBCs are also 
sanctioned to issue a river basin regulation, which may include penalties (fine and/or 
imprisonment). 
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Figure 4.1: The proposed structure of the water resource organization 
  National Water Resources Committee (NWRC)  
    
ONWRC    
    
   National level 
    
   River basin level 
    
  River Basin Committee (RBC)  
    
ONWRC Unit    
    
  Sub-River Basin Sub-Committee  
    Source: Based on the draft of the NLA Ad Hoc Committee on Water Resource Bill 
 
Table 4.1: The composition of the river basin committee (RBC) 
Type of the members Number of the members 
Representatives of government agencies concerned 10 
Representatives of water user organizations 7 
Representatives of local government organizations 3 
Experts 4 
WRO director/head of the ONWRC unit 1 
Total 25 
Source: Based on the draft of the NLA Ad Hoc Committee on Water Resource Bill 
 
To perform the tasks mentioned above, all three bills indicate a similar arrangement: an 
organized meeting, where RBC members meet and make decisions. A quorum in a given 
meeting is attained when at least one half of the total number of RBC members attends. 
Each member has one vote, and a decision is made based on a majority vote. In the case of 
a tie, the chairperson casts the deciding vote. This arrangement also applies to the sub-river 
basin sub-committees (and other committees and sub-committees to be appointed). The 
RBC members (and members of the committees and sub-committees appointed by the 
RBCs) are prescribed by the bills to meet and make decisions on river basin-related issues. 
It can be seen that the RBCs and their committees and sub-committees are managed in a 
participant-governed form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008; see Section 2.2.3).  
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Regarding the arrangement to support RBCs, both the Cabinet Bill and NLA Bill 
envisioned establishment of an RBC office in order to support the respective RBC. In 
addition, the former expressly indicated creation of a sub-river basin committee office, 
should such a sub-river basin be established and sub-committee appointed. However, there 
is no provision with regard to this aspect in the OSC Bill. The Cabinet Bill indicates 
creation of RBC offices/sub-river basin committee offices under the ONWRC, once the 
water law comes into effect. In contrast, the NLA Bill stipulates that the DWR’s Water 
Resources Regional Office (WRO) serves as secretariat for the respective RBC, while its 
director also serves as the RBC member and secretary. However, in accordance with the 
provision to set up the ONWRC within three years from the law being placed, as 
previously mentioned, the ONWRC is then required to establish its units as RBC 
secretariat offices in order to replace WROs; with the heads of these units also assuming 
the position of RBC member and secretary, in the place of WRO directors. However, 
establishment of a sub-river basin committee office is not mentioned in the NLA Bill, even 
though it sanctions the RBCs to appoint such a committee. 
 
4.3 Current water governance practices 
 
This section presents current water governance practices taking place at the local level. The 
intention here is to provide an overview of present practices by which water resources are 
managed at the local level, as observed in the Mae Rim sub-river basin. These practices are 
illustrated by those performed by irrigation water user organizations of the Mae Tang 
Operation and Maintenance Project, and traditional water user groups (muang fai group). 
The roles of local government organizations in managing water resources are discussed 
briefly. 
 
4.3.1 Irrigation water governance in the Mae Tang Operation and Maintenance 
Project  
 
4.3.1.1 The Mae Tang Operation and Maintenance Project 
The Mae Tang Operation and Maintenance Project is referred to commonly as the Mae 
Tang Irrigation Project (MIP), and one of the three National Operation and Maintenance 
Projects located in Chiang Mai province. It is under the RID Regional Irrigation Office 1. 
Completed in 1973, the MIP project area is 174,328 rai with an irrigation area of 99,298 
rai, covering five districts of the province (MIP JOURNAL, 2010a, 2010b). This area not 
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only covers part of the Mae Rim sub-river basin, but also other sub-river basins of the Ping 
River basin, such as the Mae Tang and Mae Khan sub-river basins. The MIP only has one 
main canal, which is approximately 75 km long and passes through five districts with 23 
main lateral canals to convey irrigation water to farms.  
Regarding distribution of irrigation water, the MIP project area is divided into four sections 
along the main canal, and four MIP Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Sections (i.e. 
O&M Section 1 to 4) are responsible for these. These four Sections are subdivided further 
into 15 irrigation zones, with an officer assigned for each one. The MIP also has the Water 
Allocation and Irrigation System Development Section to facilitate irrigation water 
distribution, together with its irrigation water user organizations or ‘integrated water users 
group (IWUG)’, as termed formally by the RID (OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATORY 
PROMOTION, 2009, p. 12). 
 
4.3.1.2 Irrigation water user organizations  
There are 13 IWUGs in the MIP project area. Generally, there is one IWUG for each 
irrigation zone, with the exception of Zones 3 to 5, which are organized under one single 
IWUG. IWUGs manage irrigation water at the farm level after it has been distributed into 
the lateral canals located in their irrigation zones. IWUG leaders were elected to serve a 
four year term by water users in respective irrigation zones. For example, a general 
meeting in IWUG Zone 7 was held for water users to elect water allocation chiefs of farm 
turnouts, who would form the IWUG Committee and elect its chairperson.  
Meetings are organized to discuss water issues and crop production; once for rainy season 
cropping (June - November), and at least once for dry season cropping (December – May). 
The water users are required to pay a fee of 15 Baht/rai/year; of which, 10 baht is given to 
the water allocation chiefs as remuneration for their work in distributing water to 
individual farms. The rest is kept as a common fund for the groups45. They also are 
required to participate in the maintenance of field ditches (removing sediment and weeds), 
and the IWUGs levy a fine of 150-300 baht/day for those who fail to participate.  
IWUGs in the MIP project area worked together in terms of water sharing through 1995 
and 1996. Before that, the groups did not interact with each other. Conflicts occurred as all 
groups tried to take water and consequently none reached those located downstream from 
                                                          
45
 Of 5 baht, 1 baht is now contributed to the MWUA fund. 
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the main canal. Since then, IWUG leaders have met and negotiated this matter. In 2004, 
they managed to form a network of MIP water users. In 2009, the groups also registered as 
the Mae Tang Water User Association (MWUA) with a legal entity status
46
. Thus, when it 
comes to interaction with the MIP, the IWUGs did so collectively as a network, and now as 
a water user association. As such, a general meeting for the two parties is organized twice a 
year, one before dry season cropping and the other before rainy season cropping. Issues 
regarding water availability and crop production are discussed in these meetings.  Meetings 
are held also during dry season cropping for discussing a water distribution schedule; twice 
or three times a month during water shortages and once a month in normal circumstances.    
 
4.3.1.3 Water distribution  
Generally, irrigation water is distributed simultaneously into the lateral canals for all 
IWUGs during rainy season cropping, when paddy rice is the main crop (Figure 4.2). 
Soybean is the main crop during dry season cropping, and as irrigation water is normally 
inadequate toward the latter part of that period, rotational water distribution is applied. 
Water distribution in this period can be seen as a two-step process, in which the first step 
involves the IWUGs (i.e. MWUA) and MIP, who discuss a schedule for rotational water 
distribution. The second step entails allocation of irrigation water within individual 
IWUGs, and is based on an agreed schedule. 
In the first stage of rotational water distribution, the IWUGs called for a meeting with the 
MIP in order to discuss a rotation schedule, when the amount of water passing through the 
headgate into the main canal was approximately 10 m
3
/second. However, the rotation 
schedule would be applied only when water was running at less than 8 m
3
/second. In the 
case of water flowing at between 5 m
3
 and 8 m
3
/second, the rotation schedule was divided 
into two rounds. Therefore, the IWUGs located in the first two O&M Sections of the MIP 
project area (3 IWUGs) received water for 7 days and 7 nights during the first round. In the 
second round, those IWUGs located in the last two O&M Sections (10 IWUGs) received 
water for 8 days and 8 nights. In the case of water flow amounting to less than 5 
m
3
/second, the four-round schedule was used, with water distribution periods arranged as 
follows: 5 days and 5 nights for O&M Section 1 (2 IWUGs); 4 days and 4 nights for O&M 
Section 2 (1 IWUG); 7 days and 7 nights for O&M Section 3 (4 IWUGs); and, 5 days and 
5 nights for O&M Section 4 (6 IWUGs). 
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 Based on the provision in the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 (Book I, revised version of 1992)  
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Figure 4.2: The IWUG leaders and MIP officers regulating water flow                                    
in the main canal 
 
   Source: Own photograph 
 
Based on the schedule officially announced by the MIP, the MIP officers concerned and 
IWUG chairpersons distributed irrigation water successively by starting from O&M 
Section 1 to O&M Section 4, and into the lateral canals. However, the schedule could be 
rearranged at the meetings between the IWUGs, in case adequate water was not distributed 
to water users in their areas, or more distribution time was needed.   
The second stage of distribution started when irrigation water flowed into lateral canals and 
served particular IWUGs. At this stage, the water allocation chiefs of respective IWUGs 
distributed water with the farmers into individual farms, and this was facilitated by IWUG 
chairpersons. Various distribution arrangements were practiced by different IWUGs. For 
example, in IWUG Zone 7, water was directed into farm turnouts based on a ‘day’ basis, 
starting from the farm turnouts located at the tail portion of the lateral canal. The ‘day’ 
basis gave a number of days to particular farm turnouts; then, the water allocation chiefs 
allocated water to farms served by these farm turnouts within this period of time. This 
practice of water allocation also allowed farms that were located at the tail portion of 
ditches connecting to farm turnouts to receive their water first.  
In contrast, water was distributed into farm turnouts on an ‘hour’ basis for IWUGs located 
in O&M Section 4 (IWUG Zone 10 to15). The number of hours given was calculated based 
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on the farming areas. By calculating these hours, the number of days for water allocation 
was then summed up for particular IWUGs. The water allocation chiefs allocated water to 
farms within the given periods, starting from those located at the head portions of the 
lateral canal and ditches. In this Section, water pumps also were used to feed water into the 
ditches. 
According to the IWUG leaders, there are generally no conflicts regarding irrigation water 
rotation among the water users, as there are water allocation chiefs to manage this task. 
Registration of the IWUGs, as a water user association (i.e. the MWUA), also provides a 
legal basis for the groups as a whole. The MWUA can deal effectively with water users 
who are not group members, particularly public offices, which are now required to be 
MWUA members, and must follow the water rotation schedule.  
 
4.3.2 Traditional irrigation system 
 
The traditional irrigation system or muang fai is well known and has been practiced in 
northern Thailand since the sixth century (SURARERKS, 2006). COHEN and PEARSON (1998, 
p. 87) state that in this system, “water is held back by artificial weir (fai) constructed on 
the river and is directed to individual plots by a system of primary, secondary and tertiary 
canals (muang) with the aid of smaller diversion weirs containing sluice gate (tae) and 
farm turn-outs (tang).” An arrangement is made to regulate water distribution among water 
users in the system (i.e. a muang fai group) and maintain the weir and canals. In addition, 
contribution in terms of labor and materials also are required, and a fine is levied against 
those who fail to provide it. A fee in cash or in kind (i.e. unhusked rice) also is collected as 
remuneration for the leader of the group, who has the main duties of overseeing system 
maintenance and water distribution (e.g. NGAMWITTYAROJ & ADIRECKTRAKARN, 2007; 
OUNVICHIT, SATOH, CHANTANUSART, & YAMAOKA, 2006; SURARERKS, 2006).    
In the Mae Rim sub-river basin, this system has been used by various communities, 
particularly those located outside the MIP project area, to convey water into their farms. 
For example, in San Payang sub-district, Mae Tang district, Chiang Mai province, there are 
17 muang fai groups located in its six villages; two of which have up to four muan fai 
groups. Based on the muang fai leaders interviewed, muang fai group features generally 
resemble those briefly explained above. As an illustration, one munag fai group, the Na 
Huek munag fai, is presented here in more detail. 
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The Na Huek munag fai group has approximately 600 water users from four villages in Sa 
Luang sub-district and Houy Sai sub-district, Mae Rim district, Chiang Mai province. By 
growing paddy rice in both rainy (July/August-November) and dry season cropping 
(February-May), the group relies on a concrete weir constructed at the Mae Rim river 
(Figure 4.3) to direct water into a concrete canal serving first the water users in Ban Na 
Huek village (Sa Luang sub-district). This canal splits at its tail into two concrete canals 
(namely, the west and east canals) to convey water to water users in Ban Hor Fai, Ban 
Houy Sai, and Ban Nong Plaman villages (Houy Sai sub-district). 
Regarding group management, the munag fai leader and his four assistants, who represent 
the four villages, were elected by the water users to serve a four-year term. Their main 
duties included water distribution in both rainy and dry season cropping, and arrangements 
for system maintenance. A fee of 25 Baht/rai/year was collected as their remuneration, and 
the total sum was divided equally among the five of them. 
  
Figure 4.3: The weir of the Na Huek muang fai group located at the Mae Rim River 
 
                Source: Own photograph 
 
A general meeting for the Na Huek munag fai group was organized once a year in May to 
discuss a schedule for system maintenance and financial matters as well as water 
distribution issues observed in the previous year. System maintenance was arranged twice 
a year: once in June and again around October, when the weir and canals were dredged. 
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The water users were required to supply laborers for these maintenance activities. Farms of 
less than 10 rai in size were obliged to contribute one laborer, while those larger than 10 
rai contributed two. A fine of 300 Baht/day/laborer was imposed on water users who failed 
to comply. The fines were kept as the group’s common fund, together with the fees 
collected, e.g. the annual fee of 300 Baht from occasional water users, who pump water 
from the canals. This fund was used for minor repairs to the canals. Requests for assistance 
in major canal repairs were made to the Houy Sai Sub-district (tambon) Administrative 
Organization (TAO) or RID office. 
Water was distributed to all users during rainy season cropping as the quantity was 
generally adequate. During this period, water users adjusted their water intake on their 
own, while the group leader and his assistants helped to regulate water flow by adjusting 
the sluice gate located at the weir, or those situated at the head of the east or west canals.  
Water availability was generally low toward the end of dry season cropping (latter part of 
March to mid-April), and water rotation was practiced during this time. A meeting between 
the group leader and his assistants was held to discuss a rotation schedule, which normally 
applied to the three villages of Houy Sai sub-district, where around 500 users took water 
from the east and west canals. Water was scheduled for alternate direction into each canal 
from one to three/four days, depending on availability. The agricultural area was divided 
into three portions along the two canals: head, middle and tail. The users drawing water 
from the west canal would receive it first, starting from the head portion. Normally, a 
three-day distribution period was long enough for users to obtain adequate water, as each 
portion would receive water for one day. The group leader and his assistants coordinated 
with individual farmers in distributing water into ditches and fields during this time. 
However, when water availability was considerably low, the rotation schedule was also 
applied to Ban Na Huek village (Sa Lung sub-district), located at the head portion of the 
canal system. In this case, a three-day distribution period was alternated among the three 
canals, starting from the Ban Na Huek village area, and followed by the west and east 
canals, respectively.  
According to the group leader, there was no conflict over irrigation water. Generally, the 
users received adequate water within each respective distribution period. A water pump 
was made available (borrowed from the RID office) as a precaution during water rotation 
periods, just in case water needed to be pumped into the canal system. 
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4.3.3 Roles of local government organizations on water governance 
 
The Mae Rim sub-river basin fully or partially covers the area of 13 sub-districts located in 
Sa Meorng, Mae Tang, and Mae Rim district, Chiang Mai province. Typically, each sub-
district has one local government organization (LGO); thus, there are 13 LGOs in the sub-
river basin. Of the 13 LGOs, nine are Sub-district (tambon) Administrative Organizations 
(TAOs) and four are Sub-district Municipalities (SMs)
47
. The two types of LGOs are 
mandated to develop their respective sub-districts with specific tasks indicated in the laws 
concerned, e.g. infrastructure development, provision of water for consumption and 
agriculture, disaster prevention and relief, and promotion and support for the development 
of children and women. With a four-year term, the mayors, and both TAO and SM council 
members are elected directly by the constituencies in their sub-districts to perform the 
mandated tasks. 
The LGOs generally played a supporting role when focusing on water governance by 
complementing water user organizations; be they irrigation water user groups or munag fai 
groups. That is to say, the LGOs did not engage in irrigation water management directly, 
but rather provided support, particularly in kind, to water users groups. For example, Khee 
Lek sub-district (Mae Rim district) relied on the MIP for irrigation water, and on the 
irrigation water user group (i.e. the IWUG Zone 2) for water distributed to individual 
farmers. The Khee Lek TAO was not involved with IWUG Zone 2 in this matter. However, 
it provided support to the group in terms of fuel for a water pump (borrowed from the MIP) 
during a water shortage period. This helped the group to pump water from the main canal 
and into lateral ones. Water user groups were supported in a similar manner by other LGOs 
in their location such as the Sa Loung TAO (Mae Rim district) and San Payang TAO (Mae 
Tang district). According to the leader of IWUG Zone 1, located in the Mae Tang sub-river 
basin (Mae Tang district), his group received support by way of fuel for a water pump from 
the LGOs concerned in the area, such as the San Mahapon SM and Mae Tang TAO.  
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 As presented in Section 2.4, there are three main forms of LGOs in Thailand: 1) provincial administrative 
organization, 2) municipality, and 3) TAO. The municipality is classified further into three types: sub-
district municipality (SM), town municipality, and city municipality. The TAO and SM concerned here 
share a rather similar scope of mandated tasks. However, the main distinction between the two is probably 
the structure of their councils. The TAO council generally consists of members representing all villages 
located in a particular sub-district (two representatives for each village). In contrast, the SM council has a 
fixed number of 12 members, as the SM jurisdiction is divided into two zones; with each zone having six 
representatives. 
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In addition, the LGOs also provided support for maintaining weirs, canals and ditches. This 
support came in different forms and channels. The LGOs provided materials in the form of 
fuel and items for repairing irrigation structures in an ad hoc manner when receiving 
requests from water user groups; for example, sandbags to reinforce dirt canals used by the 
muang fai groups (e.g. the Sa Lung TAO), or building materials for repairing damaged 
concrete canals, as provided to the Na Huek muang fai group by Houy Sai TAO. The 
LGOs also provided regular support through regular channels, that is to say, through 
development projects. In this case, the water user groups had to propose projects to the 
LGOs such as weir reparation or canal paving. When approved, these projects were 
implemented by the LGOs in a given fiscal year. Occasionally, the LGOs also built 
structures for irrigation water such as the weir for muang fai groups by the Sop Perng TAO 
in the 2010 fiscal year, and five reservoirs by the San Payang TAO in the 2009 fiscal year.  
 
4.4 The RBC frameworks 
 
This section discusses the RBC framework, which was implemented by the DWR. Since 
being first introduced in 2002, the RBC framework has had two versions; the current 
version replaced the previous one in 2007. Thus, this section begins with a discussion on 
the 2002 RBC framework and its implementation by taking the Upper Ping River Sub-
Committee as a point of illustration. The current version of the 2007 RBC framework is 
then presented, and an overview of its implementation is also shown.  
 
4.4.1 The 2002 RBC framework 
 
4.4.1.1 Legal framework  
The RBC framework was first introduced by the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation 
on National Water Resource Management (No.2) of 2002. This Regulation was an 
amendment of that issued in 1989, by which the National Water Resources Committee 
(NWRC) was established. The NWRC was chaired by the Prime minister, who also 
appointed its members. Its main mandate was to provide recommendations on water source 
development. Based on this establishment, the 2002 Regulation authorized the NWRC to 
appoint ‘a river basin sub-committee’ for river basins across the country.  
The 2002 Regulation contained no provision for the number of river basin sub-committee 
members. It only indicated that the sub-committee consisted of selected government 
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officers; representatives of state owned enterprises, LGOs, and water user organizations; 
and stakeholders, who worked or lived in respective river basins. In addition, experts with 
knowledge of and experience in water resource management were included as sub-
committee members. The chairperson and secretary of each river basin sub-committee 
were selected from its members. According to the 2002 Regulation, there was no fixed 
serving term for the river basin sub-committee.  
The 2002 Regulation also outlined various mandates for the river basin sub-committee. 
These tasks included, for example, providing recommendations on water resource 
management for the NWRC; creating a water resource management plan for the respective 
river basin; coordinating with the public agencies concerned in the river basin, in order to 
have action plans that were congruent with the river basin’s water resource management 
plan; prioritizing water use as well as determining the quantity of water to be used and 
water allocation measures; and solving conflicts and problems regarding water resource 
management in the river basin. Also, the sub-river basin committee was authorized to 
appoint a working group. 
 
4.4.1.2 Implementation of the 2002 RBC framework  
Implementation of the 2002 RBC framework started in February 2003, with appointment 
of the new NWRC. After bureaucratic reform in 2002, the DWR became the NWRC 
secretariat, with the DWR director general serving as NWRC secretary. 
By its Bureau of Mass Promotion and Coordination (BMPC), the DWR also outlined the 
structure of the sub-river basin committee. It consisted of three working groups at the river 
basin level; and, the working groups for provinces, sub-river basins, districts and sub-
districts (BMPC, 2003; see Figure 4.4). Apparently, the structure was based on that of the 
river basin pilot projects implemented in the Upper Ping, Lower Ping, and Pasak River 
Basins from 1999 to 2001 (PATTANEE, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). It can be seen that this 
structure was based on provincial administration, as the working groups were created at the 
provincial, district, and sub-district level (cf. Figure 2.1 and JASPERS, 2003). The DWR 
also laid out establishment processes for the sub-committee and working groups. Its 
nationwide Water Resources Regional Offices (WROs) were assigned with the tasks, 
among others, of supporting establishment of the river basin sub-committees and working 
groups, and serving as their secretariat. By 2006, 29 river basin sub-committees were 
appointed for 29 river basins. A number of working groups also were appointed (DWR, 
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2006; see Table 4.2). To illustrate implementation of the 2002 RBC framework, an 
example of the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee is presented in the following 
section.  
 
Figure 4.4: The structure of the 2002 RBC framework 
 National Water Resources Committee 
(NWRC) 
 
     
DWR as Secretariat     
    National level 
     
    River basin level 
     
 Sub-River Basin Committee  
   
WRO as Secretariat   
   
 
 
  
Working Group on Public Relation 
and Participant 
 
Working Group on Information 
 Working Group on Integrated River 
Basin Plan 
     
  Provincial River Basin Working Group   
     
  Sub-River Basin Working Group   
     
  District River Basin Working Group   
     
  Sub-District River Basin Working 
Group 
  
Source: Based on the 2002 Regulation, and DWR (2006, p. 10) 
 
Table 4.2: River basin sub-committees and working groups located                                          
in the WRO 1 area 
River basin Sub-
committee* 
Working groups* 
River 
basin 
level 
Provincial 
level 
Sub-river 
basin level 
District 
level 
Sub-
district 
level 
Upper Ping 1/37 3/83 2/44 15/360 29/625 228/8,940 
Lower Ping 1/31 3/101 3/68 - 17/410 132/3,246 
Wang 1/26 3/64 2/38 - 14/154 94/7,707 
Khong Part I and Kok 1/25 3/78 3/106 - 28/603 201/4,343 
Salawin 1/30 3/86 2/56 - 11/178 72/1,246 
Source: Adapted from the DWR (2006, p. 16)                 
*Number of sub-committees/ working group members 
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4.4.1.3 The upper Ping river basin sub-committee  
 
Establishment 
The Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee was appointed by the NWRC in August 2003. 
It consisted of 37 members who represented both the public and non-public sector (Table 
4.3). Apart from the two provincial governors and two DWR officers, the NWRC 
Appointment Order did not specify a name of any individuals or particular officers as sub-
committee members. Therefore, the public agencies and state owned enterprises, which 
were indicated in the NWRC Appointment Order, had to assign their officers as 
representatives who sat on the sub-committee. According to a URCMS officer, non-public 
sector representatives were nominated by their counterparts during a general meeting held 
by the URCMS, and they became the sub-committee members representing particular 
groups, e.g. agricultural water user groups. 
 
Table 4.3: The members of the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee 
Member Number 
Provincial governor  2 
Public agencies 11 
State owned enterprise 1 
Water user groups/organization (agriculture) 15 
Water user groups/organization (business/industry) 2 
Local government organization 2 
Civic sector/NGOs working on natural resources or the environment 2 
Educational institution/experts on natural resources or the environment 2 
Total 37 
Source: The NWRC Order No.21/2546, dated August 21, 2003 
 
The first meeting of the sub-committee was held in January 2004 by the URCMS. In this 
meeting, the chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary and assistant secretary of the sub-
committee were selected. The two provincial governors were nominated as the chairperson 
and vice-chairperson, respectively, while the WRO 1 director and URCMS director were 
nominated as the secretary and assistant secretary, respectively. To complete the structure 
of the river basin sub-committee, as showed in Figure 4.4, the compositions and mandates 
of the three working groups at the river basin level, and those of the working groups at the 
provincial, sub-river basin, and district and sub-district levels also were presented and 
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approved in this first meeting. This led to appointments of the working groups at different 
levels for the entire Upper Ping River Basin (see Table 4.2). 
 
Functions 
The 2002 Regulation stipulated various mandates for the river basin sub-committee, as in 
the examples given earlier. However, it was observed that the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee performed just one function, which related to water resource management 
planning. This was reflected by the Sub-Committee’s six meetings held throughout its 
existence from 2004 to 200748. During this period, the meetings appeared to be the Sub-
Committee’s only activity. As they were organized by the URCMS, the main agenda 
always focused on approving a water resource management plan, which was also a 
URCMS mandate. Thus, the main output generated by the Sub-Committee was limited 
with regard to such plans.  
To fully appreciate the function of the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee in this 
regard, the nature of the so-called water resource management plan needs to be clarified. 
Evidently, this plan was a collection of water resources-related programs or projects 
intended for implementation by public agencies or LGOs in the Upper Ping River Basin.  
Thus, it was not a guideline or strategy by which these public agencies or LGOs could 
follow in their planning process (e.g. BRAGA & LOTUFO, 2008). The URMCS, as the Sub-
Committee Secretariat, collected the relevant programs and projects from the LGOs via the 
meetings held for working groups at the district level. It also requested that the public 
agencies involved send in their related programs and projects. Apparently, the Sub-
Committee was not involved in planning the programs and projects collected. The approval 
of this so-called water resource management plan also appeared to be in a procedural rather 
than substantive decision making process. As observed from reports of a meeting, no 
deliberation or critical considerations were made regarding the plan, after it was presented 
to the Sub-Committee.  
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 During the same period, few meetings (i.e. activities) were held for the other working groups appointed. 
For example, six meetings were organized for the Working Group on the Integrated River Basin Plan, while 
three meetings were arranged for each of the two provincial river basin working groups (Chiang Mai and 
Lamphun provinces), with the main focus on the water resource management plan. No meeting, however, 
was organized for working groups at the sub-river basin and sub-district level. Thus, these working groups 
were truly a ‘paper committee’ because they existed ‘on paper only’ (ABERS, 2007, p. 1543) throughout the 
period in which the 2002 RBC framework was implemented.       
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It should be noted that the 2002 Regulation did not indicate how the river basin sub-
committees or their working groups were managed (cf. the 2007 Regulation in Section 
4.4.2). However, members of the governing bodies concerned were meant to make 
decisions collectively in the meetings held, and so it can be conceived in theory that this 
arrangement followed the participant-governed form suggested by PROVAN and KENIS 
(2008). Evidently, as presented above, the URCMS and WRO 1 played a pivotal role 
concerning the meetings and water resource management plans, which were the only 
activity of and output from the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee and its governing 
bodies. Thus, they were managed in practice by the lead organization governed form 
(PROVAN & KENIS, 2008) led by the URCMS and WRO 1. As this management form is 
characterized by centralization, it does not seem to support collaborative water governance, 
underlined by shared-decision making power and participation (see Section 2.3.1).         
Overall, functions performed by the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee were very 
limited. Within the function on water resource management planning, the actual role of the 
Sub-Committee was confined to a mere procedural approval of the so-called water resource 
management plan. This clearly indicates both limited involvement and decision making 
power of the Sub-Committee on the one hand, and the central role played by the URCMS 
(and by extension, DWR) in this setup on the other. These aspects were also observed in 
implementation of the current RBC framework, as presented Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.2 The 2007 RBC framework 
 
4.4.2.1 Legal framework 
The current RBC framework is regulated by the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation 
on National Water Resource Management of 2007, which replaced the 2002 RBC 
framework. The 2007 Regulation stipulates establishment of a new National Water 
Resources Committee and river basin committees, with details as follows. 
 
4.4.2.2 The National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) 
The 2007 Regulation indicates the composition of NWRC members with no fixed 
maximum number. Chaired by the Prime Minister or designated deputy Prime Minister, 
ministers of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
serve as the first, second and third vice-chairperson, respectively. The DWR director 
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general is designated as the NWRC member and secretary; and other members include 
representatives of public agencies and experts appointed by the Prime Minister. No fixed 
term is given for the NWRC as a whole, but a four-year term is prescribed for the 
appointed experts.  
The NWRC is mandated with various tasks, which include, for example, providing 
recommendations for the Cabinet (e.g. on issues regarding the water resource management 
policy); approving rules and regulations proposed by a river basin committee (RBC); and 
monitoring, coordinating, and supporting water resources-related operations. To assist the 
NWRC, the 2007 Regulation designates the DWR to serve as the NWRC secretariat, with 
tasks such as coordinating with river basin secretariats, and providing directions for water 
resource management planning to the RBCs, public agencies and LGOs.  
 
4.4.2.3 The river basin committee (RBC) 
The 2007 Regulation states that the NWRC appoints an RBC for each river basin. With the 
maximum number of 35 members and a balance between members representing the public 
and non-public sector, RBC members comprise representatives of public agencies, LGOs, 
and water user organizations. In addition, experts who have knowledge of and experience 
in water resource management also are appointed as RBC members. All RBC members 
must work or live in the respective river basin. The RBC chairperson is selected by RBC 
members, while the WRO director concerned is designated as an RBC member and the 
secretary. Like the NWRC, the 2007 Regulation does not specify a fixed term for the RBC 
as a whole, except for the expert members, who serve a four-year term.  
The mandates given to the RBC by the 2007 Regulation are similar essentially to those of 
the river basin sub-committee, as stipulated by the 2002 Regulation (see Section 4.4.1), 
with exception that the RBC is charged as well with the task of supporting LGOs in 
managing water resources in small-scale water sources. To illustrate the extent of RBC 
mandates, a full list is provided in Box 4.2.  
The 2007 Regulation indicates that an RBC meeting must follow the related provisions 
specified in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1996. Of these related provisions, there 
are two key stipulations: a quorum in a given meeting is attained when at least one half of 
the total number of respective committee members attend (Article 79); and, a decision is 
made based on a majority vote, given that each committee member has one vote. In the 
event of a tie, the chairperson casts the deciding vote (Article 82). When applied to the 
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RBC, it is suggested that RBC members participate in decision making in order to fulfill its 
mandates. This also implies that, in theory, the RBC is managed by the participant-
governed form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008), where ideally all RBC members (or at least half 
of them) take part in making decisions on river basin-related issues specified in their 
mandates. The 2007 Regulation indicates further that the WRO concerned serves as the 
RBC secretariat, with tasks as presented in Box 4.3.  
 
Box 4.2: Mandates of the river basin committee (RBC) by the 2007 Regulation  
  1.  To provide recommendations to the NWRC on the formation of policies, programs, projects 
and problem solving methods regarding water resource management; and, on the operations of 
the public agencies, LGOs and private organizations concerned in the river basin. 
  2.  To prepare a plan for water resource management for the river basin. 
  3.  To coordinate with the public agencies and LGOs concerned in the river basin in order to make 
their action and budget plans congruent with the water resource management plan mentioned, 
and the budget framework recommended to the Cabinet by the NWRC.     
  4.  To prioritize and determine the quantity of water to be used; and create a fair and effective 
water allocation measure based on water availability. 
  5.  To monitor and evaluate operations of the water resource-related government agencies in the 
river basin.   
  6.  To promote, support and provide recommendations to LGOs with regard to water resource 
management in small-scale water sources.  
  7.  To make requests for data and facts on water resources in order to compile statistics, data, 
opinions, and recommendations for water resource management in the river basin. 
  8.  To mediate in conflicts, and solve problems relating to water resource management in the river 
basin. 
  9.  To coordinate operations relating to water resource management with other RBCs concerned.  
10.  To disseminate and publicize water resource management matters, and seek opinions as well as 
create a better understanding of these matters from the public.  
11.  To appoint a sub-committee or working group to perform tasks assigned by the RBC. 
12.  To perform other tasks assigned by the NWRC. 
Source: The 2007 Regulation 
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Box 4.3: Mandates of the RBC secretariat  
1. To perform secretarial tasks for the RBC and coordinate with the NWRC secretariat and other 
RBC secretariats  
2.  To collect data, opinions, suggestions and information related to water resource management 
and present them to the RBC for preparing a water resource management plan and solving 
water resource management problems in respective river basins 
3.  To collect action and budget plans from the public agencies concerned, and LGOs in respective 
river basins, and present them to the RBC for preparing a water resource management plan for 
a particular river basin   
4.  To build capacity for water resource management, and publicize water resource management 
matters 
5.  To perform other tasks assigned by the NWRC or RBC 
Source: The 2007 Regulation 
 
4.4.2.4 Implementation of the 2007 RBC framework: an overview 
The National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) 
Like its 2002 predecessor, implementation of the current RBC framework started with 
appointment of a new NWRC. The first appointment was issued on October 4, 2007, with a 
total of only 26 members representing just the public sector and expert group. The 
additional appointment was made on March 12, 2009, with nine representatives from 25 
RBCs, and three from the LGOs, to act as NWRC members under the ‘expert’ group, as 
well as two more representatives from the public sector. On November 16, 2009, one 
additional representative was appointed from the private sector, as an NWRC member 
under the expert group. Thus, the NWRC consists of 41 members, of which those 
representing the non-public sector are all subsumed under the expert group (Table 4.4). 
Twelve NWRC meetings were held irregularly from October 2007 to December 2010. 
However, no meeting has been organized since 2011 (as of January 2014). It can be 
observed from the meeting reports that the NWRC has so far played a minimal role in 
setting directions for water resource management at the national level, which goes against 
the mandates given. Although it is viewed as ‘the national water sector apex body’ (ADB, 
2006) the NWRC has been employed largely by the MNRE and DWR in order to 
legitimize and support their work. An illustrating example is the water grid project 
(feasibility study) that was implemented in northeast Thailand. In this project, the NWRC 
legitimized the project proposal before submitting it to the Cabinet, and three out of four 
NWRC meetings held in 2010 were dominated by this issue. 
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When focusing on the RBC framework, the NWRC is authorized to appoint RBCs and 
required to oversee their operations. In practice, however, the DWR, as secretariat to the 
NWRC, has carried out all the work regarding this. From meeting reports, the NWRC only 
acknowledged and approved proposals or reports regarding the RBC work presented by the 
DWR. Apart from the official appointment of RBCs, all of the RBC-related work has been 
executed by the DWR via its regional units, i.e. WROs. Thus, the NWRC also plays a 
limited role in this aspect.  
 
Table 4.4: The members of the Nation Water Resources Committee (NWRC) 
Members Number 
Public sector  
   - Designated Deputy Prime Minister and MNRE, MOAC, and MOST 
ministers 
4 
   - Senior public officers (e.g. permanent secretaries, and director generals) 17 
Expert group  
  - Experts  7 
  - Representatives from RBCs 9 
  - Representatives from LGOs  
 Representative from the National Municipal League of Thailand   1 
 Representative from the Provincial Administrative Organization 
Association of Thailand 
1 
 Representative from the Sub-district (tambon) Administrative 
Organization Association of Thailand  
1 
 - Representative from the Federation of Thai Industries 1 
Total 41 
Source: The Orders of the Office of the Prime Minister No. 244/2550 (2007), No. 80/2552 (2009), 
and No. 253/2552 (2009) 
 
The River basin committee (RBC) 
The DWR, as secretariat to the NWRC, prepared a draft of the NWRC Announcement on 
Qualification, Nomination Procedure, Appointment, and Term and Termination of Office 
of the River Basin Committee Members, in order to establish the RBCs following the 2007 
Regulation, and presented it to the NWRC. The NWRC approved the draft and issued the 
Announcement on June 24, 2008, thus officially starting the establishment process of the 
25 RBCs.  
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The NWRC Announcement of 2008 outlined in detail, the qualifications, nomination and 
appointment procedure, and term and termination of RBC members. Thus, certain 
qualifications49 were specified for individuals to be eligible for appointment as RBC 
members and represent water user organizations and LGOs, or be RBC expert members.  
The water user organizations were classified into three groups: 1) agriculture, 2) industry, 
and 3) commerce, service and tourism. In general, individuals eligible to represent each of 
the three groups must have an occupation relating to the respective group (e.g. a person 
must have an agricultural occupation to represent the water user organizations in the 
agriculture sector). LGO executives (e.g. mayors) are the only persons eligible to represent 
LGOs, and those standing for nomination as expert members must be representatives from 
educational institutions, private organizations or NGOs involved in environmental and 
natural resources or river basin management; or they must have relevant knowledge and 
experience. 
Based on the NWRC Announcement, a provincial recruitment sub-committee was 
appointed for each province in order to identify persons qualified for nomination and 
appointment as RBC members. Chaired by the provincial governor, this sub-committee had 
ten members that included, for instance, Mayor of the PAO, President of the Provincial 
Chamber of Commerce, and Chief of the Provincial Office of Agriculture and Co-
Operatives. The WRO director concerned served as the provincial sub-committee member 
and secretary, and the Chief of the Provincial Office of Natural Resources and 
Environment was a member and assistant secretary. 
The above mentioned provincial sub-committees identified eligible persons, based on 
procedure detailed in the NWRC Announcement, in which the maximum number of 
eligible persons to be identified was also indicated. For example, two to four qualified 
persons should be nominated for each of the three groups under the water user 
organizations mentioned earlier, with a maximum of nine persons in total. Also, the 
provincial sub-committee was instructed to coordinate with agriculture-related government 
offices at the provincial level, e.g. the Agricultural Extension Provincial Office and 
Fisheries Provincial Office, and ask them to recommend individuals for nomination as 
representatives for agricultural water user organizations. After qualified persons from 
water user organizations and LGOs, as well as eligible experts, were identified and 
                                                          
49
 This qualification is applied to potential RBC members representing the non-public sector, which includes 
LGOs (the NWRC meeting report No. 3/2551).  
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nominated, the DWR organized a meeting for these individuals in order that they could 
select representatives from among themselves. Then, the NWRC officially appointed the 
selected individuals as members for respective RBCs.  
The recruitment process mentioned above was carried out to complement the NWRC 
Orders on the RBC Appointment, issued on August 1, 2008 for all 25 river basins. These 
Orders indicated only the number of RBC members representing each group of the non-
public sector, but did not specify them by name (Table 4.5). Regarding RBC members, 
who represent the public sector, the Orders indicated only ex officio members (i.e. the 
provincial governors and WRO directors concerned), and public agencies involved in 
particular RBCs. To identify individual members representing these public agencies in the 
RBCs concerned, the NWRC Announcement required the DWR to ask these members to 
appoint the officers who worked in their respective river basins. 
As the 2007 Regulation does not specify length of the term for RBC members, except for 
the four-year term applied to expert members, the NWRC Announcement stipulates that 
members representing water user organizations and LGOs serve a four-year term as well. 
Apart from general causes terminating the office (e.g. end of the term or death), RBC 
members representing LGOs are relieved from RBCs when they are no longer LGO 
executives, and members representing the public sector are relieved when they no long 
work in respective river basins. RBC members also may be dismissed by the NWRC 
chairperson upon a two-thirds majority vote from the RBCs concerned, due to misprision, 
infamous conduct or lack of ability. 
All of the processes outlined in the NWRC Announcement were implemented by the DWR 
through its WROs. Selected individuals representing water user organizations and LGOs, 
and selected experts, were finally appointed by the NWRC on December 1, 2008. The 
NWRC Announcement also required the DWR to organize a meeting for the 25 RBCs, 
with an agenda to select a chairperson and two vice-chairpersons. By January 2009, the 
first meeting had been held for 22 RBCs, and a meeting for the remaining three RBCs was 
scheduled for within the first week of February in the same year50. Thus, the establishment 
process of 25 RBCs was completed by the end of February 2009. 
 
 
                                                          
50
 The DWR executives meeting report, No.1/2552 
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Table 4.5: The RBCs located in the WRO 1 area 
 
Members 
RBC 
Ping Kok and 
Khong 
(North) 
Salawin Wang 
Number of members 
The public sector 
Provincial governor 4 2 1 2 
Government Public Relations Department  1 - - - 
Royal Irrigation Department 1 1 1 1 
Land Development Department 1 1 1 1 
Department of Agricultural Extension 1 1 - 1 
Marine Department 1 1 1 1 
Office of the Permanent Secretary, MNRE  1 1 1 1 
Royal Forestry Department  - 1 - 1 
Department of Water Resources 1 1 1 1 
Department of Groundwater Resources 1 1 1 1 
National Park, Wildlife, and Plant 
Conservation Department  
1 1 1 1 
Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation 
1 1 1 1 
Department of Local Administration 1 1 - 1 
Department of Public Works, and Town and 
Country Planning 
- - 1 1 
Department of Alternative Energy 
Development and Efficiency 
- - 1 - 
Department of Industrial Works - - - 1 
The Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
1 - - - 
Director of WRO 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 4.5: The RBCs located in the WRO 1 area (continued) 
 
Members 
RBC 
Ping Kok and 
Khong 
(North) 
Salawin Wang 
Number of members 
The non-public sector 
Representatives of local government 
organizations (LGOs) 
3 3 3 3 
Representatives of water user organizations 
(agriculture) 
5 3 3 4 
Representatives of water user organizations 
(industry) 
3 3 1 4 
Representatives of water user organizations 
(commerce, services, and tourism) 
2 3 2 2 
Experts 4 3 3 4 
Total 34 29 24 33 
Source: The NWRC Orders on the RBC Appointment (for the respective RBCs), dated August 1, 
2008 
 
As it appeared, the new RBC structure was introduced by the DWR51. That is to say, there 
is only one sub-committee at the river basin level, i.e. the sub-committee on river basin 
management and information, compared to three working groups implemented under the 
2002 RBC framework (cf. Figure 4.4). Also, sub-committees or working groups are 
established only at the provincial and sub-river basin level, and no working groups are set 
up at the district and sub-district level (Figure 4.5). In a way, the structure indicates an 
attempt to depart from provincial administration, which is prominent in the 2002 RBC 
framework (cf. Figure 2.1 and Figure 4.4). Given that the sub-committee in this new 
structure is located also at the river basin level, it came close to the two-layer river basin 
organization structure described by JASPERS (2003). However, it should be noted that in the 
Thai case one more layer was added as ‘a provincial river basin working group’, located 
between the river basin and sub-basin level (see Figure 4.5).  
 
 
                                                          
51
 According to the meeting document of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee for River Basin Management 
and Information, the RBC structure was prepared by the DWR acting as the NWRC secretariat (meeting 
No. 1/2552). 
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Figure 4.5: The structure of the 2007 RBC framework 
  National Water Resources Committee (NWRC)  
    
DWR as Secretariat    
    
   National level 
    
   River basin level 
    
  River Basin Committee (RBC)  
    
WRO as Secretariat    
    
  Sub-Committee on River Basin Management and 
Information 
 
    
  Provincial River Basin Working Group  
    
  Sub-River Basin Working Group  
Source: Adapted from the Ping RBC meeting agenda (meeting No.1/2009) 
 
4.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presented recent water resources-related policies such as the Nation Water 
Policy, and others indicated in main policy documents, including the government’s Policy 
Statements, and Administrative Plans as well as the Five-Year National Economic and 
Social Development Plans. Apparently, water resources have always been on the 
government’s agenda. However, it is also clear that emphasis has been placed on water 
source development, while integrated water resource management at the river basin level 
and public participation has received less attention. 
The chapter also discussed the three water bills. Although none were promulgated as law, 
certain directions, especially regarding the RBC framework, could be observed. Indeed, the 
RBC framework under study was stipulated by a legal document, in which some of its 
provisions were derived from one of these three water bills. An overview of this RBC 
framework and its implementation was presented. In addition, its predecessor, the 2002 
RBC framework and its implementation, was outlined as well. Evidently, the 2002 RBC 
framework was characterized by limited participation and lack of authority from the river 
basin governing bodies; as well as the central role of the DWR.    
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As the RBC framework is being implemented in river basins nationwide, water governance 
has been practiced also at the local level, as observed at the Mae Rim sub-river basin. In 
this area, irrigation water users groups (IWUGs) managed irrigation water together with 
the MIP, which was the irrigation office responsible. There also are traditional water user 
groups, or muang fai groups, managing water for their members. In addition, it was found 
that the LGOs were involved indirectly in local water governance by providing support 
such as fuel and building materials to the water user groups. Overall, local water user 
groups function well in managing water resources for their members.  
 
 85 
5. IMPLEMENTING COLLABORATIVE WATER 
GOVERNANCE: THE PING RIVER BASIN COMMITTEE 
 
The previous chapter (4.4.2) presented a brief overview of the 2007 RBC framework and 
its implementation. This chapter discusses in detail how the framework has been carried 
out on the ground by using the Ping River Basin Committee as a point of illustration. It 
begins with formation of the Ping RBC by covering the nomination and appointment 
processes of the RBC members and their background, as well as formation of the Ping 
RBC’s governing bodies. Then, the management of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
are presented, when details on the Water Resources Regional Office 1 (WRO 1), and its 
designated unit for this RBC, are covered as well. The chapter continues with discussion on 
collaborative processes, participation and functions as well as outcomes of the Ping RBC 
and its governing bodies.     
 
5.1 Formations of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
5.1.1 The formation of the Ping RBC 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, the NWRC officially appointed the RBCs for 25 river 
basins under the 2007 Regulation. However, the NWRC Appointment Orders indicated 
only the number of RBC members represented by the non-public sector and public 
agencies. Based on the NWRC Announcement of 2008, the NWRC appointed a provincial 
recruitment sub-committee for each province in order to identify eligible persons for 
nomination as RBC members from the non-public sector. This Announcement also 
requested that the public agencies involved, in particular RBCs, assign their officers to 
represent them in these committees. The following sections explain the two nomination 
processes conducted for the Ping RBC. 
 
5.1.1.1 The nomination process for the non-public sector members of the Ping RBC 
The provincial recruitment sub-committees 
The Ping River Basin covers five provinces (see Figure 3.1); thus, five provincial 
recruitment sub-committees were appointed to identify potential candidates for non-public 
sector members of the Ping RBC. As previously mentioned in Section 3.2, the Ping River 
Basin is under the responsibility of the URCMS and LRCMS, both of which are line units 
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of WRO 1. Administratively, the Ping River Basin is divided into the upper part (known as 
the Upper Ping River Basin) and the lower part (called the Lower Ping River Basin). The 
URCMS and LRCMS are responsible for the upper part, covering Chiang Mai, and 
Lamphun, and lower part, covering Tak, Kampaengphet and Nakhonsawan, respectively, 
and they essentially resemble the same administrative structure as before implementation 
of the 2007 Regulation (see Section 3.2 and Figure 3.1).   
As this study placed emphasis on the upper part of the Ping River Basin, the two provincial 
recruitment sub-committees for Chiang Mai and Lamphun are discussed herein. By 
following the NWRC Appointment Order of 2008, the designated members of these sub-
committees were the same for all provinces in the country (see Section 4.4.2) and, as an 
example, Table 5.1 presents the recruitment sub-committee for Chiang Mai province in 
detail. Nevertheless, a slight difference was observed in the case of two ‘experts’ in the 
sub-committees, because the 2008 NWRC Appointment Order required that these experts 
be appointed by respective provincial governors. Therefore, Chief of the Chiang Mai 
Provincial Local Administration Office and a retired university lecturer were appointed as 
experts for the Chiang Mai Provincial Recruitment Sub-Committee, while Director of the 
Lamphun Provincial Irrigation Project and a member of the Lamphun Municipalities 
Committee were appointed for the Lamphun Provincial Recruitment Sub-Committee. 
Nevertheless, public officials from the provincial administration were seen to represent 
these setups predominantly. 
Two meetings were held by the URCMS for each of the two provincial recruitment sub-
committees52. Reports from the meetings showed that the first one involved mainly 
provision of background information, e.g. the 2007 Regulation and RBC appointments, as 
well as the appointment of a recruitment working group for each of the sub-committees
53
. 
All members of the recruitment working groups also were sub-committee members. For 
example, all, but the provincial governor, PAO mayor and PONRE chief, were involved in 
the Chiang Mai Recruitment Working Group (cf. Table 5.1). The working groups 
contacted public agencies in respective areas, and asked them to disseminate information 
about recruitment, while inviting potential candidates to apply for enrolment. According to 
                                                          
52
 Meetings were organized for the Chiang Mai sub-committee on July 29, and August 26, 2008; and 
meetings were arranged on July 16, and August 21, 2008 for the Lamphun sub-committee.   
53
 The second meeting report was the only one available for the Lamphun sub-committee; however, other 
related documents (internal official correspondence) suggest that the agenda for its first meeting was likely 
the same as that for the first Chiang Mai sub-committee meeting.  
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a URMCS officer, URMCS staff also helped by contacting and inviting people they knew 
from the previous RBC setup (under the 2002 Regulation) to participate in this process. 
 
Table 5.1: The Chiang Mai Provincial Recruitment Sub-Committee 
Member Remark 
  1. Provincial governor Chairperson 
  2. Mayor of the Chiang Mai Provincial Administrative Organization  
  3. President of the Chiang Mai Provincial Chamber of Commerce   
  4. President of the Federation of Thai Industries, Chiang Mai Chapter  
  5. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Agriculture and Co-
operatives  
 
  6. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Tourism and Sports  
  7. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Social Development and 
Human Security 
 
  8. An expert on natural resource and environmental management  
  9. An expert on natural resource and environmental management  
10. Director of WRO 1 Secretary 
11. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Natural Resources and 
Environment (PONRE) 
Assistant secretary 
Source: Adaption based on the NWRC Order No.1/2551 (the Appointment of Provincial 
Recruitment Sub-Committee), dated June 24, 2008 
 
The second meeting mainly concerned selection of qualified individuals by following the 
designated number for each group in the non-public sector of one province, as prescribed 
in the 2008 NWRC Announcement: three qualified persons for LGOs; no more than nine 
for the water user groups; and no more than nine for the experts. According to reports of 
the meeting, 31 persons applied in Chiang Mai, and 33 in Lamphun (Table 5.2). The two 
provincial recruitment sub-committees selected these persons, based on the designated 
numbers mentioned, together with qualifications pertaining to the non-public sector groups 
through the NWRC Announcement (see Section 4.4.2). In total, there were 21 persons 
from Chiang Mai, and 21 from Lamphun selected by respective sub-committees in the final 
recruitment process (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.2: The Persons who applied to be Ping RBC non-public sector members in 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun 
Type Chiang Mai 
(number of persons) 
Lamphun 
(number of persons) 
1. Representatives of LGOs   
1.1. Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) 1 1 
1.2. Sub-district municipality 3 3 
1.3. Sub-district administrative organization 3 3 
2. Representatives of water user organizations   
2.1. Agriculture 8 4 
2.2. Industry 2 3 
2.3. Commerce, services and tourism 3 2 
3. Experts   
3.1. Representatives of educational institutions 6 5 
3.2. Persons with knowledge and experience of 
natural resources and the environment  
4 5 
3.3. Representatives of private organizations/NGOs 3 5 
Total 33 31 
Source: Reports on the second meeting of Lamphun and Chiang Mai Provincial Recruitment Sub-
Committees held on August 21 and 26, 2008, respectively. 
 
Table 5.3: Selected persons for recruitment as Ping RBC non-public sector members 
of Chiang Mai and Lamphun 
Type Chiang Mai 
(number of persons) 
Lamphun 
(number of persons) 
1. Representatives of LGOs (3 persons)   
1.1. Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) 1 1 
1.2. Sub-district municipality 1 1 
1.3. Sub-district administrative organization 1 1 
2. Representatives of water user organizations 
    (9 persons) 
  
2.1. Agriculture 4 4 
2.2. Industry 3 2 
2.3. Commerce, services and tourism 2 3 
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Table 5.3: Selected persons for recruitment as Ping RBC non-public sector members 
of Chiang Mai and Lamphun (continued) 
Type Chiang Mai 
(number of persons) 
Lamphun 
(number of persons) 
3. Experts (9 persons)   
3.1. Representatives of educational institutions 3 2 
3.2. Persons with knowledge and experience of 
natural resources and the environment  
3 4 
3.3. Representatives of private organizations/NGOs 3 3 
Total 21 21 
Source: Reports on the second meeting of Lamphun and Chiang Mai Provincial Recruitment Sub-
Committees held on August 21 and 26, 2008, respectively. 
 
Some observations can be made from the meeting reports and related official documents of 
the provincial recruitment sub-committees, based on the 2008 NWRC Announcement. 
Firstly, a strong top-down approach was adopted in providing directions for the provincial 
recruitment sub-committees, as indicated in the relevant Announcement. All details were 
specified and applied to all provinces across the country; and apparently the provincial 
recruitment sub-committees appointed simply followed the details indicated. This still 
reflects centralization as very much in the Thai public administration, where central 
administration sets the directions and line agencies or designated bodies duly using it.  
Secondly, it was obvious that the DWR attempted to utilize the power of provincial 
administration in conducting the recruitment work. This was done through the 2008 
NWRC Announcement, from which the DWR prepared its draft for the NWRC. This 
Announcement specifically indicated that provincial governors be appointed as the 
chairpersons of provincial recruitment sub-committees. As the chief of administration in a 
respective province, the provincial governor has great power (see Section 2.4). He/she not 
only supervises the provincial office, but also all other public agencies assigned to locate in 
areas of provincial administration. Thus, it was logical for the DWR to have provincial 
governors as chairperson of the sub-committees concerned, as some members officially 
were subordinates of the governors (see Table 5.1)54, and others would surely recognize the 
                                                          
54
 Public agencies under supervision of respective provincial governors include: the Agriculture and Co-
operatives Provincial Office, Tourism and Sports Provincial Office, Social Development and Human 
Security Provincial Office, and Natural Resources and Environment Provincial Office. The Provincial 
Local Administration Office and Provincial Irrigation Project are also under provincial governors (their 
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power of the governors. This strategy, however, suggests that the DWR lacked authority 
and had to rely on the power of provincial governors in conducting this recruitment 
activity.   
Lastly, it can be seen that the appointed chairpersons and members generally did not pay 
attention to the provincial recruitment sub-committees. The chairpersons of the Chiang Mai 
and Lamphun sub-committees never attended the meetings; but sent their representatives 
instead, as did the sub-committee members. For example, of the nine appointed members, 
six sent representatives to attend the second meeting of the Chiang Mai sub-committee. 
Thus, the meeting was rather a formality, with the officials and persons involved simply 
sending ‘someone’ to participate only in order to complete the procedure. From this it was 
obvious that no priority was given to the recruitment activity by these parties; who merely 
followed the official appointment issued by the NWRC.  
 
The selection process 
The 2008 NWRC Announcement prescribed that the DWR hold a final recruitment process 
for the non-public sector members of all 25 RBCs. In the case of the Ping RBC, the DWR 
assigned WRO 1 to organize a meeting for this activity. WRO 1 assigned further 
responsibility for the Ping River Basin to its two units, the URCMS and LRCMS, to 
arrange a meeting on September 10, 2008 for the final selection of members concerned 
with the Ping RBC in Chiang Mai.  
The meeting was divided into two sessions, one in the morning and the other in the 
afternoon. In the morning session, the Chiang Mai provincial governor came to open the 
meeting officially and then left immediately. The meeting then proceeded with an officer 
from the DWR’s Bureau of Mass Promotion and Coordination (BMPC) presenting 
information on the 2007 Regulation, the RBC mandates, and appointment of the RBCs. 
Regarding the Ping RBC non-public sector members, this officer mentioned that 17 
persons were to be appointed from the following groups: LGOs, water user organization 
(agriculture), water user organization (industry), water user organization (commerce, 
services and tourism), and experts. The officer also explained that based on the 2008 
                                                                                                                                                                                
chiefs were appointed as expert members to the Chiang Mai and Lamphun Provincial Recruitment Sub-
Committees, respectively).    
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NWRC Announcement, each group would nominate six individuals from its own group to 
the DWR, who would then pass the list on to the NWRC for the final appointment.  
In the afternoon, a group meeting for each of the five groups mentioned was held, when 
individuals from these groups were allowed to select six persons from among themselves 
for the final appointment, as presented above. The author joined the group meeting that had 
been arranged for qualified persons representing water user organizations in the 
agricultural sector. According to a URCMS officer responsible for this group, it was 
planned that eligible persons from each province would select one person for it, and the 
whole group would select one more person. Since there were five provinces in the Ping 
River Basin, the whole process would result in six persons, which followed the number 
suggested by the BMPC officer, based on the 2008 NWRC Announcement. The meeting 
proceeded as planned, where qualified persons selected one person from their own 
province (Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Tak
55
). In the case of Nakornsawan and 
Kampaengphet, only one eligible person from each province attended the meeting, so the 
two were selected automatically. The whole group also selected another qualified person 
from Chiang Mai to represent the group and, as agreed, this person was listed last on the 
selection list.  
Regarding the other four groups, only individuals qualified as experts and water user 
organizations in the commerce, services and tourism sector came to the meeting with more 
than six persons (11 for the former, and 7 for the latter). Six and four eligible persons 
joined the meeting for LGOs and water user organizations in the industrial sector, 
respectively. Thus, the recommendation that individuals from the groups concerned select 
six persons from their own groups could only apply to the first two groups.  
According to a URCMS officer responsible, a similar procedure was used for water user 
organizations in the agricultural sector and also applied in the expert group, for example, 
one person from each province was selected before the whole group selected another one, 
who would be placed last on the selection list. A URCMS officer responsible for the group 
of qualified persons from water user organizations in the commerce, services and tourism 
sector explained that the whole group discussed, on their own, who would be the six 
persons selected and who would be the last on the list. LGOs and the water user 
organizations in the industrial sector were the other two groups that selected all qualified 
                                                          
55
 Four qualified persons from Chiang Mai and Tak; and, three from Lamphun attended the meeting. 
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persons. However, an URCMS officer responsible stated that, among themselves, these 
individuals discussed who would be first on the selection list for their respective groups. In 
all groups, the place on the selection lists indicated the priority given to nomination by the 
groups concerned, and the NWRC would issue appointments based on these lists, as shown 
in Box 5.1. The final appointment of Ping RBC non-public members was carried out by the 
NWRC during its third meeting of 2008 (held on October 31, 2008). A list of the 17 
members concerned in the Ping RBC is presented in Box 5.2.  
 
Box 5.1: Lists of the selected persons nominated as Ping RBC non-public sector members 
1. Nominated persons representing LGOs: 6 persons 
    1.1. Mayor of Hang Dong Sub-District Municipality, Hang Dong, Chiang Mai  
    1.2. Deputy mayor of Chiang Mai PAO 
    1.3 Mayor of Khon Tee TAO, Muang, Kampaengphet 
    1.4 Mayor of Don Kaew TAO, Mae Rim, Chiang Mai 
    1.5 Mayor of Wang Pang Sub-District Municipality, Viang Nonglong, Lamphun 
    1.6 Mayor of Tak PAO 
2. Nominated persons representing water user organizations in the agricultural sector:            
6 persons 
    2.1. A representative from Kampaengphet 
    2.2. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    2.3. A representative from Tak 
    2.4. A representative from Nakornsawan 
    2.5. A representative from Lamphun 
    2.6. A representative from Chiang Mai 
3. Nominated persons representing water user organizations in the industrial sector: 4 
persons 
    3.1. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    3.2. A representative from Tak  
    3.3. A representative from Nakornsawan 
    3.4. A representative from Lamphun 
4. Nominated persons representing water user organizations in the commerce, service, and 
tourism sector: 6 persons 
    4.1. A representative from Kampaengphet 
    4.2. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    4.3. A representative from Tak 
    4.4. A representative from Lamphun 
    4.5. A representative from Lamphun 
    4.6. A representative from Tak 
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Box 5.1: Lists of the selected persons nominated as Ping RBC non-public sector 
members (continued) 
5. Nominated persons representing the experts: 6 persons 
    5.1. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    5.2. A representative from Lamphun 
    5.3. A representative from Tak 
    5.4. A representative from Kampaengphet 
    5.5. A representative from Nakornsawan 
    5.6. A representative from Chiang Mai 
Source: An official correspondence to the BMPC from the URCMS on behalf of WOR1,                                  
dated September 11, 2008 
 
Box 5.2: List of the Ping RBC non-public sector members                 
Members representing LGOs: 3 persons 
    1. Mayor of Hang Dong Sub-District Municipality, Hang Dong, Chiang Mai  
    2. Deputy mayor of Chiang Mai PAO 
    3. Mayor of Khon Tee TAO, Muang, Kampaengphet 
Members representing water user organizations in agricultural sector: 5 persons 
    4. A representative from Kampaengphet 
    5. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    6. A representative from Tak 
    7. A representative from Nakornsawan 
    8. A representative from Lamphun 
Members representing water user organizations in industrial sector: 3 persons 
    9. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    10. A representative from Tak  
    11. A representative from Nakornsawan 
Members representing water user organizations in commerce, service, and tourism sector: 
2 persons 
    12. A representative from Kampaengphet 
    13. A representative from Chiang Mai 
Members representing the experts: 4 persons 
    14. A representative from Chiang Mai 
    15. A representative from Lamphun 
    16. A representative from Tak 
    17. A representative from Kampaengphet 
Source: The Ping RBC name list (available at www.dwr.go.th) 
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Who were the Ping RBC non-public sector members? 
Generally, the Ping RBC non-public sector members who are appointed have backgrounds 
related to the sectors or groups they represent. For example, the three members who 
represented LGOs were local politicians serving as mayors or deputy mayor in their 
respective LGOs; and, those expert members included university lecturers, and local 
leaders who had a background in water resource and community forest management.  
However, members representing water user organizations in the agricultural sector had 
rather complicated backgrounds. Of the five members, two were involved in local politics, 
as one was serving as Deputy Mayor of a TAO and the other a PAO Council member. Two 
other members had been involved in local politics: one a TAO mayor before being 
involved actively with NGOs; and, the other serving as a PAO Council member for three 
terms. The last member served as a sub-district chief, which is a position considered as an 
officer of the Department of Provincial Administration, though locally elected. Although 
these members were involved in agriculture, as they did have farms or orchards, it seems, 
for most of them, farming was of secondary importance.  
 
5.1.1.2 The nomination process for Ping RBC public sector members 
The appointment of Ping RBC public sector members 
As mentioned in Section 4.4.2., RBC appointment orders that were issued by the NWRC 
indicate ex officio members, and the public agencies involved in particular RBCs. The 
provincial governors of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Tak and Kampaengphet were appointed for 
the Ping RBC as ex officio members. The Chiang Mai provincial governor was later 
selected as the Ping RBC chairman. The Director of WRO 1 also was appointed as an ex 
officio member and secretary. Another 11 public agencies and one state-owned enterprise 
were specified as member agencies (see Table 4.5). According to the 2008 NWRC 
Announcement, the DWR had to tell these public agencies to appoint officers active in the 
Ping River Basin as Ping RBC member representatives. 
     
Who were the Ping RBC public sector members? 
Seventeen Ping RBC members represented public sector members; of which five were ex 
officio, and the rest assigned (Table 5.4). The five ex officio members included four 
provincial governors who were from the provincial administration, and one senior DWR 
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officer (Director of WRO 1) from central administration.  Of 12 assigned members, nine 
were directors of regional offices, and two chiefs of provincial offices involved with public 
agencies from central administration; and, one member was director of a state owned 
enterprise located in the Ping River Basin (see Table 5.4 and Section 2.4). 
It seemed straightforward at first glance that some Ping RBC public sector members were 
appointed as ex officio members and the others assigned by their respective agencies in 
terms of their nomination and appointment process. However, it was found that some 
members also were assigned by their agencies to represent other RBCs; one member in 
particular was appointed as a member of five other RBCs by her agency. Furthermore, 
besides being a Ping RBC member and secretary, the Director of WRO 1 also was an ex 
officio member and secretary of three other RBCs (see Table 4.5).  
This situation came to light because the public agencies concerned had different 
organizational arrangements. As seen in Table 5.4, several public agencies from central 
administration were involved in the Ping RBC. As these agencies are at the central 
administrative level, they mainly base themselves in Bangkok, in Thailand’s capital city. 
However, they also have regional offices established in certain provinces that are 
responsible for particular regions based on their own divisions. For example, the DWR 
divides the country administratively into ten regions with a WRO established for each 
region, while the Land Development Department has 12 administrative regions with a 
Land Development Regional Office created for each. These ‘regions’ may cover more than 
one river basin. Thus, when assigning officers to particular RBCs, based on the 2008 
NWRC Announcement, the public agencies concerned normally appoint directors of their 
regional offices to all river basins that fall within particular administrative regions. As a 
result, some officers became a member of more than one RBC.    
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Table 5.4: The Ping RBC public sector members 
Member Department Administrative 
Level 
Ex officio members 
  1. Provincial governor of Chiang Mai MOI Permanent Secretary Office Provincial 
  2. Provincial governor of Lamphun MOI Permanent Secretary Office Provincial 
  3. Provincial governor of Tak MOI Permanent Secretary Office Provincial 
  4. Provincial governor of Kampaengphet MOI Permanent Secretary Office Provincial 
  5. Director of WRO 1  Department of Water Resources Central 
Assigned members  
  6. Director of the National Policy and 
Planning Development Office 
Government Public Relations 
Department 
Central 
  7. Director of Royal Irrigation Office 1 Royal Irrigation Department Central 
  8. Chief of the Land Use Planning 
Group, Land Development Regional 
Office 6 
Land Development Department Central 
  9. Director of Agricultural Extension and 
Development Regional Office 6 
Department of Agricultural 
Extension 
Central 
10. Director of Marine Regional Office 1  Marine Department Central 
11. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial 
Office of Natural Resource and 
Environment (LPNRE) * 
MNRE Permanent Secretary 
Office 
Central 
12. Director General of the Department of 
Water Resources 
Department of Water Resources Central 
13. Director of Groundwater Resources 
Regional Office 7 
Department of Groundwater 
Resources 
Central 
14. Director of Protected Area 
Management Regional Office 16 
National Park, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation Department 
Central 
15. Director of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation Regional Office 10 
Department of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Central 
16. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial 
Office of Local Administration** 
Department of Local 
Administration 
Central 
17. Director of Bhumipol Dam  Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT)***  
- 
Source: The Ping RBC name list (available at www.dwr.go.th) 
Note: * LPNRE is under the provincial administration, but its chief was assigned to represent the 
Permanent Secretary Office, MNRE, which is the central administration. 
          ** Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Local Administration is under the provincial 
administration, but its chief was assigned to represent the Department of Local 
Administration, which is the central administration. 
          *** EGAT is a state owned enterprise under supervision of the Ministry of Energy. 
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5.1.2 The formation of the sub-committee for river basin management and 
information 
 
The Ping RBC Secretariat announced at the first Ping RBC meeting (held on February 6, 
2009) that a sub-river basin committee should be established. According to the DWR 
officer, who spoke in this meeting on behalf of the Ping RBC Secretariat, one river basin 
sub-committee was to be established for each river basin. This sub-committee was to assist 
the respective RBC in terms of river basin management and information.  
To this end, the Ping RBC Secretariat proposed a sub-committee structure consisting of 
representatives from public agencies (e.g. Royal Irrigation Department and Royal Forestry 
Department, LGOs, water user organizations, and experts), with the Director of WRO 1 as 
a member and secretary. Therefore, this proposed structure largely resembled that of the 
Ping RBC. The meeting discussed this structure widely and various suggestions came from 
Ping RBC members such as inclusion of a representative for the Department of Public 
Works and Town and County Planning, and five non-public sector representatives from 
each province rather than seven from three types of water user organizations.    
However, a notable suggestion was lodged by the Chair of the meeting; a Deputy Governor 
representing the Chiang Mai Governor. He requested that the Lamphun Provincial 
Governor be appointed as the chairman of the sub-committee concerned. When asked by a 
Ping RBC member why this should be so, the Chair explained that the Lamphun Provincial 
Governor could draw the attention of people concerned; and that his request was based on 
the (provincial) public administration system and the ‘recognition’ a provincial governor 
received as compared to other would-be sub-committee members. This again illustrated the 
clout of provincial governors (and their deputies) in provincial administration.    
As appeared in the Ping RBC Order No.3/2552, dated September 14, 2009, the final 
structure of the sub-committee consisted of 49 members with the Lamphun Provincial 
Governor as chairman, and Director of WRO 1 as secretary (Table 5.5). Similar to the Ping 
RBC, sub-committee public sector members mainly represented public agencies from 
central administration. Water user organizations and expert group from the non-public 
sector were subsumed under the ‘civic society’ group. Members representing this group 
were selected from qualified individuals, who were included previously for final selection 
of Ping RBC non-public sector members. This was suggested by a member of the Ping 
RBC during its first meeting, as presented above.  
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The 2007 Regulation does not prescribe the governing bodies within the RBCs. Thus, 
establishment of the river basin sub-committees, and indeed that of provincial and sub-
river basin working groups, reflects how the DWR translated and implemented the 2007 
RBC framework on the ground, as discussed in the following sections. Evidently, the DWR 
exerted its directions regarding this framework through the RBC secretariat, as officers 
from its line units were appointed as members and secretaries of the river basin governing 
at all levels (see Figure 4.5). 
 
Table 5.5: The Ping River Basin Sub-Committee for River Basin                              
Management and Information 
Member Department Administrative 
Level 
Public sector 
  1. Provincial governor of Lamphun 
(Chairman) 
MOI Permanent Secretary Office Provincial 
  2. Director of Royal Irrigation Office 1 Royal Irrigation Department Central 
  3. Director of Royal Irrigation Office 4 Royal Irrigation Department Central 
  4. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial 
Office of Local Administration 
Department of Local 
Administration 
Provincial 
  5. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial 
Office of Natural Resource and 
Environment 
MNRE Permanent Secretary 
Office 
Provincial 
6. Director of Government Public 
Relations Regional Office 3 
Government Public Relations 
Department 
Central 
 7. Director of Government Public 
Relations Regional Office 4 
Government Public Relations 
Department 
Central 
  8. Director of Protected Area 
Management Regional Office 16 
National Park, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation Department 
Central 
  9. Director of Protected Area 
Management Regional Office 14 
National Park, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation Department 
Central 
10. Director of Protected Area 
Management Regional Office 12 
National Park, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation Department 
Central 
11. Director of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation Regional Center 10 
Department of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Central 
12. Director of Forest Resource 
Management Office 1 (Chiang Mai) 
Royal Forestry Department Central 
13. Director of Marine Regional Office 1 
(Chiang Mai)  
Marine Department Central 
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Table 5.5: The Ping River Basin Sub-Committee for River Basin                            
Management and Information (continued) 
Member Department Administrative 
Level 
14. Director of Environmental 
Regional Office 1 
MNRE Permanent Secretary 
Office 
Central 
15. Chief of the Chiang Mai Provincial 
Office of Public works and Town 
and County Planning  
Department of  Public Works and 
Town and County Planning 
Provincial 
16. Director of WRO 1                                
(Secretary) 
Department of Water Resources Central 
17. Director of the URCMS                            
(Assistant secretary)  
Department of Water Resources Central 
18. Director of the  LRCMS                             
(Assistant secretary) 
Department of Water Resources Central 
LGOs 
19. Mayor of the Chiang Mai PAO - Local 
20. Mayor of the Lamphun PAO - Local 
21. Mayor of Tak - Local 
22. Mayor of Kampaengphet                               
(First vice chairman) 
- Local 
23. Mayor of Nakornsawan - Local 
Expert   
24. Expert - - 
Civic society 
25. Five representatives from Chiang Mai - - 
26. Five representatives from Lamphun - - 
27. Five representatives from Tak - - 
28. Five representatives from Kampaengphet - - 
29. Five  representatives from Nakornsawan* - - 
Source: The Ping RBC Order No.3/2552, dated September 14, 2009 
Note: *One representative was selected as second vice chairman 
 
5.1.3 The formation of provincial river basin working groups 
 
The first meeting of the River Basin Sub-Committee on River Basin Management and 
Information was held on July 15, 2009, at which the secretariat (WRO 1 and its responsible 
units - the URCMS and LRCMS) proposed that a river basin working group should be 
established at a provincial level for each province in the Ping River Basin (see Figure 3.1). 
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It also proposed a provincial river basin working group structure that involved officers 
from several provincial administration offices, the PAO Mayor, and representatives of 
water user organizations located in respective provinces. Various suggestions were given 
by sub-committee members; for example, representatives of water user organizations 
should be separated into three sectors (agriculture, industry and commerce); and the 
PONRE Chief should be the working group secretary instead of the Director of WRO 1.  
The five provincial river basin working groups in the Ping River Basin were finally 
appointed on September 14, 2009. Although different in numbers, these working groups 
shared the same composition of public and non-public members, with the provincial 
governor and PONRE Chief in respective provinces seen as the chairperson and secretary, 
respectively. Public sector members included chiefs of provincial administration offices, 
and representatives of the central administration agencies concerned, while non-public 
sector members were representatives of water user organizations (agriculture, industry and 
commerce). These members were contacted by the URCMS or LRCMS, and presented to 
the first meeting of particular provincial river basin working groups for approval. Some of 
these members also represented the civil society group in the River Basin Sub-Committee 
on River Basin Management and Information. In addition, the Mayor of the respective 
PAO also was appointed as a working group member, while directors of the URCMS and 
LRCMS were assigned as members and assistant secretaries of working groups located in 
areas they were responsible for. As the structure of the five provincial river basin working 
groups is essentially the same, only the Lamphun Provincial River Basin Working Group is 
presented here as an example (Table 5.6). 
Establishment of the five provincial river basin working groups was simple when 
compared to that of the sub-river basin working groups, which was complicated and 
delayed, as described in the following section. The matter was discussed only once in the 
meeting of the River Basin Sub-Committee mentioned above, and the working groups 
concerned were established officially by the Ping RBC Orders dated September 14, 2009. 
However, when viewing from a broader perspective, the establishment of these working 
groups also was delayed, in that their first meeting was held in 2010, about one year after 
the Ping RBC was appointed.  
The establishment process presented above showed that the secretariat of the Ping RBC 
framework (i.e. WRO 1, URCMS, and LRCMS) played a central role, by suggesting 
establishment of the working group and proposing its structure. Furthermore, it also 
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selected the provincial river basin working group members who represented water user 
organizations. Similar conduct was observed in the formation process of sub-river basin 
groups. 
Essentially, the establishment of river basin governing bodies at the provincial level 
reflects that the administrative boundary (i.e. the provincial boundary) still influences the 
RBC framework. This is the case, even though this framework claims to promote a river 
basin as a unit for water resource governance.  
 
Table 5.6: The Lamphun Provincial River Basin Working Group 
Member Remark 
  1. Lamphun provincial governor Chairman 
  2. Lamphun provincial clerk  
  3. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial Office   
  4. Mayor of the Lamphun PAO  
  5. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial Office of Agriculture and          
Co-operatives 
 
  6. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial Public Relations Office  
  7. Chief of the Lamphun Provincial Office of Local Administration  
  8. Director of the Lamphun Provincial Irrigation Project  
  9. Head of the Lamphun Provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
Office 
 
10. A representative of Protected Area Management Regional Office 16  
11. A representative of Forest Resource Management Office 1     
(Chiang Mai) 
 
12. A representative of Water Resources Regional Office 1  
13. A representative of Marine Regional Office 1 (Chiang Mai)  
14. A representative of Environmental Regional Office 1  
15. A representative of Groundwater Resources Regional Office 1  
16. A representative of the Lamphun Provincial Water Works  
17. A representative of water user organizations (commerce)  
18. A representative of water user organizations (industry)  
19. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture)  
18. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture)  
21. Chief of the Lamphun PONRE Secretary 
22. Director of the URRCMS Assistant secretary 
Source: The Ping RBC Order No.5/2552 dated September 14, 2009 
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5.1.4 The formation of sub-river basin working groups 
 
At the first meeting of the River Basin Sub-Committee on River Basin Management and 
Information dated July 15, 2009, the Sub-Committee’s secretariat proposed appointing a 
structure for a sub-river basin working group for each of 20 sub-river basins located in the 
Ping River Basin, apart from the provincial river basin working group structure. The 
proposed sub-river basin working group structure would comprise members representing 
the pubic and non-public sector located in respective sub-river basins, and they would 
include district officers; village headmen and sub-district chiefs; representatives of LGOs; 
representatives of public agencies; representatives of educational institutions or experts on 
natural resource or environmental management; representatives of water user organizations 
(agriculture, commerce or industry); leaders of water resource networks (local groups 
established by the DWR); and, representatives of WRO 1. During the discussion on this 
proposed structure, concerns were aired about the size of each working group, as many 
villages and sub-districts were located in one sub-river basin. It was concluded that a 
preliminary structure would be presented to the stakeholders in each sub-river basin, and 
they would decide the final structure of the working group for their sub-river basin.  
The first three sub-river basin working groups, located in the upper part of the Ping River 
Basin, were appointed by the Ping RBC on September 14, 2009 (Mae Kan, Mae Klang, 
and Mae Rim (see Figure 3.2). The structure of the sub-river basin working groups was 
composed of at least 16 members, who represented both the public and non-public sector. 
The public sector members involved district officers and district agricultural officers as ex 
officio members; and representatives of the Chiang Mai Provincial Irrigation Project (CIP), 
Protected Area Management Regional Office 16 (PMRO 16) and Groundwater Resources 
Regional Office 1 (GRO 1), with the URCMS Director indicated as secretary. The non-
public sector members included an expert on natural resource and environment, 
representatives of water user organizations (agriculture, commerce, and industry), 
representatives of water resource networks and a representative of an educational 
institution. In addition, representatives of LGOs and chairpersons of the Village Headmen 
and Sub-District Chiefs Clubs from each district concerned also were included in the 
structure.  
The working group chairperson was selected in 2010 during a meeting organized by the 
URCMS for each of the mentioned working groups. The working group’s secretariat (i.e. 
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URCMS) contacted individuals to represent the non-public sector group, as mentioned 
above, and they were presented to the meeting for approval. According to the secretariat, a 
district local administration officer would nominate a representative of LGOs as the 
working group members from each district concerned. Also, the three public agencies 
involved (CIP, PMRO 16, and GRO 1) would be contacted in order to assign their officers 
to the working groups. As an example, the Mae Rim Sub-River Basin Working Group is 
presented in Table 5.7. 
The sub-river basin working group appointments were delayed and they stretched through 
the whole four-year term of the Ping RBC
56
. There are 14 sub-river basins in the upper part 
of the Ping River Basin (see Figure 3.2). However, only three sub-river basin working 
groups were appointed in 2009, as presented above. In the following year, no appointment 
was made. Seven sub-river basin working groups were assigned in 2011, with the last four 
appointed in 2012, which was the final year of the Ping RBC term.  
It should be noted that in order to appoint a sub-river basin working group, a responsible 
unit of the DWR (in this case the URCMS) needed to organize a meeting with the sub-river 
basin concerned, they intended to discuss a preliminary sub-river basin working group 
structure, as presented above, and provide information about the RBC framework. 
However, as the URCMS is a line unit of WRO 1, which is in turn a DWR regional office, 
it could not organize the meeting in question on its own. Instead, it needed a directive from 
the DWR, including a budget to go ahead. As it appeared, there was no directive in 2010 
regarding the establishment of new sub-river basin working groups. Nevertheless, in 2011, 
the DWR ordered its line units to appoint sub-river basin working groups for all remaining 
sub-river basins situated in areas for which they were responsible. The URCMS managed 
to appoint only seven sub-river basin working groups in that year, while the remaining four 
were assigned in 2012.  
The establishment of sub-river basin working groups clearly shows how influential the 
DWR is in implementing the 2007 RBC framework through its line units. In turn, this 
indicates continuation of traditional public administration practices, which rely on 
hierarchy to carry out public policies in the Thai administrative context. 
 
 
                                                          
56
 Officially, the term for non-public sector members is four years (see Section 4.4.2) 
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Table 5.7: The Mae Rim Sub-River Basin Working Group 
Member Remark 
  1. Mae Rim District Officer Chairman 
  2. Mae Tang District Officer First vice-chairman 
  3. Samerng District Officer  Second vice-chairman 
  4. Mayor of the Sa Loung TAO  
  5. Mayor of the Mae Tang TAO   
  6. Mayor of the Mae Sap TAO  
  7. A representative of the Chiang Mai Provincial Irrigation Project  
  8. A representative of Protected Area Management Regional Office 
16  
 
  9. A representative of Groundwater Resources Regional Office 1  
10. A representative of the Village Headman and Sub-District Chief 
Clubs: Mae Rim 
 
11. A representative of the Village Headman and Sub-District Chief 
Clubs: Mae Tang 
 
12. A representative of the Village Headman and Sub-District Chief 
Clubs: Samerng 
 
13. An expert on natural resource and environment: Mae Rim  
14. An expert on natural resource and environment: Mae Tang  
15. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture):                 
Mae Rim  
 
16. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture):                 
Mae Tang 
 
17. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture): 
Samerng 
 
18. A representative of water user organizations (commerce)  
19. A representative of water user organizations (industry)  
18. A representative of Water Resource Networks  
19. A representative of Water Resource Networks  
20. A representative of educational institutions  
21. Director of the URCMS Secretary 
22. URRCMS officer Assistant secretary 
Source: Based on the Ping RBC Order No.11/2552 dated September 14, 2009, and the Mae Rim 
Sub-River Basin Working Group’s meeting report (June 15, 2010) 
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5.1.5 The current status of the Ping BRC and its governing bodies 
 
The 2007 Regulation and 2008 NWRC Announcement indicate that the RBC non-public 
sector members serve a four-year term57. Since the entire RBC non-public sector members 
were appointed by the NWRC on December 1, 2008, their term ended on the same day of 
November 30, 2012. According to a URCMS officer, the RBCs became ‘the acting RBCs’ 
after the above mentioned date. Consequently, the sub-committees and working groups 
appointed by respective RBCs also became the acting sub-committees and working groups. 
A new chain of appointments was required in order to restore the RBCs and their 
governing bodies to normal official status. 
According to a URCMS officer, the recruitment process, as described in Section 5.1.1.1, 
was conducted to identify, select and nominate qualified persons as non-public sector 
members of the Ping RBC. This process was completed as of January 2014, and the 
nomination list has been sent to the DWR for passing on to the NWRC for the final 
appointment. 
 
5.2 Management of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
The previous section presents in detail how the RBC framework was implemented in terms 
of forming the RBC itself, as well as its governing bodies, as the Ping River Basin 
unfolded. This section turns to discussion on how these river basin governing bodies 
manage themselves (see PROVAN and KENIS (2008) in Section 2.2).  
 
5.2.1 The Ping RBC management 
 
As presented in Section 4.4.2, the 2007 Regulation indicates various mandates for the 
RBCs (see Box 4.2), and the RBC members are supposed to take part in making decisions 
for achieving their mandates, which suggests that they are to be managed by the 
participant-governed form of PROVAN and KENIS (2008). As Provan and Kenis (2008) 
explain, each governance form has both advantages and shortcomings. However, 
centralization in the Thai context has been prevalent, and participation by the non-public 
sector in the domain of public sector work is limited. Thus, the participant-governed form 
for the RBC framework seems to be appropriate when compared with the lead organization 
                                                          
57
 There is no term of service for RBC public sector members specified in the 2007 Regulations or the 2008 
NWRC Announcement.     
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governed form and NAO model. This is because the former would provide a foundation 
upon which the non-public sector groups concerned (e.g. water user organizations) could 
act on equal terms together with their public sector counterparts in managing water 
resources in their respective river basins. In practice, however, RBC management did not 
proceed as outlined, as evidenced by the case of the Ping RBC. 
Understanding RBC management can be approached from the activities implemented in 
order to fulfill the functions mandated, as they will in turn reflect decision making 
processes and involvement of RBC members. The Ping RBC found that only one activity 
was organized, in which a very formal meeting was presided over by the Ping RBC 
chairman or his representative (Figure 5.1). This meeting was organized twice a year; thus, 
there were eight in total throughout the first four years of the Ping RBC’s existence (2008-
2012).  
 
Figure 5.1: Meeting of the Ping RBC (05.03.2010)  
 
    Source: Own photo 
 
As the Ping RBC was supposed to be governed by all members, they would be expected to 
play a role in deciding when to call for a meeting, what agendas would be discussed, and at 
which venue the meeting would be held. In practice, however, the Ping RBC secretariat 
(i.e. WRO 1, and especially the URCMS), made decisions on all aspects regarding the 
meeting. That is to say, it decided when a meeting was to be arranged within a (fiscal) year. 
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It also decided on the meeting agenda with the main item always being approval of 
integrated river basin management and development plan (see Section 5.5).  
The Ping RBC meetings were held in Chiang Mai every time, although some non-public 
sector members suggested that it should be arranged in other provinces also located in the 
Ping River Basin (see Figure 3.1). This could be because the URCMS received the budget 
(thus, the directive) for organizing the RBC and River Basin Sub-Committee meetings 
(those of the latter were always organized in Lamphun, see the following Section). With no 
budget, and for that matter no directive, the LRCMS could not arrange the RBC meetings 
in Tak, Kampaengphet, or Nakornsawan. It should also be noted that distances between 
these provinces in the lower Ping River Basin and Chiang Mai are approximately 280 km., 
350 km., and 460 km. for Tak, Kampaengphet, and Nakornsawan, respectively. Thus, 
travelling to Chiang Mai for a meeting was a burden for non-public sector members from 
these provinces, although a travel allowance was paid.  
Thus, Ping RBC members of both the public and non-public sector had never been 
involved in RBC management. Instead, the Ping RBC was managed by using the lead 
organization governed form with WRO 1, particularly through the URCMS, which played 
a central role. Apparently, the Ping RBC management process was highly centralized, as a 
typical characteristic of the lead organization governed form. As only one activity was 
managed solely by units of WRO 1, there was no room for participation from other Ping 
RBC members, or public or non-public sectors alike.  
 
5.2.2 Management of the Ping RBC’s governing bodies 
 
The 2007 Regulation does not indicate how governing bodies of the Ping RBC (the Sub-
Committee on River Basin Management and Information, provincial river basin working 
groups, and sub-river basin working groups) are to be managed. However, evidence 
observed from their implementation suggested that they all were managed by the lead 
organization governed form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008). Like the Ping RBC, the 
management of its governing bodies can be approached from the activities organized in 
order to fulfill the functions mandated to them. 
 
5.2.2.1 The Sub-Committee on River Basin Management and Information  
Based on the Ping RBC Order No.3/2552, dated September 14, 2009, several mandates 
were assigned to the Sub-Committee on River Basin Management and Information. These 
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include, for instance, preparing a master plan for river basin management, and water 
resources and water sources development, conservation, and rehabilitation; preparing an 
annual action plan following policies and the master plan; and monitoring and evaluating 
action plan implementation by the public agencies concerned.  
Similar to the Ping RBC, the only activity organized for the Sub-Committee, in order to 
fulfill its mandates, was meetings, and six were organized (two meetings per year) 
throughout the first three years of its existence (2009-2012). These meetings were always 
held slightly before those of the Ping RBC. For example, the Sub-Committee meeting was 
arranged on February 18, 2010 (Figure 5.2), a few weeks before the Ping RBC meeting, as 
shown in Figure 5.1. Clearly, this was an attempt by WRO 1 and its line units to create an 
image that Ping River Basin-related issues were discussed and approved by the Sub-
Committee before presenting to the Ping RBC for consideration. 
Similar to the Ping RBC meetings, WRO 1 with the URCMS was the sole agency to 
organize Sub-Committee meetings. It called for meetings that were very formal and always 
organized in Lamphun. As presented above, one reason for this may be because the 
URCMS received the budget, and thereby had the directive to hold the meetings for the 
Sub-Committee. It also identified meeting agendas, in which the main item was always 
concerned with approval of the integrated river basin management and development plan 
(see Section 5.5). As Lamphun is located approximately 35 km from Chiang Mai, the Sub-
Committee members representing the civil society group from Tak, Kampaengphet, and 
Nakornsawan bore the same burden of travel to attend the meetings as the RBC non-public 
sector members from the same provinces.  
The situations observed are evidence that the Sub-Committee was managed by the lead 
organization form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008). As the ‘lead organization’, WRO 1 via the 
URCMS managed all aspects of the Sub-Committee meetings, which was its only activity. 
The Sub-Committee members simply attended the meetings with little to say about their 
arrangement.  
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Figure 5.2: Meeting of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee (18.02.2010) 
 
    Source: Own photo 
 
5.2.2.2 The Provincial River Basin Working Groups 
There were five provincial river basin working groups appointed on September 14, 2009 by 
the Ping RBC for each province located in the Ping River Basin (see Figure 3.1). They all 
were given the same mandates, for example, collecting information on water resources, 
other related natural resources, and completed water resource-related projects; presenting 
the needs of water source development projects in the respective provinces or sub-river 
basins to the Ping RBC; and, coordinating with the ‘public agencies’ concerned when 
preparing their action plans concerned with, for instance, water source development and 
conservation, water allocation, and watershed rehabilitation in order to prepare a provincial 
or sub-river basin action plan58. 
As with the Ping RBC and River Basin Sub-Committee discussed above, the only activity 
organized for provincial river basin working groups, in order to realize their mandates was 
meetings. Although officially appointed in September 2009, the first meeting for each 
provincial river basin working group was held in 2010. Unlike the Ping RBC and River 
Basin Sub-Committee, the meeting for the provincial river basin working groups was 
normally organized only once per (fiscal) year (Figure 5.3). Thus, only two meetings were 
arranged over the first three years (2009-2012) for each of the working groups under the 
                                                          
58
 The Ping RBC Order No.4/2552, No.5/2552, No.6/2552, No.7/2552, and No.8/2552 dated September 14, 
2009. 
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Ping RBC setup, apart from the Chiang Mai and Lamphun Working Group, which both had 
meetings organized in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
Again, the URCMS were seen to play a key role in organizing the provincial river basin 
working groups. It made arrangements in all aspects of the meetings, in which the main 
item on the agenda was approval of the integrated river basin management and 
development plan for respective provinces (see Section 5.5). The same situation was highly 
likely to occur in the case of the LRCMS, as it was tasked with mandates for provincial 
working groups in Tak, Kampaengphet, and Nakornsawan. Thus, management of the 
provincial river basin working groups also was in the lead organization form (PROVAN & 
KENIS, 2008), performed primarily by the URCMS and LRCMS.  
 
Figure 5.3: Meeting of the Chiang Mai Provincial River Basin Working Group 
(02.08.2010) 
 
    Source: Own photo 
 
5.2.2.3 The Sub-River Basin Working Groups 
The Ping River Basin consists of 20 sub-river basins (see Appendix III). Appointments for 
the sub-river basin working groups stretched through the first four years of the Ping RBC 
framework, especially in the upper part of the Ping River Basin (see Section 5.1.4). Based 
on the Ping RBC Order on the appointment of Sub-River Basin Working Groups, the 
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working groups were charged with the same mandates as those assigned to the provincial 
river basin working groups, but they were confined to respective sub-river basins only59.    
Similar to the provincial river basin working groups, the only activity organized for the 
sub-river basin working groups was a meeting held only once a year (Figure 5.4), which 
was organized by the URCMS for the 14 sub-river basin working groups under its 
responsibility. The LRCMS would have to do the same for its six sub-river basin working 
groups (see Table 5.7). Thus, they called the meetings and identified their agendas. Like 
the other governing bodies of the Ping River Basin, the main item on the meeting agenda 
of the sub-river basin working groups was concerned with the integrated river basin 
management and development plan for each sub-river basin (see Section 5.5). Indeed, the 
meetings provided an opportunity for the URCMS or LRCMS to collect water resource-
related plans from LGOs located in respective sub-river basins, which were incorporated 
later into the integrated Ping River Basin management and development plan. From the 
evidence presented, it can be seen that the sub-river basin working groups were managed 
using the lead organization form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008), in which the URCMS and 
LRCMS played a central role. 
 
Figure 5.4: Meeting of the Mae Klang Sub-River Basin Working Group (11.06.2010) 
 
    Source: Own photo 
 
                                                          
59
 For example, the Ping RBC Order No.9/2552, No.10/2552, No.11/2552, No.12/2552, No.13/2552 and 
No.14/2552 dated September 14, 2009.  
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5.2.3 WRO 1: The lead organization in Ping RBC management 
 
As discussed in Section 4.4.2, the 2007 Regulation suggests that RBCs be managed using 
the participant-governed form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008). Evidence from implementation of 
the Ping RBC, however, indicated that the Ping RBC and its governing bodies were 
managed by the lead organization form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008) with WRO 1, primarily 
through the URCMS and LRCMS, which both played the role of lead organization. Thus, 
this section presents details of WRO 1 and the URCMS as an example of line units directly 
responsible for the implementation of the RBC framework. 
 
5.2.3.1 Water Resources Regional Office 1 (WRO 1) 
Water Resources Regional Office 1 (WRO 1) is one of ten regional offices of the DWR. 
Located in Lampang, which is situated approximately 100 km southwest of Chiang Mai, 
WRO 1 is responsible for an area that covers five river basins: Ping, Salawin, Kok, Khong 
Part I, and Wang (see Figure 3.1 and Appendix II). Similar to other WROs, WRO 1 has 
several divisions including administration, academic affairs, water source development and 
rehabilitation, water management, hydrology and strategy; and five Coordination and 
Management Sections (CMSs) responsible for respective river basins, for example, the 
URCMS and LRCMS for the Ping River Basin (Figure 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.5: Structure of Water Resources Regional Office 1 
 WRO 1 Director  
   
Administration Section  Academic Affairs Section 
   
Strategy Section  Hydrology Section 
   
Water Management Section  Water Resource Development 
and Rehabilitation Section 
   
Salawin CMS  Wang CMS 
   
LRCMS  URCMS 
   
 Kok and Khong (North) CMS  
 
Source: Own illustration based on information provided at http://region.dwr.go.th/wrro1 
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WRO 1 is mandated with several tasks, resembling those of other WROs. They include, for 
instance, promoting and supporting the establishment of water resource management 
organizations at the river basin and local level; developing and implementing plans for 
water source development, conservation, and rehabilitation; and, acting as the secretariat of 
the RBCs and water resources-related sub-committees existing in the area it is responsible 
for60. WRO 1 acts for the last mandate as secretariat for four RBCs and their river basin 
sub-committees: Ping, Salawin, Kok and Khong (North), and Wang (see Table 4.5 and Box 
4.3), while the WRO 1 Director serves as a member and secretary for these RBCs and their 
sub-committees. Evidently, the secretarial tasks of the RBCs and their governing bodies 
were assigned to the CMSs responsible, as observed in the Ping RBC effort, where the 
URCMS took this responsibility. 
 
5.2.3.2 The Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (URCMS) 
The Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (URCMS) is one of 
the five CMSs under WRO 1. Located in Chiang Mai, its responsible area covers the upper 
part of the Ping River Basin (Chiang Mai and Lamphun) with 14 sub-river basins (see 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2). Like other CMSs, the URCMS is charged with tasks concerning water 
resource management in the area it is responsible for such as collecting relevant 
information for water resource management; coordinating and managing water resources; 
supporting the establishment of water resource management organizations as well as 
building their capacity and transferring technologies to them; conducting public relations 
and research on river basin management-related issues, and acting as the secretariat of 
water resource management sub-committees at the river basin level61. 
As found in implementation of the Ping RBC, the URCMS was actually assigned 
secretariat tasks for both the Ping RBC and its River Basin Sub-Committee, with its 
director serving as their assistant secretary. Furthermore, the URCMS also acted as the 
secretariat of two provincial and 14 sub-river basin working groups located in the area it is 
responsible for, where its director served as assistant secretary in the former and secretary 
in the latter. Indeed, secretarial tasks became the main work of the URCMS, and other 
assignments such as water resource management and coordination and research were 
virtually absent.  
                                                          
60
 http://region.dwr.go.th/wrro1. 
61
 Ibid. 
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Activities (i.e. the meetings) of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies, as presented above, 
were organized primarily by WRO 1 through the URCMS. Although WRO 1 (the URCMS 
and LRCMS by extension) was  a member with equal status as other members of the Ping 
River Basin governing bodies, and assigned secretarial tasks officially, it became ‘the lead 
organization’ (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008) in the setup. It managed all aspects of these 
governing bodies with practically no involvement from other public or non-public 
members, as reflected by the organizations in the meetings previously mentioned. 
Apparently, these meetings had the integrated river basin management and development 
plan as the main item on the agenda. As such, it was clear that WRO 1 exerted its power by 
acting as the lead organization to direct the Ping RBC setup and achieve one of its own 
mandates as Ping RBC secretariat regarding the water resource management plan (see Box 
5.3). However, when taking the 2007 Regulation (i.e. legal infrastructure for the RBC 
framework) into consideration, this probably was the only mandate that WRO 1 could 
fulfill in its capacity (see Section 6.3.). 
 
5.3 Collaborative process in the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
Collaboration between members and organizations involved in a collaborative arrangement 
is fundamental for its success. As discussed in Section 2.2, scholars have identified various 
issues concerning a collaborative process from a collaborative governance perspective. 
When applying them in RBC framework implementation, these issues can be expressed as, 
for example, a face-to-face dialogue between RBC members, a sense of ownership for the 
RBCs and their governing bodies, or some immediate outcomes produced by the river 
basin governing bodies (see ANSELL & GASH, 2008). Evidence from Ping RBC 
implementation indicated that collaboration between members of this RBC, and those of its 
governing bodies was basically non-existent. The following sections present this evidence 
in detail. 
 
5.3.1 Collaborative process in the Ping RBC 
 
It was clear from Section 5.2.1 that Ping RBC members had very limited opportunity to 
interact with each other because the only forum in which they met was in the meetings 
arranged twice a year by WRO 1 via the URCMS. Quantitatively, it was already evident 
that the Ping RBC lacked face-to-face dialogue between its members (ANSELL & GASH, 
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2008). Information gained from Ping RBC meetings and meeting reports also indicated that 
interaction between the members during these meetings was limited. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ping RBC meetings were of formal format with repeated 
procedure. They began with an open statement from the chairman, who asked the secretary 
(in practice, the assistant secretary - URCMS Director) to conduct the meeting by 
following the agenda, which was standardized and usually included 1) issues from the 
chairman, 2) approval of the report from the previous meeting, 3) issues to inform the 
meeting, 4) issues for consideration and approval, and 5) other issues.  
For the first item on the agenda, the chairman normally informed the meeting of the reason 
why the actual chairman (Chiang Mai Governor) was absent. Indeed, the Governor never 
attended the meetings himself. In dealing with the second item, the assistant secretary 
asked for approval of the report from the previous meeting, which had been sent to each 
member beforehand. If there was any discussion here, it was only to correct typing errors 
in the report concerned. The assistant secretary then moved to the third item, which was to 
inform the meeting of various issues such as project implementations in the Ping River 
Basin by the public agencies concerned, or drought and flood situations. The members 
representing Bhumibol Dam, and the RID also presented water resource situations in the 
river basin. Generally, there was no discussion carried out on the third item. The assistant 
secretary usually outlined the five-year integrated river basin management and 
development planning framework, a planning process, or an annual integrated river basin 
management and development plan (see the following section) for the fourth item of the 
agenda. He then asked the members to consider and approve these items. This agenda 
generally drew some comments or questions for clarifications from the members, but 
without meaningful deliberation or discussions on the framework or plan concerned. The 
last item was open for issues brought up by the secretariat or Ping RBC members, for 
example, the secretariat would invite members to attend a certain meeting. There was no 
practical discussion here also. Overall, it could be seen that the meeting was largely a one-
way communiqué from the secretariat. Thus, due to the infrequency of the meetings, there 
was little dialogue between RBC members.                   
Information deriving from interviews with Ping RBC members indicated further that 
contact between the Ping RBC Secretariat (i.e. WRO 1 and the URCMS) and members; or, 
among the members themselves was virtually nonexistent. According to the members 
interviewed, contact made from the Ping RBC Secretariat mainly concerned a meeting, for 
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example, sending an official invitation letter for a meeting, and afterwards sending a report 
of the meeting concerned, as well as requesting (see Box 5.3, mandates no.3). This was 
confirmed by a URCMS officer responsible, who explained that contact made was 
concerned mainly with meetings and information requests (particularly project plans): “we 
[the Ping RBC secretariat] made contact only during the meeting preparation - inviting 
them [members of the river basin governing bodies] to the meeting, so to say; and to get 
information from them. That’s all.” Conversely, members made virtually no contact with 
the Ping RBC Secretariat. For instance, a member representing the public sector stated that 
he made no contact to the Ping RBC Secretariat, except for sending plans: “no contact was 
made [to the Ping RBC Secretariat], this I frankly admit.” A member representing the 
agricultural water user organization group mentioned that the reason why he made no 
contact with the Secretariat was because “[the Ping RBC] was nonsense and it was not 
significant”; thus, he “had no intention” of making contact.  
In addition, the members interviewed revealed that they made no contact with each other 
under the capacity of Ping RBC members. A public sector representative explained that he 
met RBC members only in the context of other committees or meetings; however, he never 
contacted these persons as a Ping RBC member, and received information on the RBC 
concerned only through meetings. Another public sector representative made a similar 
comment when pointing out that he contacted some RBC members on a personal basis, not 
as ‘a Ping RBC member’. He commented further that “the RBC was not really a talk of the 
town issue. It died out after the meeting.”  
Apparently, the Ping RBC members lacked face-to-face dialogue and interaction, upon 
which other elements of a collaborative process such as trust and shared understanding 
could be built (ANSELL & GASH, 2008). Additionally, the comments shown above also 
suggested that the members did not value the Ping RBC. Indeed, some members from the 
non-public sector stated from the interview that they intended not to be involved in this 
arrangement. For example, a member representing LGOs commented that the Ping RBC 
meeting provided ‘little value’, and he preferred to work for his own jurisdiction, while a 
member representing the expert group stated that he would not participate as a Ping RBC 
member in the next term. Members from the public sector also pointed out that the Ping 
RBC was not relevant to their work, and therefore less of a priority when compared to their 
own work. For instance, one member from this group stated that the Ping RBC was ‘too far 
away’ from his line of duties. In contrast, a member whose duties concerned natural 
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resource management pointed out that he did not contact the Ping RBC or its secretariat as 
they played ‘little role’ in solving problems. He further explained that if a problem 
occurred (e.g. water source-related problem), he would directly contact WRO 1 because 
“there [at WRO 1] is a center for coordination, where the problem can be solved promptly. 
However, here [at the Ping RBC setup], there is only a gathering of plans, so that a 
meeting can be arranged.” Another member indicated that Ping RBC work was placed as 
the ‘very last’ priority, and she would only allow her designated representatives62 to attend 
Ping RBC meetings when they were really free from their own work. Thus, it was clear 
that the members did not share a sense of interdependency, which helps to facilitate 
collaboration (ANSELL & GASH, 2008; THOMPSON & PERRY, 2006).  
 
5.3.2 Collaborative process in the Ping RBC’s governing bodies 
 
The collaborative process in the governing bodies of the Ping RBC, like that of the Ping 
RBC itself, also was characterized by a lack of face-to-face dialogue. This insufficiency 
was evidenced clearly by the number of meetings, which were the only activity organized 
for these governing bodies, as presented in Section 5.2.2. It is highly unlikely that 
collaboration could take place when members of the collaborative arrangements concerned, 
such as the provincial river basin and sub-river basin working groups, met only once a 
year.  
Information gained from the meetings and meeting reports indicated the same patterns as 
those found in the Ping RBC. That is to say, the discussions and interactions among 
members of the governing bodies concerned in the meetings were very limited, which 
could be expected, as the same official meeting format always applied, i.e. only the 
chairperson officially presided, and the secretariat conducted meetings with a similar 
standardized agenda, as presented in the previous section.  
Interviews with the River Basin Sub-committee members also indicated the same feature as 
that in the Ping RBC case: virtually no contact was made between the secretariat and 
members, or among the members themselves. For example, a member representing the 
civil society group indicated that the secretariat contacted him only regarding the meeting, 
while he never contacted the secretariat. This member also stated that the members 
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 As some representatives of the public sector could not attend Ping RBC meetings, they could send a 
designated representative instead. These designated representatives were formally registered with the Ping 
RBC Secretariat.   
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representing the civil society group in his province contacted each other only when it 
comes to the meeting (e.g. how to get to a meeting venue) - “if there is no meeting, we 
never call each other”; and, they simply ‘return to their place’ after the meeting. Similarly, 
a member representing the civil society group from another province pointed out that the 
secretariat also contacted him only regarding the meeting, and while there was ‘no issue’ 
that necessitated contact between them. This member explained further that he rarely 
contacted other members by saying, “they went on with their own business, so did I, and 
we met only in the meetings.” Indeed, these comments reflected an insufficient sense of 
interdependency. This is underscored further by the admission of a member from the civil 
society group that had no idea about the River Basin Sub-committee, and did not 
participate in its meetings. However, he remained active in the irrigation water user groups 
in his area. 
In addition, a member of the River Basin Sub-committee representing the public sector, 
who was also appointed as a member and secretary of the Lamphun Provincial River Basin 
Working Group, provided a bit of picture regarding interactions in this working group. He 
stated that although he was a secretary, all secretarial work was performed by the URCMS, 
whose director served as an assistant secretary. This implied that little contact occurred 
between this member and the URCMS, even if the former was the official secretary. 
 
5.4 Participation in the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
Participation by the non-public sector in decision making is a key element underlying both 
collaborative water governance and river basin governance (BAKKER & COHEN, 2011; 
JASPERS, 2003). Indeed, public participation can be simply referred to as “direct 
involvement of the public in decision making” as defined by MOSTERT (2006, p. 154). The 
RBC framework prescribed that non-public sector representatives from water user groups, 
LGOs, and experts be included, together with those from the public sector, as members of 
the RBCs. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, various mandates are assigned to the RBCs (see 
Box 4.2), thus implying that RBC members would make decisions on various water 
resources-related issues in respective river basins to achieve those mandates. Based on 
stipulations in the 2007 Regulation (see Section 4.4.2), the level of public participation in 
the RBC framework should be the same as that of co-decision making, where decision 
making power is shared between the public and non-public sector members of the RBCs 
(MOSTERT, 2006).   
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As presented in previous sections, the activity arranged for the river basin governing bodies 
within the Ping RBC framework was limited to meetings only. In addition, the meetings 
also were limited in number, as they were organized annually (once or twice a year for 
each governing body). A close examination of these meetings revealed largely one-way 
communication, where the secretariat informed members of the governing bodies 
concerned of varied information; for instance, drought and flood situations, and project 
implementation by the public agencies concerned in the river basin. Thus, participation in 
the Ping RBC arrangement was confined essentially to the information supply level, which 
in effect is not ‘genuine public participation’ (MOSTERT, 2006). 
However, one main item on the meeting agenda (see Section 5.3.1) that required decisions 
from governing bodies was the issue relating to the integrated river basin management and 
development plan. The following sections describe how participation in this decision 
making process took place in the Ping RBC framework.   
 
5.4.1 Participation in the Ping RBC 
 
Participation by the Ping RBC members in making decisions that involved the integrated 
river basin management and development plan occurred in both the first and second annual 
meetings. In the first meeting, decision making was concerned with approval of a five-year 
integrated river basin management and development framework63, and a planning process 
for an annual integrated river basin management and development plan. Approvals of the 
final version of the five-year framework already mentioned and the annual integrated river 
basin management and development plan were the main items requiring decision making at 
the second meeting. 
As presented in Section 5.3.1, consideration and approval was normally put in as the fourth 
item of the meeting agenda. Thus, regarding this item in the first Ping RBC meeting, the 
assistant secretary (URCMS Director) presented a general overview of the five-year 
integrated river basin management and development framework and related planning 
process; and, asked the members to give their approval. That is to say, he explained to the 
meeting that the five-year framework was a collection of the plans, and their budget 
proposals were to be implemented by the public agencies concerned in the Ping River 
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 It was reported  that the issue of the five-year planning framework was dropped at the first Ping RBC 
meeting held in 2013, and only the planning process for the annual integrated river basin management and 
development plan remained on the agenda concerned.  
 120 
Basin, which were grouped into the Ping River Basin management and development 
strategies. These strategies were developed in 2009 and included, for example, watershed 
conservation and rehabilitation; water resource quality management and pollution control; 
and, enhancement of participatory river basin management. 
A further planning process for pursuance also was outlined to the meeting by the assistant 
secretary. For example, the five-year planning framework, when approved, would be 
presented to the respective five provincial river basin working groups, and River Basin 
Sub-Committee for their approval, before submitting it to the Ping RBC for final approval 
during its second meeting. He also explained that the five-year planning framework would 
be used for the public agencies concerned in order to plan their annual integrated river 
basin management and development plans, which would be collected and incorporated 
later as the annual integrated river basin management and development plan for the Ping 
River Basin, and presented to the Ping RBC for final approval during the second meeting.       
The meeting always approved the five-year framework and proposed planning process 
after only a few comments were made. The chairman normally asked the meeting whether 
there were any objections to the items outlined by the secretariat, to which there was 
always no response. Probably, this was due partly to the large amount of information being 
presented, and focus also being placed on the annual integrated river basin management 
and development plan, which would be approved at the second meeting (at least this was 
the impression presented by the secretariat). 
The procedure for the second meeting was the same as that of the first one. That is to say, 
the assistant secretary presented an overview of the five-year framework and annual 
integrated river basin management and development plan as the fourth item on the meeting 
agenda. It was found based on the meeting reports that sometimes only the annual plan 
concerned was presented for approval. 
Similar to the five-year framework, the annual integrated river basin management and 
development plan was a collection of project plans, and their budget proposals were to be 
implemented by the public agencies concerned and LGOs in the river basin. However, their 
annual budget proposals were prepared by these public agencies and LGOs and submitted 
to the national budget for allocation (see the following section). They were then grouped 
into river basin strategies like those collected for the five-year framework. The supporting 
documents for the five-year framework and the annual plan were voluminous; in practice 
they were collections of project plans for many public agencies and LGOs located in five 
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provinces of the Ping River Basin. Ping RBC members always received these documents 
upon arrival at the meeting. 
After the assistant secretary presented the overviews mentioned above, he asked the 
meeting to approve the five-year framework and annual plan. As observed, members gave 
more comments or questions regarding the two items than those given during approval of 
the five-year framework and related planning process in the first meeting. However, these 
comments or questions largely concerned the planning procedure or certain project plans 
listed in the framework, or the plan itself, rather than deliberation about water resource 
needs and how the proposed framework and plan would affect them (cf. Box 2.3). For 
example, there would be questions on whether certain project plans could be added to the 
annual plan (e.g. a water source development project), or suggestions related to the 
planning process (e.g. organized brainstorming sessions, and establishment of a working 
group on project development).  
The meeting always approved the five-year framework and annual plan. Again, this was 
probably due partly to the large amount of information presented in combination with the 
urge of the chairman to reach approval, so as ‘the work could continue’. It should be noted 
that the five-year framework and annual plan, presented by the assistant secretary together 
with DWR or WRO 1 representatives, involved project plans with budget proposals and 
how they were related to other budget plan frameworks (e.g. the provincial budget plan), 
and that the approved annual plan would be presented to the NWRC. Thus, the impression 
was given for the need of approval, so that the annual plan in particular could be processed 
further by the NWRC, and later presented to the Cabinet for budget allocation.  
 
5.4.2 Participation in the Ping RBC’s governing bodies 
 
Participation in making decisions by the governing bodies of the Ping RBC involved the 
integrated river basin management and development plan. Similar to the Ping RBC, the 
River Basin Sub-Committee participated in approving both the five-year integrated river 
basin management and development framework, and a planning process for annual 
integrated river basin management during its first meeting; and, the final version of the 
five-year framework and annual plan concerned were dealt with during its second meeting.  
A similar procedure was observed at the Ping RBC meetings, where the assistant secretary 
of the Sub-Committee (also the URCMS Director) presented information about the five-
year framework, and planning process or annual plan for the meetings; and then asked the 
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members for approval. Indeed, a similar set of information as that outlined in its meetings 
to the Ping RBC, as described above, was presented to the Sub-Committee. With few 
questions asked regarding certain project plans listed on the five-year framework or annual 
plan, the meeting always approved them. It should be noted that the Sub-Committee 
members were given a voluminous support document upon arrival at the meeting, and also 
the impression that they should somehow approve the plan, or at least the overall plan, in 
case they have issues with specific items; and then the planning process could continue 
(e.g. the Ping RBC could then approve the plan). 
The provincial river basin working groups were informed in only one meeting about the 
five-year integrated river basin management and development framework approved by the 
Ping RBC and the planning process by their assistant secretary (the URCMS or LRCMS 
Director). They were then informed about the annual integrated river basin management 
and development plan, which was the collection of project plans and budget proposals for 
implementation by the public agencies concerned and LGOs within respective provinces, 
and the provincial river basin working groups were asked to approve it. The meetings 
always approved the annual plan. Unlike the meetings of the Ping RBC or River Basin 
Sub-Committee, the chairman (a designated deputy provincial governor) of the Chiang Mai 
Provincial River Basin Working Group conducted the meetings, while the secretary (the 
URCMS Director) simply presented information, as he was seen as ‘the secretary’. He 
indeed ordered the second meeting because he preferred the LGOs and public agencies 
concerned to submit more project plans to the annual one. Therefore, two meetings were 
held for this working group in 2010 instead of the one that was planned. The chairpersons 
of the provincial river basin working groups were the provincial governors, who had great 
power in their respective provinces (see Section 2.4). Therefore, a situation where the 
chairman played a key role in the meeting and decision making, as observed in Chiang Mai 
is likely to occur also in other provincial working groups.      
The sub-river basin working groups were involved minimally in making decisions 
concerning the five-year integrated river basin management and development framework, 
and annual integrated river basin management and development plan. As observed, they 
were only informed of the five-year framework. However, the sub-river basin working 
groups played a role in submitting water resource-related project plans to the secretariat in 
order that they be included in the five-year framework or annual plan. As presented earlier, 
the sub-river basin working group meetings provided an opportunity for the URCMS and 
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LRCMS to ask local communities or LGOs located in respective sub-river basins to submit 
water resource-related project plans. According to a URMCS officer responsible, the water 
resource-related project plans submitted by LGOs were considered as sub-river basin plans 
for respective sub-river basins wherever they were situated. If local communities or water 
user groups wanted to submit the plans concerned to the URCMS or LRCMS, they could 
do so via LGOs.   
Overall, participation in the Ping RBC framework was largely at the information supply 
level (MOSTERT, 2006). Furthermore, the river basin governing bodies participated in 
decision making on only the main issues related to the integrated river basin management 
and development plan, which was found to be influenced by the Ping RBC secretariat, 
except in the provincial river basin working group setup, where the chairpersons seemed to 
play a major role. By and large, this situation seemed like a typical case of policy 
implementation, where the public agency responsible was unwilling to share decision 
making power with others, especially the general public, although there was a legal 
framework requiring it to do so. However, in the case of RBC framework implementation, 
a fundamental question remains as to whether the river basin governing bodies, particularly 
the RBCs or ‘the apex’ body of each river basin, actually have decision making power, 
which could then be shared. From this perspective, the answer is obvious in that they do 
not have such decision making power, which was reflected clearly by the outcomes 
produced by the RBC framework, particularly the integrated river basin management and 
development plan, as discussed in the following section.     
 
5.5 Functions and outcomes of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
The 2007 Regulation stipulates various mandates for the RBCs (see Box 4.2). It was 
observed through implementation of the Ping RBC framework that the river basin 
governing bodies at different levels within this RBC were also established, and several 
mandates were assigned to them (see Section 5.2.2). This section discusses the functions 
they performed and the outcomes produced by the Ping RBC framework.   
 
5.5.1 Functions of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
 
Although the Ping RBC, River Basin Sub-Committees, provincial river basin working 
groups, and sub-river basin working groups have been given tasks with many mandates,  
Section 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present evidence that their performance function was very limited, 
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which mainly concerned the river basin management and development plan. However, 
other functions related to critical mandates, such as water use prioritization and creation of 
fair and effective water allocation, have never been performed, especially by the Ping 
RBC.  
It was evident from the previous section that the secretariat of the Ping RBC framework 
(the URCMS in particular) played a central role in preparing the five-year river basin 
management and development framework and annual river basin management and 
development plan. In fact, it collected project plans from the public agencies concerned 
and LGOs in the Ping River Basin, and presented them for approval to the river basin 
governing bodies as the five-year framework and annual plans. This was carried out in a 
rushed manner with little time for consideration. In reaction to this, a Ping RBC member 
representing the agricultural water user group complained during the meeting that the Ping 
RBC functioned like ‘a rubber stamp’. An examination of the river basin management and 
development plan, and further planning process after approval from the Ping RBC, 
revealed that the plan in question was a mere exercise with no real impact, as discussed in 
the following section. This finding showed that the Ping RBC framework performed 
practically no functions. As such, the Ping RBC was not even ‘a rubber stamp’.  
 
5.5.2 The outcomes of the Ping RBC frameworks 
 
As evidenced throughout the discussions in Section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, the outcomes 
produced by the Ping RBC framework as a whole (PROVAN et al., 2007) were the five-year 
integrated river basin management and development frameworks, and the annual integrated 
river basin management and development plans for the Ping River Basin. Also, the nature 
of these two documents was explained - they were essentially collections of the project 
plans prepared by the public agencies concerned and LGOs located in the Ping River 
Basin. It can be seen by this characteristic that the documents were not actually the plans 
developed by the Ping RBC and its governing bodies. The plans mentioned also were 
similar to those produced by the old RBC framework, which was implemented from 2002 
to 2007 (see Section 4.4.1). Obviously, this was not a ‘framework’ or ‘plan’ that would be 
used for guiding the public agencies concerned and LGOs in developing their objectives 
and project plans (see Box 4.2 (3); cf. BRAGA & LOTUFO, 2008). 
It was observed from the meetings and their documents that an emphasis was placed on the 
annual integrated river basin management and development plans. In fact, annual plans 
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only were sent out to other bodies for consideration, according to the Ping RBC secretariat. 
These bodies included the NWRC, public agencies concerned, and provincial offices. 
The Ping RBC secretariat submitted the approved annual plans to the DWR, who acted as 
the NWRC secretariat, and in turn passed on these plans to the NWRC for consideration. 
The NWRC has met only 12 times since its inception in October 2007, and no meeting was 
organized in the three year period of 2011 to 2013. No item on approval of the annual plans 
in questions was on the agenda in any of these 12 meetings. There was no further action 
taken, and the plans concerned ended at the DWR.  
As found from the Ping RBC meetings and their documents, this incident had never been 
reported by the secretariat, which instead, informed the meeting about approval of the 
annual budget proposals and project implementations by the public agencies concerned. 
This gave the impression, to at least the members of the river basin governing bodies 
representing the non-public sector that the annual plans approved by the Ping RBC actually 
resulted in approval of the annual budget proposals, and projects being implemented by the 
public agencies concerned. This was because the annual plan for the Ping River Basin was 
simply a collection of the project plans derived from the annual budget proposals of the 
public agencies concerned, as previously mentioned. Also, the secretariat provided an 
indication that these public agencies would submit their project plans to their respective 
ministries for annual budget allocation by the Cabinet after the mentioned river basin 
annual plan had been approved by the Ping RBC. However, this indication was misleading 
and contradicted the actual practice of the public agencies concerned. 
The Ping RBC secretariat indicated that the approved annual plan of the Ping River Basin 
would be sent to the public agencies concerned in order to process the project plans 
contained in it further, so as to get budget support. However, these public agencies did not 
need approval from the Ping RBC before proceeding. In fact, they had their own 
frameworks, directives and budget calendar given by their respective departments, based 
on, for example, the Government Administrative Plans (see Section 4.1.3) and annual 
budget calendar of the Bureau of Budget (BOB).  
The annual budget calendar of the BOB starts around October of a given calendar year. 
Thus, the budget calendars for public agencies located in provincial areas might start even 
earlier, in order that their respective regional offices and departments have an overview by 
October of all project plans and budget proposals for implementation in the following 
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fiscal year64. Regarding this, WRO 1 would have to go through the same process; however, 
it never truly sought ‘an approval’ from the Ping RBC, but only submitted its project plans 
for inclusion as the annual plan of the Ping River Basin. As being part of local government, 
the LGOs have their own planning and budget allocation framework; however, they also 
can submit project plans that exceed their financial capacity directly to the relevant public 
agencies, for example, the RID for a medium scale water source. In any case, the public 
agencies concerned are not required to submit their project plans to the RBCs for approval 
before they propose them to their respective departments and ministries for annual budget 
allocation.   
Apart from the NWRC and public agencies concerned, the Ping RBC secretariat stated that 
the approved annual plan of the Ping River Basin would be sent to the provincial offices 
for inclusion in the provincial annual action plan, which could be submitted also for annual 
budget allocation (see Section 2.4). However, it is highly unlikely that the annual plan 
mentioned can be incorporated into respective provincial annual action plans because there 
are regulations and procedures that regulate their planning process. For example, a project 
plan must address the strategies of a province, which are indicated in its four-year 
provincial development plan, and it would be assessed by a relevant sub-committee 
appointed by the integrated provincial administration committee. Indeed, lists of possible 
measures or projects for each strategy have been suggested in the four-year provincial 
development plans, and naturally, the provincial office itself proposed most of the project 
plans included in the provincial annual action plan, as observed in the case of Chiang 
Mai65. At any rate, the annual plan of the Ping River Basin would make little or no impact 
as far as the provincial annual action plan is concerned.                  
Evidently, the Ping RBC framework generated no outcomes. The five-year integrated river 
basin management and development frameworks, and annual river basin management and 
development plans it produced, would be mere outputs with virtually no impact on the Ping 
River Basin. It also was apparent that the decision making power of the Ping RBC was not 
comprehensive or legally bound to other bodies. This, together with evidence regarding its 
management, collaboration and participation aspects, clearly indicates that the Ping RBC is 
not a ‘river basin committee’ as defined by MOLLE et al. (2007; see Box 2.5). In fact, it 
                                                          
64
 This next fiscal year starts on October 1, of the next calendar year. 
65
 For example, of the 51 projects included in the provincial annual action plan of the 2014 fiscal year, 44 
were proposed by the Chiang Mai Provincial Office.  
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cannot be considered any type of river basin organization or delegated water governance 
partnership (see Box 2.2).   
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presents the 2007 RBC framework implementation using the Ping River Basin 
Committee as an illustrative case. It initially discusses formation of the Ping RBC 
framework, which started in 2008 with the nomination and appointment of Ping RBC non-
public sector members. Then, the River Basin Sub-Committee on River Basin Management 
and Information, five provincial river basin working groups, and 20 sub-river basin 
working groups were appointed by the Ping RBC. The appointment of the latter was 
delayed until completion in 2012, the last year of the first four-year term of the full RBC 
framework (the term of the Ping RBC non-public sector members ended in 2012).   
The chapter continues with discussion on management of the Ping RBC and its governing 
bodies. It was evident that, instead of the participant-governed form as suggested in the 
2007 Regulation, they were managed by the lead organization form, where the secretariat 
(WRO 1, and the URCMS in particular) played a central role. In terms of collaborative 
process, it was found that the Ping RBC framework was characterized by a lack of face-to-
face dialogue, and little interaction between the Ping RBC secretariat and members of the 
Ping River Basin’s governing bodies, or between the members themselves. Furthermore, 
participation in the Ping RBC arrangement was seen to be largely at the information supply 
level, which does not constitute true public participation. As public participation suggests 
shared decision making power, a critical question for the Ping RBC is whether it has 
comprehensive decision making power, which could be shared. From the only function 
performed concerning the integrated river basin management and development plan, the 
Ping RBC apparently had no comprehensive decision making power that was legally bound 
to other bodies.  
As a whole, the Ping RBC framework only produced the five-year river basin management 
and development frameworks and integrated river basin management and development 
plans. These frameworks and plans were its [the Ping RBC] only outputs with practically 
no impact on the Ping River Basin. All in all, the Ping RBC cannot be considered as any 
kind of river basin organization or delegated water governance partnership.    
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6. DISCUSSION: COLLABORATIVE WATER 
GOVERNANCE IN THE THAI ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTEXT 
 
Evidence presented in the previous chapter clearly shows that the Ping RBC and its 
governing bodies have no authority, very limited function, and virtually no outcomes. The 
Ping RBC members representing the non-public sector referred to the Ping RBC as ‘a 
paper tiger’ or ‘a yak66 with no club’, which was an accurate reflection. At first glance, 
evidence indicates that WRO 1 via the URCMS and LRCMS as the Ping RBC secretariat, 
and the DWR by extension, obviously captures and directs the Ping RBC framework in 
order to achieve its own mandates as the secretariat.  
To understand the full situation, however, the interwoven factors in the Thai administrative 
context, in which all players in the Ping RBC framework are embedded, need to be looked 
at, particularly those representing the public sector. Thus, this chapter discusses the effects 
of the Thai administrative system and its reform on Ping RBC implementation, and the 
legal infrastructure underlying this implementation. 
 
6.1 The Thai administrative system and Ping RBC implementation 
 
The 2007 Regulation stipulates establishment of the NWRC and 25 RBCs. It also requires 
that the DWR serves as the NWRC secretariat, and its WROs act as secretariats of RBCs 
located in areas that they are responsible for (see Section 4.4.2). With this provision, the 
2007 Regulation essentially delegates the DWR as a responsible agency for implementing 
the 2007 RBC framework. As presented in Section 5.1, various public agencies from 
different administrative levels also were involved in the Ping RBC and its governing 
bodies. Thus, the Thai administrative system, where the DWR and public agencies 
involved are its elements, plays a critical role in current implementation of the RBC 
framework.
                                                          
66
 A yak is a Thai mythical creature, which uses a club as a weapon. Without a club, the yak poses no threat 
or fear despite its sheer size. ‘A yak with no club’ metaphor rightly reflects the nature of the Ping RBC, 
given its large number of members and also its 26 governing bodies at the river basin, provincial, and sub-
river basin level. However, if it has no club, it has no authority and produces no outcome.    
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6.1.1 Effects of the administrative system on the Ping RBC framework 
 
Thailand is a unitary state, which implies that the administrative system is the same 
throughout the country, and also the rules and regulations are by and large the same 
nationwide. As such, public agencies involved in implementation of the RBC framework, 
including the DWR, must observe general rules and regulations that are similar; while 
simultaneously following their own specific criteria. This obviously hinders collaborative 
effort such as that in the RBC framework, where collaboration and participation are 
required not only from the public agencies concerned, but also the non-public sector under 
a new entity (i.e. an RBC). The following sections discuss the effects of the administrative 
system on implementation of the RBC framework, as evidenced in the Ping RBC setup. 
 
6.1.1.1 WRO 1 as a public agency 
As part of the DWR, WRO 1 is a central administrative agency located in a provincial area. 
As such, its units including the URCMS and LRCMS also retain this same status, even 
though they are located in the provincial administration jurisdiction [i.e. Chiang Mai for 
the former, and Kampaengphet for the latter (see Figure 2.1)]. Unlike their counterparts at 
the provincial administration level, the URCMS and LRCMS are not under the supervision 
of the provincial governors concerned. They are accountable for WRO 1, who in turn 
reports directly to the DWR. The same holds true for other WROs and their CMSs. In 
pursuance to the 2007 Regulation, WRO 1 was indicated as the Ping RBC secretariat. In 
practice, WRO 1 assigned this task further to its units (URCMS and LRCMS), who also act 
as the secretariat of other governing bodies in the Ping River Basin (see Section 5.2.3).  
As a public agency, WRO 1 and its units must observe the relevant rules and regulations 
applied to all public agencies. Concerning RBC framework implementation, they must 
follow at least two main regulations: the Ministry of Finance’s Regulation on Expenditure 
for Training Workshops, Events, and the International Conference of 2006 and its updates; 
and, the Royal Decree on Meeting Allowance of 2004, together with relevant 
announcements on the eligibility of committees and sub-committees as well as their 
secretaries and assistant secretaries for meeting allowance, and its rate. These regulations 
prescribe in detail relevant expenses regarding the meetings of the Ping RBC and its 
governing bodies. For example, a member of the Ping RBC and Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee would receive a meeting allowance of 1,200 baht, and 800 baht, respectively, 
for attending a meeting; and members needing accommodation would receive an allowance 
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not exceeding 1,200 baht per room (one room for one person), or 750 baht per room (one 
room for two persons). The CMS officer responsible for organizing each meeting must 
submit a formal request for a budget from WRO 1, as practiced by the URCMS officers 
concerned.  
In addition, WRO 1 and its units must follow specific directives given by the DWR; for 
example, those concerning water source development and rehabilitation. Regarding Ping 
RBC implementation, the directive for establishing the sub-river basin working groups, as 
presented in Section 5.1.4, is a good example. However, there were other directives that 
WRO 1 and its CMSs had to follow such as an annual plan for the RBC framework, which 
corresponds to an annual budget allocated to the DWR; and, common report templates 
designed for the RBC framework. Furthermore, WRO 1 must also adhere to other 
directives, which reflect compliance of the DWR with government policies; for instance, 
administrative reform (see Section 6.2) and the decentralization effort. 
Thus, as the nature of a public agency dictates, WRO 1, and the URCMS and LRCMS for 
that matter, were not ‘free’ to implement the Ping RBC framework. They had to follow the 
rules and regulation concerned, which in turn sanctioned their actions. Indeed, the DWR 
had to comply with various laws and the government policies concerned on its own. From 
a public administration perspective, this can be considered as a normal situation (PETERS & 
PIERRE, 2012). However, when it comes to implementing the RBC framework, this normal 
practice may not be suitable because more flexibility is needed (e.g. in organizing a 
meeting), while collaboration and participation must also be encouraged [or forced in the 
case of public agencies (O’TOOL JR., 2010)]. As discussed in Section 2.2.4, a legal 
infrastructure is needed to facilitate RBC framework implementation in order to realize this 
collaborative water governance policy (see Section 6.3). Alternatively, the RBC framework 
and its implementation need to be readjusted at least by taking the reality of a public 
agency into consideration (see Section 7.2). 
 
6.1.1.2 The public agencies involved in the Ping RBC framework 
There were various public agencies involved in the Ping RBC arrangement, as presented in 
Section 5.1. They were obliged, like WRO 1, to follow the relevant rules and regulations as 
well as the laws and government policies concerned. These public agencies must also 
address the directives given to them by their superiors; and, in the case of LGOs, must 
fulfill the mandates in their jurisdiction.  
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Despite attempts by the 2007 Regulation to involve these public agencies, it could only 
oblige them to have passive involvement by attending a meeting and providing their 
project documents when requested. Again, this can be considered as normal practice for 
public agencies, as they have their own priorities and directives, which they duly have to 
follow. Furthermore, the 2007 Regulation was not comprehensive vis-à-vis relevant laws 
and regulations, from which these priorities and directives were derived. Thus, the RBC 
framework was the ‘very last’ priority for the public agencies and LGOs involved, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.1.  
As it stands at present, the public agencies and LGOs concerned are unlikely to change 
their action regarding the RBC framework. This is not because they are resistant to change; 
but in this case, they simply continue to perform their own duties, while the RBC 
framework has become their additional, low priority task. As presented above, the relevant 
legal infrastructure or readjustment of the RBC framework and its implementation are 
needed in order to make the framework a priority for these public agencies and LGOs. This 
would encourage or force the public agencies and LGOs concerned to be involved in the 
setup actively, thereby obliging them to collaborate with their non-public sector 
counterparts. 
 
6.1.2 Effects of the administrative levels on the Ping RBC framework 
 
Apart from rules and regulations, and directives that the public agencies and LGOs 
concerned have to follow, there are also the administrative levels that regulate these public 
entities: central, provincial, and local (see Section 2.4; Figure 2.1). Generally, public 
agencies are distinguished clearly in terms of their administrative levels and their 
mandates. For example, the Chiang Mai Provincial Irrigation Project (CIP) is a unit of the 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) at the provincial administrative level, and responsible 
for irrigation-related tasks in Chiang Mai, while Irrigation Regional Office 1 is a unit of 
RID at the central administrative level and supervises, among others, CIP and the Mae 
Tang Irrigation Project (see Section 4.3.1). Implementation of the Ping RBC framework 
also was influenced by these administrative structures, especially the central and provincial 
administration. 
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6.1.2.1 The central administration 
Apparently, the RBC framework is designed for implementation in provincial areas 
nationwide. From a DWR perspective, this fact already poses a challenge. Unlike several 
other departments from central administration, the DWR has no provincial offices at the 
provincial administrative level. Thus, it has no official link to the provincial administration, 
and also no ‘local’ unit to facilitate RBC framework implementation in respective 
provinces (cf. the RID presented above). Instead, the DWR has to rely solely on its WROs 
and river basin coordination and management sections (CMSs)67. Regarding Ping RBC 
implementation, WRO 1 delegated the task to the URCMS and LRCMS, who were 
responsible for two provinces (Chiang Mai and Lamphun), and covered three (Tak, 
Kampaengphet, and Nakornsawan), respectively.  
The RBC framework was unfolded in implementation of the Ping RBC setup, and it was 
evident that public sector members of the river basin governing bodies largely represented 
central administration at the river basin level (i.e. the Ping RBC and Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee). All but one of the assigned public agencies for the Ping RBC represented 
central administration (11 of 12 agencies; see Table 5.4), while most public sector 
members of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee (see Table 5.5) also came from this 
administrative level (14 of 18 members). From the perspective of Thai administration, 
these arrangements were intended to be above the provincial administration level, which 
would be involved mainly with governing bodies of the river basin at the provincial and 
sub-river basin level.    
However, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, the central public agencies concerned simply 
assigned the directors of their regional offices to the Ping RBC. With different internal 
structures, certain regional office directors were appointed as member of more than one 
RBC. The Director of WRO 1 was an ex officio member and secretary of four RBCs, 
including the Ping RBC. In practice, it is difficult already for these members to participate 
in Ping RBC activities. The same likely holds true for the public sector members concerned 
with the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee, who were appointed by the Ping RBC. This is 
because they were also regional directors of the central public agencies concerned, and 
maybe assigned as members of certain RBCs as well. Indeed, some were appointed also as 
Ping RBC members (e.g. directors of Irrigation Regional Office 1 and Marine Regional 
                                                          
67
 There are 31 CMSs in total from ten WROs. 
 133 
Office 1). In addition, this situation is complicated further by the fact that these public 
sector members were obliged to follow specific mandates and directives given by their 
superiors, as discussed in the previous section.  
 
6.1.2.2 The provincial administration 
As observed in the Ping RBC setup, the provincial administration was relied upon for 
implementing the RBC framework. It was involved from the beginning through the 
provincial recruitment sub-committees to identify eligible persons for appointing as Ping 
RBC non-public sector members (see Section 5.1.1.1). Five provincial governors also were 
seen as ex officio members of the Ping RBC; one of whom was selected as its chairperson. 
In addition, the provincial governors also were appointed as chairpersons of the Ping River 
Basin Sub-Committee and provincial river basin working groups, with the latter including 
some provincial public agencies as their members (see Table 5.5 and 5.6). District officers 
were also assigned as chairpersons and members of the sub-river basin working groups 
(see Table 5.7).   
Administratively, it deems logical to include those from the provincial administration in 
the river basin governing bodies, as they have authority in provincial areas that is exercised 
especially through provincial governors (see Section 2.4). However, it seems that only the 
DWR needs provincial administration, and not vice versa. Evidently, the Chiang Mai 
Governor, as the chairman and a member of the Ping RBC, never attended the meetings, 
nor did the governors of Lamphun, Tak, Kamphaengphet or Nakornswan, who also were ex 
officio members, but they sent their representatives instead of their selves.  
Again, this situation does not indicate that the provincial administration resists or fails to 
provide collaboration in implementing the RBC framework. From the provincial 
administration’s perspective, the framework is yet another activity in which it has to take 
part. However, the provincial administration also has its own mandates. In other words, the 
government and Ministry of Interior gives all provinces (76 in total) specific mandates and 
directives that can be grouped into four main areas: economy, social development, security, 
and administration. Under the integrated provincial administration scheme (see Section 
2.4), all provincial public agencies have to support the provinces, while at the same time 
address their own specific mandates and directives assigned by their respective 
departments and ministries (i.e. central administration). 
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Thus, to realize the RBC framework in general, and implement it at the provincial and sub-
river basin level in particular, the DWR would have to readjust its implementation 
approach, while taking the nature of the provincial administration previously mentioned 
into consideration. This might mean a compromise with the idea of using a basin as a 
managerial unit, as described in a collaborative water governance/river basin governance 
approach (BAKKER & COHEN, 2011; JASPERS, 2003). However, scholars suggest going 
beyond this idea and building sustainable water governance on existing administrative 
structure (GIORDANO & SHAH, 2014; WARNER et al., 2008). From the public 
administration’s point of view, a comprehensive legal infrastructure is required to facilitate 
RBC framework implementation that would bind together all provincial offices (and 
provincial governors) and provincial public agencies, as well as the central public agencies 
concerned (see Section 6.3). 
 
6.2 Thai administrative reform and Ping RBC implementation 
 
Administrative reform efforts have been intensified in Thailand since the late 1990s (see 
Section 2.4), with emphasis placed on the efficiency aspect derived from new public 
management (see Section 2.4; BOWORNWATHANA, 2000). These reforms have been 
institutionalized by laws, and responsible agencies were established (e.g. Office of the 
Public Sector Development Commission - OPDC). Accordingly, public agencies are 
obliged to follow these laws, and also the directives issued by the agencies in charge of the 
national administrative reform such as the OPDC and Bureau of the Budget (BOB). It was 
observed that administrative reform also influenced Ping RBC framework implementation, 
especially through the DWR. The following sections provide an overview of Thai 
administrative reform in practice and its effects on Ping RBC implementation. 
 
6.2.1 Elements of administrative reform 
 
The Thai government has implemented various administrative reform initiatives since the 
economic crisis in 1997 in order to improve its public agencies. The aims of this 
improvement have centered on such issues as better service quality; integrated public 
management, accountability and transparency; and, high performance as well as a recent 
focus on internationalization in context of the ASEAN Community68 (OPDC 2008; 2013b). 
                                                          
68
 The ASEAN Community is an initiative of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to 
promote more integration in the region based on three main pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security 
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The reform efforts include, for instance, organizational restructuring and management 
reform. 
One of the main measures for public organizational restructuring was to follow the 
Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act of 2002, which resulted 
in establishing new central administrative agencies, e.g. the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment, where new departments such as the DWR and Department of 
Groundwater Resources were created. In addition, some central public agencies were 
dissolved and their tasks and personnel transferred to other agencies. For example, the 
Accelerated Rural Development Department was disbanded; and its tasks and personnel 
were transferred to three new departments, including the DWR, Department of Rural 
Roads, and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.   
Restructuring was realized also through creations of new types of public agencies. For 
instance, several autonomous public organizations (POs) were established as implementing 
units following the (Autonomous) Public Organization Act of 1999, e.g. the Agricultural 
Research Development Agency (ARDA) and Highland Research and Development 
Institute (HRDI)69 (BOWORNWATHANA, 2012). In addition, service delivery units (SDUs) 
were created through regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister as ‘quasi-autonomous 
divisions under a department’ to support the government in performing some internal 
functions; for instance, the Royal Thai Mint and Printing Bureau (LORSUWANNARAT & 
BURACOM, 2010).  
Besides organizational restructuring, the OPDC introduced a result-based management 
approach to reform management in the Thai public sector (KOIKE, 2013). This approach 
was implemented in 2004 and consists of three components: performance agreement (goal 
setting), performance appraisal, and incentives for performance (KOONMEE, 2011). As a 
framework for performance evaluation, the OPDC introduced the concept of the ‘Balanced 
Scorecard’ that comprised four perspectives: effectiveness, service quality, efficiency, and 
organizational development’ (LORSUWANNARAT & BURACOM, 2010; OPDC, 2013a). Public 
agencies are required to develop annual performance agreements reflecting these four 
perspectives. They also have to negotiate with the OPDC about performance indicators and 
scoring criteria to be used as well as intended targets; and report their implementation 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. It is to be 
implemented in 2015; see www.asean.org.  
69
 ARDA and HRDI are supervised by Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.   
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progress to the OPDC three times yearly, using e-SAR (Self-Assessment Report) 
(LORSUWANNARAT & BURACOM, 2010; OPDC, 2014).  
The incentives are in the form of cash rewards and allocated to individual officers based on 
the performance of their agencies, that is to say, the agreed targets (the performance score: 
5) or at least achievement of the standard performance score (3 or above)70. Regarding the 
annual performance appraisal, the external bodies perform this task at the organizational 
level, i.e. TRIS Corporation Limited for all public agencies concerned and 76 provincial 
offices; as well as the Office for Standards in Education for all of the higher education 
institutes concerned (KOONMEE, 2011). According to KOONMEE (2011, p. 146), ‘various 
concepts and appraisal justifications’ were used to assess the performance of individual 
officers, which is likely to be carried out by their superiors following the Civil Service Act 
of 2008. In any case, however, the performance scores given will range from 1 to 5, where 
those who receive scores of 3 or above are eligible for the performance incentives 
mentioned71.   
 
6.2.2 Effects of administrative reform on the Ping RBC framework 
 
It was observed that performance agreement influenced the implementation of the Ping 
RBC as the main element of management reform. The following sections discuss 
performance agreement in practice with reference to the RBC framework and its effects on 
framework implementation, as observed in the Ping RBC arrangement. 
 
6.2.2.1 The DWR and WRO 1 performance agreement 
The DWR has engaged in the performance agreement practice since 2004. Following the 
performance evaluation framework of the OPDC, the DWR performance agreement 
comprised four perspectives, i.e. effectiveness, service quality, efficiency, and 
organizational development. The DWR performance agreement for the 2011 fiscal year is 
presented as an example in Table 6.1. Once a given performance agreement is signed, the 
DWR delegates the ‘targets’ to its line units which in turn develop performance agreements 
accordingly. 
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 The OPDC’s official correspondence on reward allocation for the 2012 fiscal year, dated November 7, 
2013  
71
 Ibid. 
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Table 6.1: The DWR performance agreement for the 2011 fiscal year (selected) 
Indicator Target Result Score 
1. Effectiveness perspective  
- Adequate water for use in target areas  3 1 1.00 
- Water resource management with participation from target 
groups 
5 5 5.00 
- Alleviation of water shortage in target communities  5 1 1.00 
- Preparation of integrated water resource management plan 1 3 5.00 
- Number of public personnel, the general public, river basin 
organizations, LGO representatives, and networks that attended 
capacity building activities on water resource management 
100% 
(15,000) 
5 5.00 
2. Service quality perspective 
- Service satisfaction  85% n/a 1.00 
- Implementation of anti-corruption measures 5 5 5.00 
3. Efficiency perspective 
- Percentage of overall budget disbursement  94% 1.5 1.00 
- Implementation of the law development plan 5 5 5.00 
4. Organizational development perspective 
- Achievement in the public service standard (the fundamental 
level)  
5 - 5 
Source: DWR (2011, pp. 22-25) 
 
Thus WRO 1, as one of the DWR’s line units, is tasked with certain objectives that 
contribute to the achievement of the DWR’s overall annual targets. Consequently, WRO 1 
distributes these targets among its own units (see Figure 5.5). For example, one of the 
performance indicators for WRO 1 effectiveness for the 2009 fiscal year was ‘achievement 
in supporting a budget planning process for integrated budget plans at the river basin level, 
and provincial and provincial cluster development plans’. WRO 1 assigned this 
performance indicator (i.e. the target) further to its five CMSs, including the URCMS and 
LRCMS. The Director of WRO 1 signed the WRO 1 performance agreement with the 
DWR by following the performance agreement scheme. Furthermore, directors of the 
WRO 1 line units signed their performance agreement with WRO 1. This performance 
agreement practice (KOONMEE, 2011) showed that it follows a top-down approach, where 
the targets are decided at a higher level, while the lower level could only acknowledge 
these targets. 
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6.2.2.2 The Ping RBC framework in the performance agreement context 
Based on related documents, the RBC framework was not addressed explicitly in the 
general DWR performance agreements. However, some performance indicators (i.e. 
targets) involved the Ping RBC framework, as found in the URCMS performance 
agreements. For example, meeting arrangements for the Ping River Basin governing bodies 
(see Section 5.1) was set as a URCMS performance indicator in the 2009 fiscal year; while 
support for preparation of the integrated river basin management plan, and provincial and 
provincial cluster development plan was included in the following fiscal year.  
Apparently, the performance indicators mentioned above were not meant to assess 
performance of the Ping River Basin governing bodies, but rather their secretariat (i.e. 
WRO 1) and the URCMS. A closer look at these performance indicators also revealed that 
they indicated the strategic behavior of the public agencies in question and their attempt to 
fulfill the performance agreement exercise (DE BRUIJN, 2007; DECHARIN, 2003), rather than 
using it to assess their performance and enhance strategic management (KAPLAN & 
NORTON, 1996). 
The URCMS performance indicator for the meeting arrangements of the Ping River Basin 
governing bodies mentioned above included a description that explained how this target 
would be achieved in five levels. For instance, an achievement at level 4 (score: 4) 
regarding the Ping RBC meeting arrangements was attained when the third meeting was 
held; and level 5 (score: 5) was reached when the Ping River Basin-related problems were 
collected, and Ping RBC meeting reports and summaries were prepared. Regarding the 
performance indicator for supporting preparation of the integrated river basin management 
plan, and provincial and provincial cluster development plan, the five-level achievement 
framework also applied. Here, an achievement at level 4 (score: 4) was indicated by the 
five-year integrated river basin management and development framework, and annual 
integrated river basin management and development plan being presented to the Ping RBC; 
while level 5 (score: 5) was achieved when the annual plan in question was sent to the 
provincial offices concerned and the DWR.            
In addition, there was a performance indicator associated with capacity building on water 
resource management, which would contribute to the Ping RBC framework, at least in 
theory. The target groups for this performance indicator were public personnel, the general 
public, river basin organizations, LGO representatives, and ‘networks’ (water user groups 
created by the DWR). The total number was set by the DWR, e.g. 15,000 persons in the 
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2009 fiscal year (see Table 6.1). Later, the divided number was distributed to WROs and 
CMSs. For example, in the fiscal year mentioned, the URCMS was assigned with a target 
number of 420 persons. Accordingly, this assigned number was set as an indicator of 
achievement at level 5 (score: 5). However, from descriptions of this performance 
indicator, ‘capacity building activities’ were not specific activities organized to enhance 
knowledge and understanding on water resource management, but activities conducted by 
the URCMS, such as meetings to establish sub-river basin working groups and ‘networks’, 
and training workshops for small-scale water source database development. Attendees of 
these activities were then considered as target groups. 
The situations mentioned above confirm the challenges faced by the Thai public sector 
management reform, where use of the Balanced Scorecard “focuses more on the search for 
KPIs (key performance indicators) and ignores the construction of strategic maps” 
(BOWORNWATHANA, 2010, p. 225). Indeed, the Balanced Scorecard in the Thai public 
sector context became ‘the KPI Scorecard’ with the focus on performance evaluation 
(DECHARIN, 2003). 
Regarding the Ping RBC framework, the performance indicators involved did not really 
contribute to its implementation. That is to say, these performance indicators did not 
address the ‘targets’ on collaboration and participation in the Ping RBC framework. For 
example, the performance indicator on providing support for the river basin and 
provincial/provincial cluster planning process focused mainly on the river basin 
management and development framework/plan; while the target could be achieved simply 
by sending the plan to the DWR and provincial offices concerned. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this reflected well on the activities of the Ping River Basin governing 
bodies, where the river basin management and development framework/plan was always 
the main issue. At the same time, all the issues concerning collaboration and participation 
were absent from the scene, even though they are critical elements of collaborative water 
governance, as well as being indicated in the 2007 Regulation.   
Thus, it can be seen that the Ping RBC-related performance indicators only helped WRO 1 
and the URCMS to fulfill their obligation regarding the performance agreement. However, 
their ambition to do more in implementing the Ping RBC framework was blocked 
somehow due to these performance indicators (DE BRUIJN, 2007). Thus, the DWR needs to 
readjust its practice in the performance agreement when it comes to RBC framework-
related targets. For example, the DWR should encourage WROs to set more ambitious 
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targets, e.g. to have a river basin development and management plan included in the annual 
provincial development plan, instead of merely ‘sending’ it to provincial offices. This 
could be facilitated also by adjusting the existing laws and regulations concerned, or 
introducing new ones; for instance, amending the regulations on integrated provincial 
administration that require provincial offices to include a river basin management and 
development plan in their annual provincial development plan, given that relevant criteria 
are observed (e.g. contribution to the respective province’s natural resource development 
strategy). 
 
6.3 Legal infrastructure and Ping RBC implementation 
 
Legal frameworks have been discussed rarely in the context of Ping RBC implementation. 
In fact, the 2007 Regulation was presented only once during the first meeting of the Ping 
RBC and Ping River Basin Sub-Committee. However, it is clear that comprehensive legal 
frameworks are needed, as discussed in the previous sections. Conversely, it is also 
apparent that a relevant legal infrastructure (e.g. BINGHAM, 2011) was not in place to 
facilitate realization of the RBC framework.  
This omission clearly affected RBC framework implementation, as evidenced by Ping 
RBC arrangements, where the public agencies responsible (especially the URCMS) relied 
on only some regulations for merely routine Ping RBC functions that concentrated on 
meeting arrangements (e.g. meeting allowance). However, no laws or regulations are in 
place to allow the Ping RBC to function as the governing body of the Ping River Basin, 
and thereby enabling collaborative water governance. Indeed, the whole RBC framework 
setup is regulated by only one regulation, which is the Office of the Prime Minister’s 
Regulation on National Water Resources Management of 2007 [the 2007 Regulation], and 
by its nature, is not comprehensive. The following sections discuss the 2007 Regulation as 
legal infrastructure for the RBC framework, and water law that could provide a more 
comprehensive legal foundation for the RBC effort. 
 
6.3.1 The 2007 regulation as legal infrastructure for RBC implementation 
 
The RBC framework was implemented following the Office of the Prime Minister’s 
Regulation on National Water Resources Management of 2007, which is one of several 
Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulations issued by the Prime Minister, with Cabinet 
approval to facilitate public administration. In the Thai legal context, the Prime Minister’s 
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Regulation is a subordinate legislation (SUMANTAKUL, 2004), which is lowest in terms of 
legal hierarchy (SAKSAENG, 2011)72. According to UWANNO (2004), the Prime Minister’s 
Regulation also is low in terms of legal status when compared to other types of subordinate 
legislation such as the royal ordinance and ministerial regulation. It is especially a kind of 
subordinate legislation issued by the Prime Minister to regulate the administration with no 
backup of any other primary legislation (i.e. Acts); thus, it can be enforced upon only 
public agencies and state-owned enterprises, and cannot be applied to the private sector 
(UWANNO, 2004).  
Apparently, the 2007 Regulation alone cannot provide comprehensive legal infrastructure 
for water resource management, as outlined in its provisions (i.e. the National Water 
Resources Committee [NWRC] and RBC framework). Due to its legal nature, the 2007 
Regulation can provide the NWRC and RBCs with only very limited authority, which is 
clearly evident when it comes to water use requests and permission, where the NWRC has 
had no conclusive answers to requests since 200373. This issue would be out of discussion 
for the RBCs, as one of them initially passed it on to the NWRC. It is clear, however, that 
the 2007 Regulation only regulates water use and water allocation for the public sector and 
state-owned enterprises74. Thus, priority and quantity of water to be used, as well as water 
allocation measures (see Box 4.2), if created at all, will not be applied to the private sector 
because it is beyond the legal authority of the 2007 Regulation, as the Office of the Prime 
Minister’s Regulation (see UWANNO, 2004). Clearly, relevant legal frameworks are needed 
in order to realize collaborative water governance in the form of the RBC and enable it to 
perform its functions effectively.           
The integrated provincial administration scheme, which started almost at the same time as 
the RBC framework in this study, could provide a comparative picture of how 
comprehensive legal frameworks can facilitate its implementation. This scheme was 
implemented following the Royal Decree on Integrated Provincial and Provincial Cluster 
Administration of 2008, which was issued as part of the State Administration Act (No.7) of 
2007. In a way, the 2008 Royal Decree can be seen as a translation into implementation of 
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 The Thai legal hierarchy is arranged as follows: 1) constitution, 2) organic laws, 3) Acts or equivalence 
(e.g. Codes and palace law), 4) royal decrees issued in pursuant to the constitution, 5) subordinate 
legislation (SAKSAENG, 2011).    
73
 The NWRC meeting report No.3/2551 and No.2/2552, dated October 31, 2008 and July 15, 2009, 
respectively.  
74
 The NWRC meeting report No.3/2551, see also UWANNO (2004). 
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the integrated provincial administration policy indicated in the aforementioned Act. It 
should be noted that provinces and provincial clusters can propose their budget plans, as a 
provision in the Act indicates, and they are considered as ‘public agencies’, as defined in 
the Budget Procedure Act of 1959. This ensures that the provinces and provincial clusters 
are eligible to make budget requests based on the Act concerned.    
Similar to the 2007 Regulation, the 2008 Royal Decree indicates the setup of the 
Committee on Integrated Provincial and Provincial Cluster Administration Policy (CIPP) 
to oversee implementation of the integrated provincial administration scheme, chaired by 
the Prime Minister. This national committee also has established 18 provincial clusters 
covering the entire country. However, it is apparent that the focus of the 2008 Royal 
Decree is placed on individual provincial administration, with comprehensive prescriptions 
provided. Regarding implementation of integrated provincial administration in each 
province, a provincial committee has been established and chaired by a provincial 
governor; and charged with the main tasks of developing a four-year provincial 
development plan and annual action plan, as well as monitoring and evaluating 
implementation of these plans. The committee members are represented by all public 
agencies and state-owned enterprises whose offices are located in respective provinces, 
LGOs, the general public, and private sector. Despite criticism of this being the 
recentralization of central administration (see MUTEBI, 2004), this arrangement for 
provincial administration indicates a move toward collaborative governance, where not 
only the provincial governor and his/her staff at the provincial office make decisions about 
provincial development, but also representatives from LGOs and the private sector. 
In a way, the setup and tasks mandated, as mentioned above, are similar to that of the 
RBCs. However, there are some differences, especially in terms of authority and financial 
support. The 2008 Royal Decree renders authority on the integrated provincial 
administration committee to develop a four-year provincial development plan and annual 
action plan that oblige other public agencies and LGOs to follow. Furthermore, it also 
obligates the BOB to allocate sufficient budget for realizing an annual provincial plan. 
These two points are in stark contrast to the RBC framework, as shown in the case of the 
Ping RBC, where there is no actual river basin development plans prepared by the 
committee itself, and the so-called ‘integrated river basin development plans’ are not 
recognized by the BOB.  
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In addition, differences can be seen also from the implementation processes of the 
integrated provincial administration framework that are outlined in the 2008 Royal Decree. 
For example, a public survey must be conducted in order to obtain local needs and assess 
local capacity upon which a four-year provincial development plan will be developed. 
After which, it must be presented for discussions in a meeting attended by the chiefs of all 
public agencies, state-owned enterprises, LGOs located in the province concerned, and 
representatives of the general public and private sector. Regarding supervision of the 
implementation of the plans, inspectors from the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry 
of Interior will monitor and evaluate the performance of the provinces and provincial 
clusters, from which monitoring and evaluation reports must be submitted to the CIPP 
twice per year. Apparently, the 2007 Regulation lacks such provisions. 
 
6.3.2 Water law as legal infrastructure for RBC framework implementation 
 
The RBC framework, as prescribed in the 2007 Regulation, clearly shows the intension to 
involve the non-public sector in managing water resources in respective river basins. This 
collaborative water governance project also can be seen as a Thai government effort to 
open up its public sector and move toward collaborative governance with participation 
from the non-public sector. However, as discussed in the previous section, the 2007 
Regulation is not a comprehensive legal framework, as virtually no authority is granted to 
either the NWRC or RBCs. This also implies that no decision making power is delegated to 
the non-public sector representatives involved in these governing bodies (see BAKKER & 
COHEN, 2011; MOSTERT, 2006). Furthermore, by its legal nature, the 2007 Regulation can 
be enforced only upon public agencies and state-owned enterprises, while water resource 
issues also involve non-public sector users such as those in agricultural and industrial 
areas.  
From a legal infrastructure perspective, comprehensive legal frameworks are needed in 
order to redress the shortcomings of the 2007 Regulation and push forward collaborative 
governance in the Thai water sector. However, there is no primary legislation (i.e. Acts) 
from which such legal frameworks can be devised; also, it should be reiterated that 33 
water-related laws exist, but none of them comprehensively deals with water resources. 
Thus, in the Thai administrative and legal context, an Act is necessitated, which is second 
only to the constitution and organic laws in terms of its legal hierarchy (see SAKSAENG, 
2011). Specifically, a Water Act is required (cf. LEBEL et al., 2009), where principles are 
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laid out not only for water resource management based on a collaborative water 
governance concept, but also for authority over water resources in general such as water 
resource management, water rights and water allocation. 
The Water Act will be enforced as a national law upon both the public and private sector. 
Regarding water resource management, governing bodies such as the NWRC and RBCs, 
will be given full authority to manage water resources at the national and river basin level. 
However, this authority needs to be stated expressly in the Water Act. For example, the 
NWRC should have the power to prepare a national water resource development and 
management master plan, and approve water-related plans or projects before submitting a 
budget allocation to the BOB (after THE FACULTY OF LAW, THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY, 
1993). Meanwhile, KAOSA-ARD et al. (2001b) suggest, among other things, that the water 
law should grant RBCs and their governing bodies authority to issue water allocation 
measures with legal sanctions for offenders. In addition, the Water Act should grant power 
to the RBCs in creating a river basin development master plan. This would oblige the 
public agencies concerned and LGOs to follow in preparing water-related plans or projects, 
which must be approved by respective RBCs before including them in their budget 
proposals. The authority delegated, especially to the RBCs and their governing bodies, will 
empower the non-public sector representatives involved to participate meaningfully, as 
their actions will have binding effects on the course of water resource management in their 
respective river basins or sub-river basins. 
As observed from Ping RBC implementation, WRO 1 and its line units were solely 
responsible for activities of the Ping RBC and its governing bodies, and they became ‘the 
lead organizations’ in arranging Ping RBC management, even though officially they were a 
member of this RBC with the specific task of secretary (see Section 5.2). Evidently, the 
Ping RBC and its governing bodies could not act on their own. The Water Act can redress 
this issue by specifying how the RBCs will be managed, e.g. by the participant-governed or 
NAO form (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008). Like the State Administration Act (No.7) discussed 
in the previous section, the Water Act can include a provision that enables RBCs to be 
recognized as ‘public agencies’ and eligible for making budget requests following the 
Budget Procedure Act of 1959. Thus, the RBCs will have their own budget for achieving 
their mandates. In addition, a supporting structure also can be prescribed in the Water Act, 
for example, the Cabinet Water Bill (see Section 4.2.2), in which provisions establish RBC 
and sub-river basin committee offices. Unlike current RBC secretariats, which are DWR 
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regional units assigned to the task (see Section 5.2.3), these offices are to be created 
specifically for supporting the RBCs and sub-river basin committees.        
With the Water Act as a primary legislation that sets basic principles as mention above, 
necessary subordinate legislation, such as royal decrees and ministerial regulations, can be 
issued to outline in detail how these principles are to be realized. For example, all the 
Water Bills discussed in Section 4.2.2 include a provision that establishes and demarcates a 
river basin by means of a royal decree. The 2005 version of the Thammasat University 
Water Bill indicates further that at least one public hearing must be conducted before the 
royal decree concerned can be issued, and a public hearing guideline will be prescribed in a 
ministerial regulation. Details on water use (e.g. type of commercial agriculture requiring 
water permits) also are to be defined by a ministerial regulation, as appeared in the NLA 
Water Bill. 
All in all, a comprehensive legal infrastructure for the RBC framework can be derived 
from the Water Act. Essentially, decision-making power over water resources is initiated 
and delegated to the RBCs, which by design consists of not only public sector 
representatives, but also non-public sector ones75. As such, meaningful participation from 
the non-public sector can be expected. By authority of the Act, decisions made by RBCs 
also will be recognized as official and legally bound. From the legal and public 
administration viewpoint, the Water Act will be able to redress the limitation of the 2007 
Regulation in realizing the RBC framework76.  
However, to paraphrase MOLLE et al. (2001, p. 12), the Water Act is a ‘high’ scenario, 
which is very difficult, if not impossible, to reach due to lack of political support. As a 
matter of fact, no water act has been passed since drafting the first water bill in 1992. 
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 Previous water bills were criticized for their lack of public participation and public sector dominance (e.g. 
KAOSA-ARD et al., 2001b). However, later drafts such as those discussed in Section 4.2.2 constantly indicate 
that representatives from the non-public sector should be included as RBC members in proportion to those 
from the public sector, as showed in Table 4.1. It should be noted from Table 4.1 that LGOs are considered 
as part of the non-public sector (see footnote no. 49). 
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 This does not imply that the Water Act is a panacea for the Thai water sector, as various international cases 
have shown a large gap between visions set in water law and reality after this law was implemented (e.g. 
KEMERINK, MÉNDEZ, AHLERS, WESTER, & VAN DER ZAAG, 2013; LAUBE, 2010; MEMON, & WEBER, 2010; 
VON KOPPEN & SCHREINER, 2014). However, knowledge is available on critical issues such as river basin 
institutional arrangement, water availability and water use, water rights and water pricing derived from the 
Thai context (e.g. KAOSA-ARD et al., 2001b; KOONTANAKULVONG, HOISUNGWAN, CHAOWIWAT, & 
SUTHIDHUMMAJIT, 2012; MOLLE, 2001; MOLLE, CHOMPADIST, SRIJANTR, & KEAWKULAYA, 2001; 
THOMAS, 2005), and it can be utilized to reduce the gap when implementing the Water Act.            
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Currently, as of 2014, there is also no movement regarding a water act or major water 
sector reform. Thus, ‘low’ scenarios (MOLLE et al., 2001, p. 12) need to be developed from 
existing laws and regulations in order to complement the 2007 Regulation in supporting 
RBC framework implementation (see Section 7.2). 
 
6.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter discusses RBC framework implementation in the Thai administrative context 
and its supporting legal infrastructure. Generally, public agencies have to address relevant 
rules and regulations, government policies concerned, and directives assigned by their 
superiors. This poses a challenge to RBC framework implementation, as the public 
agencies involved have their own priorities and directives, resulting in passive participation 
in the RBC setup. Likewise, the RBC framework implementing units (e.g. WRO 1) must 
also comply with relevant rules and regulations as well as their own mandates, including 
the performance agreement exercise, which has proved to be of little value to RBC 
framework implementation.  
The Thai administrative level, especially central and provincial administration, also 
complicates realization of the RBC framework further. As observed in the Ping RBC 
arrangement, some representatives of central public agencies became members of more 
than one RBC, rendering it impractical for their involvement, while provincial offices also 
had their own mandates and directives. Apparently, the DWR had to readjust its RBC 
implementation approach when taking the nature of the Thai administrative system into 
account. A comprehensive legal framework also is needed in order to make the RBC 
framework a priority of the public agencies and LGOs concerned. 
Indeed, the 2007 Regulation cannot provide a comprehensive legal infrastructure for RBC 
framework implementation, as it is a type of subordinate legislation issued by the Prime 
Minister without backup from any primary legislation; thus, it carries very limited 
authority and can be enforced only upon public agencies and state-owned enterprises. 
Essentially, virtually no power is delegated to the NWRC or RBCs, thus water-related 
regulations, if issued at all, cannot be applied to the private sector. Therefore, primary 
legislation in the form of a Water Act is required to provide a comprehensive legal 
infrastructure for RBC implementation. In effect, with authority delegated by the Water 
Act to RBCs in particular, the non-public sector representatives would have meaningful 
involvement, as RBCs would be recognized by the public agencies and LGOs concerned, 
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while their decisions would be legally binding and enforceable to both the public and 
private sector. However, the Water Act is a ‘high’ scenario, which is unlikely to be 
achieved in the near future. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
The RBC framework was introduced officially in 2007, and has been implemented 
nationwide by the DWR since then. From the Ping RBC implementation, it is evident that 
the RBC and its governing bodies are far from achieving the mandates outlined in the 2007 
Regulation. The following sections draw conclusions on the RBC framework as a 
collaborative water governance effort, as well as providing outlooks and policy 
recommendations for this effort. 
 
7.1 The RBC framework: much ado about nothing 
 
The 2007 Regulation prescribed the RBC framework consisting of the NWRC and RBCs, 
with the former being responsible for overseeing water resources-related issues at the 
national level, and the latter for various tasks concerning water resource management at the 
river basin level. In reflecting a broader trend in the Thai administrative context, which 
places emphasis increasingly on non-public sector participation, the 2007 Regulation 
indicated that representatives from water user organizations and LGOs as well as local 
experts be appointed as RBC members together with public sector representatives. In 
addition, some RBC members representing the water user organizations also were 
appointed as NWRC members. The RBC framework can be seen as collaborative water 
governance, where the non-public sector is involved in managing water resources (BAKKER 
& COHEN, 2011). 
Following provisions of the 2007 Regulation, the responsible agency - the DWR and its 
units concerned (i.e. WROs) - has duly implemented the RBC framework. As observed, the 
NWRC played a negligible role in providing national water resource management 
guidelines. Indeed, it remains as a ‘paper committee’ (ABERS, 2007) with no meeting since 
2011.  
From unfolding implementation of the RBCs in the Ping RBC setup, the Ping RBC was 
formed with representatives from both the public and non-public sector, as did its 
governing bodies at the river basin, provincial and sub-river basin level. However, the Ping 
RBC arrangement, as a collaborative water governance project, evidently suffered lack of 
participation and collaboration. Participation in this arrangement was confined to 
‘information supply’ rather than ‘co-decision making’, as suggested in the Regulation 
concerned (MOSTERT, 2006). Indeed, evidence showed that the annual integrated 
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development and management plans for the Ping River Basin were not followed up by 
other public agencies or bodies, indicating that the RBC had no decision making power 
with legally binding effects. In other words, there was no authority delegated to the Ping 
RBC setup that empowered members of its governing bodies, especially those representing 
the non-public sector in making decisions on water resources-related issues in the river 
basin. In addition, collaboration barely existed in this setup, where interactions among 
members of the governing bodies occurred only during infrequent meetings, solely 
arranged by WRO 1, and the DWR unit concerned in the area.  
Apparently, the Ping RBC and its governing bodies performed virtually no functions, and 
generated practically no outcomes that affected the management of water resources in the 
Ping River Basin. Indeed, they could not be considered even in the form of river basin 
governing bodies (cf. MOLLE et al., 2007; NOWLAN & BAKKER, 2007), despite their official 
status, mandates and elaborate structure. With all this evidence, together with the fact that a 
national budget as well as time and effort were spent over the years for this project, the 
Ping RBC arrangement was clearly much ado about nothing. It should be reiterated that the 
Thai administrative system is the same throughout the country, where all public agencies 
operate under the same relevant policies, laws and regulations. As the RBC framework has 
been implemented nationwide in the other 24 river basins, a similar outcome to that of the 
Ping RBC setup can be expected. 
Collaborative governance in the Thai water resource sector, as expressed in the form of the 
RBC framework, has been far from successful. The causes for this unsuccessful project 
obviously lay in the Thai administrative system. However, they were not due to resistance 
towards collaborative governance by the public agencies involved because they had to 
share authority with the non-public sector, or that certain public agencies still made ‘the 
ultimate call’ (AGRANOFF, 2006, p. 62), as seemed apparent when observing the role 
played by WRO 1 as the lead organization (PROVAN & KENIS, 2008) in the Ping RBC 
context. Also, the causes were not a case of ‘policy meets reality’, where the RBC 
framework encountered existing water resources-related public agencies or state-owned 
enterprises (MOLLINGA & BHAT, 2010). Rather, it was a case of no authority being 
delegated to the RBC framework in the first place. From a public administration 
perceptive, this authority will not only sanction the NWRC and RBCs in managing water 
resources, but also empower them vis-à-vis other elements of the administrative system 
(e.g. the central and provincial administration). Ultimately, this authority will force 
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relevant public agencies to participate actively in the RBC framework (O’TOOL JR., 2010), 
which by default now requires involvement of the non-public sector. Unfortunately, the 
aforementioned authority was absent; thus, implementing units like WRO 1 could only 
perform some routine functions in the name of RBCs, while the other public agencies 
involved continued their business as usual. Without authority, the RBCs are truly ‘a yak 
with no club’. 
 
7.2 Outlooks and policy recommendations 
 
In principle, the RBC framework is supposed to provide a solid foundation for water 
resource management in the respective river basins (see Section 4.2.2), with its key 
features including involvement of the non-public sector and use of a river basin as a unit 
for managing water resources. However, as unfolded in the Ping RBC framework, it is far 
from achieving its overarching goal on integrated water resource management at the river 
basin and national level, with the public participation stated in the preamble of the 2007 
Regulation.  
Notwithstanding, the RBC framework continues to be implemented, as the 2007 
Regulation is still being enforced. Section 5.1.5 presents the recruitment process performed 
to nominate selected representatives from the non-public sector as Ping RBC members for 
a new four-year term. This process was conducted also for 24 other RBCs, based on the 
NWRC Announcement on Qualification, Nomination Procedure, Appointment, and Term 
and Termination of Office of the River Basin Committee Members of 2013.  As of present 
(August 2014), new RBC non-public sector members have not been appointed officially 
due to political situations77, but the same patterns regarding RBC framework 
implementation, as discussed in Chapter 5, are likely to be repeated. For example, 
according to a URCMS officer, meetings in the 2014 fiscal year were organized for the 
acting sub-river basin and provincial working groups in the Ping River Basin, in order to 
have an integrated river basin management and development plan that could be sent to the 
provincial offices concerned (see Section 5.5.2). Indeed, DWR news updates78 showed that 
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 After the Yingluck government dissolved parliament on December 9, 2013, Thailand was run by a 
caretaker government, which was overthrown by a military coup on May 22, 2014. Led by Prime Minister 
Prayuth Chan-ocha, the current government only assumed office on August 30, 2014. Thus, the NRWC had 
no chairperson (Prime Minister or assigned Deputy Prime Minister) during this period and could not 
appoint RBC non-public sector members officially. 
78
 Available at www.dwr.go.th 
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meetings were arranged also in other river basins for their acting governing bodies, with 
agendas including approval of the integrated river basin management and development 
plan.  
Given that the RBC framework continues to be implemented in the same context as 
discussed in Chapter 6, it is highly likely to generate the same outcome (or rather no 
outcome), as observed in the Ping RBC arrangement (Section 5.5). Policy changes at the 
national level and/or DWR are required in order avert this similar result and realize 
collaborative water governance, in which the non-public sector, especially water users, 
play an important role in managing water resources. 
 
7.2.1 Policy changes at the national level 
 
Section 6.3.1 clearly presents that the 2007 Regulation, on which the RBC framework is 
based, is not comprehensive in terms of its legal authority. To redress this shortcoming 
ideally, a water law should be promulgated, and although it can be considered as a ‘high’ 
scenario and rather difficult to form (MOLLE et al., 2001), it is much needed in order to 
improve Thailand’s water governance, in which among other things, authority and 
responsibility are still fragmented (see footnote no. 32; HILL, FURLONG, BAKKER, & COHEN 
2008) and water rights have not been defined clearly (KAOSA-ARD et al., 2001b).  
Again, this recommendation does not imply that a water law is a silver bullet for the Thai 
water sector (see also footnote no. 79). However, to begin with, it would provide a crucial 
and comprehensive legal framework for collaborative water governance, especially 
regarding authority in water resource management (Section 6.3.2). While some challenges 
ahead would remain (e.g. COHEN & DAVIDSON, 2011), the river basin governing bodies 
would have full authority and official recognition, and the RBCs would no longer be ‘a yak 
with no club’. Indeed, the RBCs would be better positioned to avoid challenges such as 
policy coverage and accountability when their authority and governance structure, as well 
as mandates, are defined clearly (COHEN & DAVIDSON, 2011). If a water law is indeed 
passed, extended knowledge would be readily available for its operation on the ground. For 
example, KAOSA-ARD et al. (2001b) suggest that a ‘water management block’ (i.e. a sub-
river basin or its parts) be created within a river basin. While an RBC oversees the river 
basin at the policy level, a water management block committee of mainly non-public sector 
members becomes an operational unit at the local level. This suggestion takes into account 
the fact that Thailand has conflicts over water resources which normally occur at the sub-
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river basin level (RAYANAKORN, n.d.); thus, local people should find solutions themselves 
with support from relevant public agencies. Unfortunately, this well-grounded suggestion 
cannot be implemented without a strong legal backup, and it certainly is not discussed in 
the case of the 2007 Regulation. 
Water law promulgation is definitely an ideal policy change at the national level. However, 
the fact remains that it is rather difficult to reach, as previously discussed. Thus, another 
more probable option would be to issue a new Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation 
on National Water Resource Management (the new Regulation) to replace the 2007 
Regulation, as this could help to induce some changes regarding collaborative water 
governance in the country. As an Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation can be issued 
by the Prime Minister with Cabinet approval, the process of passing it is relatively simple 
and quick. Also, it should be noted that despite its inferior legal authority compared to an 
Act or other subordinate legislation, the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation can still 
be enforced upon public agencies and state-owned enterprises (see Section 6.3.1).  
The new Regulation should establish river basin governing bodies as types of 
‘collaborative watershed partnerships’ (see Box 2.2), with a focus on developing a river 
basin master/action plan. As SABATIER et al. (2005, p. 6) explain, the collaborative 
watershed partnership “provides a forum in which management plans and implementing 
actions are negotiated, then turned over to member agencies for formal legal actions.” By 
way of legal authority from the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation, the new 
Regulation can include a provision requiring the public agencies and state-owned 
enterprises concerned to follow the river basin master/action plan in developing their water 
resources-related projects/programs. With this provision, some authority is indeed 
delegated to the new river basin arrangements, thereby empowering the non-public sector 
representatives involved.  
In the existing Thai administrative context (Chapter 6), the current form of RBCs (Table 
4.5; Figure 4.5) should be abolished. An emphasis for the new river basin arrangement 
should then be placed at the sub-river basin and provincial level. In other words, there is a 
scaling-down of focus from the (main) river basin to the sub-river basin level, while at the 
same time taking into account the reality of the Thai administration (WARNER et al., 2008), 
where the provincial administration is very prominent (see Section 2.4). Accordingly, the 
river basin governance structure should consist of a provincial river basin working 
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group/partnership and those sub-river basin working groups/partnerships located in a 
particular province79. According to COHEN and DAVIDSON (2011, p. 8), watershed 
boundaries can be considered as ‘policy choice, rather than as an unquestionable scale at 
which good water governance must take place’. Thus, sub-river basin boundaries can be 
arranged to fit within a respective province for the purpose of this new river basin 
governance scheme. 
The structure of a provincial river basin working group/partnership should in principle 
comprise representatives of water resources-related public agencies and state-owned 
enterprises located in the respective province as well as those representing the provincial 
industrial and commercial sector (e.g. a provincial chamber of commerce) and sub-river 
basins (cf. Table 5.6). By following standard practice in the provincial administration, a 
provincial governor should be included as an ex officio member and appointed chairperson 
of this working group/partnership. Members of the sub-river basin working 
groups/partnerships should represent mostly local water user groups (e.g. muang fai groups 
and irrigation water user groups [Section 4.3]) and TAOs/municipalities located in the area 
(cf. Table 5.7)80. Their chairperson should also be a local water user group representative to 
be included as an ex officio member in the provincial river basin working 
group/partnership. The main mandate for a provincial river basin working 
group/partnership would be to develop a provincial river basin master/action plan that 
addresses water resources-related issues, while taking into account sub-river basin 
perspectives (provided by the sub-river basin working groups/partnerships). As presented 
above, public agencies and state-owned enterprises must follow the master/action plan 
when preparing their water resources-related projects/programs for implementation in a 
particular province.  
Accordingly, the DWR also is required to change its operation when implementing the new 
river basin governance scheme on the ground. Essentially, the implementing units (i.e. 
WROs) of the DWR need to assist the provincial river basin governing bodies in creating 
the plans mentioned previously (cf. the integrated river basin management and 
development plan presented in Section 5.4.1.). The DWR also has to facilitate the sub-river 
basin working groups/partnerships so that their needs and concerns regarding water 
                                                          
79
 There are 254 sub-river basins in total; for the numer of sub-river basins located in each river basin, see 
Appendix II. 
80
 It was recommended following a proposal by KAOSA-ARD et al. (2001b) for a water management block 
committee.   
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resources are articulated. To this end, more activities (e.g. meetings, planning workshops 
and field visits) should be organized for these governing bodies. At the same time, capacity 
building (e.g. participation capacity, technical capabilities on water resource management 
and planning skills) also is necessary for both the river basin governing bodies and WROs 
(TANKHA & FULLER, 2010). As these activities are to be organized within the respective 
province, they would put less burden on the members of the river basin governing bodies, 
especially the members of the non-public sector (see Section 5.2.1). As the provincial river 
basin master/action plan will have an officially binding effect, the members of the 
provincial river basin working group/partnership, especially the public sector 
representatives, would be encouraged to participate actively in those actions. The resulting 
water resources-related projects/programs would also address local needs and problems. 
 
7.2.2 Policy changes at the DWR 
 
It would be imperative for the DWR to change its course regarding RBC framework 
implementation if either a water law or new Regulation is passed. For example, radical 
changes are certain in the case of a water bill containing provisions, as those promulgated 
in the NLA Bill (Section 4.2.2). Such provisions would result eventually in the DWR no 
longer playing a role in the RBC project, as a new department (i.e. the ONWRC) and its 
line units would assume this task. However, it is also likely that the two recommendations 
for policy changes at the national level will never take place, meaning that the RBC 
framework remains the same (see Section 4.4.2 and 5.1). Indeed, this is current reality. 
With no changes from the higher policy level, the DWR should make some policy changes 
by itself, in order that the RBC framework may generate certain meaningful outcomes. 
Such policy changes should be geared toward a rearrangement of the RBC framework and 
an alteration of the ways the framework is implemented by its implementing units. 
The 2007 Regulation prescribes a basic structure of an RBC (e.g. the maximum members; 
see Section 4.4.2.3) and lays out its mandates (Box 4.2). However, the DWR put forth the 
current structure of the RBC framework (i.e. the river basin governing bodies within the 
RBC; Figure 4.5) in its capacity as the NWRC secretariat. In the same capacity, the DWR 
should amend this structure in order to make it less complex, and more easily manageable. 
Thus, the river basin sub-committee should be abolished, as it did not provide any 
assistance to the RBC regarding ‘river basin management and information’ (Section 5.1.2; 
Table 5.5). As a result, an amended RBC structure would consist of the RBC (as required 
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by the 2007 Regulation) as well as the provincial river basin and sub-river basin working 
groups. In addition, the structures of the latter two bodies should be readjusted by 
following those proposed for the river basin governing bodies under the new Regulation, 
presented in the previous section. With this structural rearrangement, a focus should be 
shifted from the RBC to the river basin governing bodies at the sub-river basin and 
provincial level, where more action should be taken as described below.   
It was evident that the DWR opted to push the RBC toward a task it could achieve under 
the current administrative system and legal framework, i.e. river basin water resource 
management planning, as this issue was always the main item on the agenda at meetings of 
the river basin governing bodies. Given the present circumstances, the DWR should 
continue in this direction because other RBC mandates would be extremely difficult to 
reach. However, the DWR needs to set new directives for its implementing units (i.e. 
WROs) in dealing with the RBC and its governing bodies. 
Initially, the DWR should provide a directive for the WROs to facilitate the river basin 
governing bodies in developing a river basin management and development plan for the 
respective provinces. This would be essentially an attempt to redress the shortcoming of no 
official binding effect or practical impact on the so-called ‘integrated river basin 
management and development plan’ at the river basin level (see Section 5.5.2). It should be 
made clear to the WROs that the provincial river basin management and development plan 
would be developed based on the needs and/or problems suggested by the sub-river basin 
working groups (now mainly consisting of local water user representatives) located in a 
particular province. Once the plan is ‘approved’ by the RBC, it would be proposed to the 
provincial offices, relevant public agencies and PAOs. 
It is normal practice for local communities and organizations to propose projects/programs 
to the public agencies concerned, or LGOs located in the area, for consideration and 
inclusion in their plans and budget proposals. With no official way linked to the national 
budget allocation process (cf. an annual provincial action plan – Section 6.3.1), a river 
basin management and development plan has to follow the practice mentioned above to be 
realized and have impact. In fact, WROs also implement water source development and 
rehabilitation projects; thus, the DWR should indicate that WROs give priority to project 
proposals in this area if they come via provincial river basin working groups through their 
river basin management and development plans. 
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The DWR should request that WROs actively organize activities for the river basin 
working groups at the sub-river basin and provincial level, which is in line with the 
directive on provincial river basin management and development planning mentioned 
previously. It was apparent from the Ping RBC setup that activities organized for the river 
basin governing bodies were only formal and infrequent meetings, with virtually no 
interactions occurring in between. Thus, less formal meetings should be organized 
regularly (e.g. bimonthly or quarterly) to provide forums for working group members to 
interact and have face-to-face dialogue (ANSELL & GASH, 2008) on water resources-related 
issues in their areas, with time allocated for discussion on the provincial river basin 
management and development plan. In addition, the capacity building described earlier 
(e.g. participation capacity and planning skills) should be arranged for both WROs and the 
working groups concerned (TANKHA & FULLER, 2010).  
All in all, regarding RBC framework implementation, policy changes made by the DWR 
would lead hopefully to the provincial river basin management and development plan 
being taken up by public agencies and eventually put into action; and thus, improve 
performance of the RBC arrangement. In addition, through regular meetings as well as 
capacity building activities, interaction between the sub-river and provincial river basin 
working groups may induce social learning over time, such as knowledge gain, trust 
building, and group agreement (KOONTZ, 2014); which is essential for success in the 
collaborative water governance effort (BRUMMEL, NELSON, SOUTER, JAKES, & WILLIAMS, 
2010).   
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SUMMARY 
 
The river basin committee (RBC) framework was first introduced in Thailand in 2002, and 
the current one adopted in 2007 has been implemented in all 25 river basins located in the 
country ever since. By all accounts, the RBC framework is innovative as far as Thailand’s 
administrative system and water resource sector are concerned. It was only recently that the 
former started to promote non-public sector participation, and the underlying legal 
framework expressly requires that representatives of the non-public sector, such as water 
user organizations and local experts, be included in the RBC together with those 
representing the public agencies concerned. The latter envisions the RBC as a new 
mechanism for managing water resources by using a river basin as a managerial unit. 
Based on the RBC framework’s prescription, it can be seen that Thailand is moving toward 
collaborative water governance, where both public and non-public sector representatives 
take part in decision making on water resource-related issues in their respective river basin. 
This study empirically examines the implementation process and outcomes of the RBC 
framework by using the Ping RBC arrangement as an illustrative case. It aims specifically 
to explore the formation and management of the RBC, its collaborative processes and 
participation, and the outcomes it generates. To this end, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key informants such as the officials responsible from Water Resources 
Regional Office 1 (WRO 1), and Ping RBC members; and an informal interview was 
applied as well with some DWR officials. In addition, relevant activities were observed 
through non-participant observation, while related documentary data, e.g. documents on 
the RBC framework, also were collected. The data gathered were analyzed by means of 
qualitative content analysis. 
It was found overall that the Ping RBC framework was established by following relevant 
directives. Ping RBC members include representatives from the public sector such as the 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and Department of Water Resources (DWR), as well as 
the provincial governors concerned and representatives from the non-public sector, 
including water user organizations (agricultural, industrial, commercial, service, and 
tourism sectors), local government organizations (LGOs), and the expert group; while 
WRO 1 serves as the secretariat. In addition, other governing bodies were established as 
well, including one river basin sub-committee, five provincial river basin working groups, 
and 20 sub-river basin working groups who, similar to Ping RBC members, represented 
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both the public and non-public sector at the river basin, provincial, and sub-river basin 
level. 
It was discovered that regarding RBC management the Ping RBC and its governing bodies 
were governed by the lead organization-governed form, where WRO 1 played the leading 
role and left no room for involvement from other members. For example, it called the 
meetings and prepared their agenda. Indeed, meetings were the only activity organized for 
these river basin governing bodies and they were infrequent (e.g. twice per year for the 
Ping RBC). Furthermore, they were organized with a formal format, where the officer 
responsible normally provided information to the meeting, with virtually no deliberation or 
discussion. With these meetings being the only activity where members of the river basin 
governing bodies could get together, it was apparent that face-to-face dialogue, which is a 
crucial element in leading to others elements in a collaborative process, such as trust and 
shared understanding, was simply non-existent. Interaction between the secretariat and 
members of the river basin governing bodies, as well as among the members also failed to 
occur.   
Participation in the Ping RBC setup involved just information sharing, as members of the 
Ping RBC and its governing bodies were provided with only data on, for example, drought 
and flood situations. The governing bodies of the Ping River Basin, especially the Ping 
RBC, took part in approving river basin management and development frameworks as well 
as annual river basin management and development plans. However, their approval was 
unnecessary because the frameworks and annual plans in question were a collection of 
project plans gathered from the public agencies concerned and LGOs located in the river 
basin. They were prepared based on relevant policies and directives, with no need for 
approval from the Ping RBC setup before submission for national budget allocation. Since 
the frameworks and annual plans were the only outputs produced, it was therefore apparent 
that the Ping RBC framework performed virtually no functions to fulfill its mandates such 
as a water resource management plan, water user priority or water allocation.  
Evidently, the Ping RBC framework is an ineffective mechanism that is characterized by 
lack of collaboration, participation and outcomes, which have impacts on water resource 
management in the river basin. A similar result can be expected from the other 24 RBCs 
operating under the same administrative system and legal framework. Therefore, Thailand 
is still far from achieving collaborative governance in its water resource sector. Clearly, 
this unsuccessful RBC framework was influenced by the Thai administrative system; for 
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instance, the public agencies involved have to follow their own policies and directives, 
thereby failing to make the RBC framework their top priority and only passively 
participating in the setup. However, the underlying cause is due largely to the RBC 
framework’s lack of authority. This is because the legal framework regulating the RBC 
framework has limited legal authority; consequently, virtually no authority is delegated to 
this arrangement. Accordingly, the RBC framework has no full authority regarding water 
resource management as its decisions, if any, can be enforced upon only public agencies 
and state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, it also has less authority when compared to other 
public bodies governed by superior legal frameworks; as such, it cannot force active 
participation in the RBC arrangement, and is not officially recognized (e.g. by the budget 
allocation system). It can be seen as important that with no authority delegated, non-public 
sector representatives do not share any decision making power despite their inclusion into 
the framework concerned.   
Therefore, to avert the same result generated by the RBC framework in moving toward 
collaborative water governance, policy changes are needed regarding its authority and 
implementation process at the national level, or at the DWR. Ideally, a change is required 
at the national level by passing a comprehensive legal framework, i.e. a Water Act. By this 
law, the RBC framework’s authority in managing water resources is secured and the 
framework itself is officially recognized. Arrangements for implementation of the RBC 
framework also can be prescribed, e.g. a budget allocation system recognizing the RBC 
framework and creating the RBC’s own office. However, this option is rather difficult to 
achieve, if not impossible, due to the lack of political support.  
A more probable change at the national level would be to issue a new regulation that 
revises the RBC framework, which can be done more easily than passing a law. 
Essentially, under this new regulation, the new RBC framework would be based at the 
provincial level. As such, the RBC would be abolished, while the provincial RBC and its 
governing bodies would be transformed to ‘collaborative watershed partnerships’ focused 
on a provincial river basin master/action plan. By this new regulation, the public bodies 
concerned would be obliged to follow the plan mentioned when preparing their water 
resource-related projects/programs, which would be applicable within authority of the 
regulation. In addition, diverse activities (e.g. meetings and capacity building) should be 
organized in order to support both the river basin governing bodies and implementing units 
of the DWR.      
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The DWR should change its policies regarding implementation of the RBC framework, if 
there is no change at the national level, and the RBC framework continues to be carried out 
under the current regulation. It is essential in this circumstance for the DWR to encourage a 
revision of the RBC structure in order to make it less complex and more manageable, and 
shift the focus from the RBC itself to the river basin governing bodies at the provincial and 
sub-river basin level. Besides capacity building activities, and frequent and less formal 
meetings, the DWR should also direct its implementing units to facilitate the river basin 
governing bodies in order to develop a river basin management plan for respective 
provinces. This should be based on the problems and needs of the sub-river basins located 
in those particular provinces; and presented through the public agencies and LGOs 
concerned for consideration and inclusion in their own plans. This might be the only way 
to increase the likelihood of some elements of the river basin management plan being 
realized, given that the RBC framework has no authority or official recognition. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Das Konzept der Wassereinzugsgebiets-Komitees (WEK) wurde in Thailand erstmals 2002 
eingeführt, und die aktuelle Fassung von 2007 wurde bis heute in allen 25 Fluss-Einzugs-
gebieten des Landes umgesetzt. Auf alle Fälle ist das WEK-Konzept eine Neuerung für 
Thailands Administration und den Wasser-Sektor. Erst in jüngerer Zeit wird dort Parti-
zipation des zivilen Sektors propagiert, und die gesetzlichen (the Office of the Prime 
Minister’s Regulation on National Water Resource Management of 2007) verlangen 
ausdrücklich, dass Vertreter der Zivilgesellschaft, wie Wasser-Nutzer-Organisationen und 
lokale Experten zusammen mit den Vertretern der öffentlichen Einrichtungen in die WEKs 
einbezogen werden. Das WEK wird als neuer Mechanismus für das Management von 
Wasser-Ressourcen verstanden, der das Wassereinzugsgebiet als Management-Einheit 
nutzt. Mit den Vorgaben des WEK-Konzepts bewegt sich Thailand hin zu einer kolla-
borativen Wasser-Steuerung, bei der zivile und öffentliche Sektor-Vertreter an der Ent-
scheidungsfindung zu Ressourcen-Fragen in ihrem Wassereinzugsgebiet beteiligt sind. 
Diese Untersuchung betrachtet den Umsetzungs-Prozess und die Leistungsabgaben des 
WEK-Konzepts und nutzt dazu das WEK des Ping-Flusses als illustrativen Fall. Sie zielt 
darauf, die Einrichtung und das Management des WEKs, seine Zusammenarbeit und 
Partizipation und die Ergebnisse, die es erzielt, zu erkunden. Zu diesem Zweck wurden 
teilstrukturierte Interviews mit Schlüsselpersonen, wie den Funktionären des Regionalen 
Wasser-Ressourcen-Amts 1 (WRO 1), den Ping WEK-Mitgliedern, und offene Interviews 
mit einigen Funktionären des Wasser-Ressourcen-Departments geführt. Weiterhin werden 
wesentliche Aktivitäten nicht-teilnehmend beobachtet, und entsprechende Dokumente zum 
WEK-Konzept gesammelt. Die Daten werden mit Methoden der qualitativen Inhalts-
analyse ausgewertet. 
Das Ping-WEK-Konzept enthält die folgenden Direktiven: Zu den Ping-WEK-Mitgliedern 
gehören Vertreter des öffentlichen Dienstes, wie z.B.des Königlichen Bewässerungs-
Departements, des Wasser-Ressourcen-Departments, die betroffenen Provinz-Gouverneure 
sowie Vertreter der Zivilgesellschaft, zu denen Wasser-Nutzer-Organisationen (landwirt-
schaftliche, industrielle, kommerzielle, dienstleistende und touristische) gehören, sowie 
lokale Körperschaften und eine Experten-Gruppe. Das WRO 1 dient als Sekretariat des 
Komitees. Auch weitere Steuerungs-Gremien wurden eingerichtet, wie ein Wasser-Ein-
zugs-Sub-Komitee, fünf provinzielle Wassereinzugsgebiets-Arbeitsgruppen und 20 Sub-
wassereinzugsgebiets-Arbeitsgruppen, die vergleichbar zu den Ping-WEK-Mitgliedern 
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sowohl dem öffentlichen als auch dem zivilen Sektor auf den 3 Ebenen Wasserein-
zugsgebiet, Provinz und Sub-Wassereinzugsgebiet angehören. 
Es konnte festgestellt werden, dass das Ping WEK Führungs-Organisations-gesteuert war, 
wobei das WRO 1 diese Führungsrolle hatte und keinen Raum für das Engagement anderer 
Mitglieder ließ. Es berief die Sitzungen ein und gab die Tagesordnung vor. Tatsächlich 
waren die seltenen Sitzungen, - höchstens zweimal jährlich - die einzige Aktivität des Ping 
Komitees. Diese wurden sehr formell abgehalten, wobei der verantwortliche Beamte den 
Teilnehmern Informationen vortrug, ohne weitere Wortmeldungen oder Diskussion. Da 
diese Sitzungen die einzige Aktivität war, bei der die Mitglieder zusammenkommen 
konnten, war es offensichtlich, dass ein persönlicher Dialog, der ein Schlüsselelement für 
weitere Stufen im kollaborativen Prozess ist, wie Vertrauen und geteiltes Verständnis, 
schlichtweg nicht stttfand. Auch gab es keine Interaktion zwischen dem Sekretariat und 
den Mitgliedern oder zwischen den Mitgliedern untereinander. 
Partizipation im Ping WEK war auf Informationsaustausch begrenzt, wobei die Mitglieder 
und Funktionsträger des Komitees mit Daten versorgt wurden, wie z.B. über Dürre- oder 
Flut-Ereignisse. Die Leitung des WEK engagierte sich bei der Bestätigung des Ping 
Einzugsgebiets-Managements-und Entwicklungskonzepts, und insbesondere des jährlichen 
Managements- und Entwicklungsplans. Jedoch war es eigentlich gar nicht nötig, diesen 
beiden Dokumenten zuzustimmen, denn die betreffenden Konzepte und Pläne wurden aus 
einer Abfrage bei den öffentlichen Ämtern und lokalen Körperschaften im Einzugsgebiet 
nur nebeneinandergestellt. Entwickelt wurden diese Einzelpläne aus einschlägigen Politik-
vorgaben und Direktiven, die keine Zustimmung des Ping WEKs brauchten, um für die 
nationale Budgetzuweisung eingereicht zu werden. Da diese Konzepte und Pläne aber das 
einzige Leistungsergebnis des WEKs waren, wurde es offensichtlich, dass das WEK-
Konzept letztlich nichts leistete um sein Mandat zu erfüllen, weder Wasser-Resoourcen-
management Plan, Wassernutzer-Priorität oder Wasser-Zuteilung beeinflusste, oder gar 
festlegte. 
Offensichtlich ist das WEK-Konzept ein unwirksamer Mechanismus, ohne Zusam-
menarbeit, Partizipation und Leistungen, die eine Wirkung auf das Wasser-Ressourcen-
Management im Einzugsgebiet haben. Und einen ähnlichen Befund kann man auch für die 
weiteren 24 WEKs im Land erwarten, da sie unter dem gleichen Verwaltungssystem und 
Verordnungshintergrund operieren. Thailand ist noch weit enfernt davon, eine collabo-
rative Steuerung seiner Wasserresourcen zu erreichen. Ursächlich dafür ist eindeutig das 
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Verwaltungssystem. So müssen die öffentlichen Einrichtungen, die im WEK engagiert 
sind, vorrangig ihren eigenen Politiken und Richtlinien folgen, und damit geben sie dem 
Engagement im WEK nur nachrangige Priorität und verhalten sich so passiv wie möglich 
in ihrer Beteiligung. Dies liegt daran, dass das WEK-Konzept nicht mit Autorität ausge-
stattet ist, und deshalb wird dem WEK konsequenterweise auch keine reale Autorität 
gegeben, auch nicht für das Wassermanagement und die dafür nötigen Entscheidungen. 
Wenn je doch, dann würde das nur die öffentlichen Dienststellen und Staatsbetriebe 
betreffen, nicht aber die zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteure. Aber auch innerhalb der Admi-
nistration hat das WEK weniger Autrität gegenüber allen Akteuren, die von höherrangigen 
Direktiven gesteuert sind, und so kann es aktive Partizipation nicht wirklich einfordern, 
und wird auch offiziell nicht wirklich wahrgenommen (z.B. vom Budget-Zuweisungs-
System). Solange dem WEK keine Autrität zugewiesen wird, warden die Nicht-
Regierungs-Vertreter im Komitee auch keine eigene Entscheidungsbefugnis teilen, auch 
wenn sie formal als Mitglied gelten. 
Daher sind politische Änderungen auf nationaler Ebene oder im Department für Wasser-
Ressourcen nötig, die dem WEK Autorität und Entscheidungsgewalt zuweisen, wenn es 
Fortschritte in Richtung auf kollaborative Wasser-Ressourcen-Steuerung bewegen soll. 
Idealerweise könnte das ein nationales Gesetz bewirken, wie z.B. ein Wassergesetz. Durch 
ein solches Gesetz könnte das WEK-Konzept legal hochrangig verankert werden, und das 
WEK bekäme die notwendige Autorität, um offiziell ankerkannt zu sein, und die ihm 
zugewiesenen Aufgaben auch zu erfüllen. Es könnte ein eigenes Büro einrichten, und 
offizielle Budget-Anträge stellen. Allerdings ist diese Option schwer zu realisieren, dafür 
fehlt seit Jahren die politische Unterstützung. 
Eine eher wahrscheinliche Änderung auf der nationalen Ebene, könnte darin bestehen, die 
derzeitige Direktive und damit das WEK-Konzept zu verändern, was leichter erreichbar ist, 
als ein neues Wassergesetz zu verabschieden. Ein neues WEK-Konzept müsste dann auf 
der Provinzebene greifen. Das übergreifende WEK würde insofern aufgelöst, während die 
provinziellen Komitees dann umgewandelt würden in „kollaborative Provinz-
Wassereinzugsgebiets-Partnerschaften“, und auf einen provinziellen Masterplan oder 
Aktionsplan zur Wassernutzung ausgerichtet wären. Die öffentlichen Einrichtungen in der 
Provinz müssten sich dann den Entscheidungen der Partnerschaften beugen und den 
Masterplan anerkennen, wenn sie ihre Projekte und Programme rund um das Wasser 
planen. Dann könnten auch weitere Aktivitäten geplant und finanziert werden, (wie 
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Veranstaltungen und Fortbildungen) die sowohl die Mitglieder der Partnerschaft als auch 
alle ausführenden Personen im Bereich des Departements für Wasserressourcen fördern. 
Sollte es auf der nationalen Ebene keine Änderung geben, und das WEK-Konzept in 
heutiger Fassung fortbestehen, könnte zumindest das Department für Wasser-Ressourcen 
seine Politik ändern, was die Umsetzung des WEK-Konzepts betrifft. Dann ist es 
vorrangig, die WEK-Struktur zu vereinfachen, und den Schwerpunkt auf die Provinz- und 
Sub-Prvinz-Ebene zu verlagern, wo das Wasser-Ressourcen-Management tatsächlich 
stattfindet. Neben Aus- und Fortbildung und häufigeren und weniger formalen Treffen, 
sollte das Department seine Durchführungsebene anweisen, die verbliebenen WEKs dabei 
zu unterstützen, einen Einzugsgebiets-Management-Plan für die Provinz zu entwickeln, der 
sich auf die Bedürfnisse und Probleme der betreffenden Provinz bezieht. Dieser Plan sollte 
den öffentlichen Einrichtungen und Körperschaften zur Beachtung und zur freiwilligen 
Übernahme in deren eigene Pläne zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Eventuell ist dies der 
einzige Weg, um die Chancen zu erhöhen, dass der Einzugsgebiets-Management-Plan dann 
wenigsten in einigen Elementen verwirklicht wird, obwohl das WEK-Konzept in dieser 
dritten Option weiterhin weder Autrität noch öffentliche Anerkennung genießt. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix I 
 
List of Thai ministries 
 
 Ministry Number of 
Departments/Offices 
1. Prime Minister’s Office 3 
2. Ministry of Defence* - 
3. Ministry of Finance 10 
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14 
5. Ministry of Tourism and Sports 4 
6. Ministry of Social Development and Human Security 6 
7. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 16 
8. Ministry of Transport 8 
9. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 11 
10. Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 5 
11. Ministry of Energy 6 
12. Ministry of Commerce 8 
13. Ministry of Interior 8 
14. Ministry of Justice 10 
15. Ministry of Labour 6 
16. Ministry of Culture 6 
17. Ministry of Science and Technology 4 
18. Ministry of Education* - 
19. Ministry of Public Health 10 
20. Ministry of Industry 8 
Source: The Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act of 2002, and its 
amendments 
Note: *The internal structure is regulated by other Acts. 
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Appendix II 
 
List of river basins in Thailand 
 
 
River basin 
Number of           
sub-river basin 
Area (km
2
) WRO* 
1. Salawin  17 19,105.94 WRO 1 
2. Mekong 37 57,188.60 WRO 3 
3. Kok 4 7,299.83 WRO 1 
4. Chi 20 49,129.87 WRO 4 
5. Mun 31 71,071.57 WRO 5 
6. Ping 20 34,499.39 WRO 1 
7. Wang 7 10,793.57 WRO 1 
8. Yom 11 23,948.15 WRO 9 
9. Nan 16 34,908.11 WRO 9 
10. Chao Phraya 2 20,266.49 WRO 2 
11. Sakaekrang 4 5,055.88 WRO 2 
12. Pasak 8 15,623.36 WRO 2 
13. Tha Chin 2 13,491.63 WRO 7 
14. Mae Klong 11 30,180.71 WRO 7 
15. Prachinburi 4 9,672.10 WRO 6 
16. Bang Pakong 4 10,700.71 WRO 6 
17. Tonle Sap 3 4,085.93 WRO 6 
18. East Coast Gulf 6 13,093.05 WRO 6 
19. Phetchaburi 3 6,260.17 WRO 7 
20. Prachuapkhiri-khan Coast  5 7,132.81 WRO 7 
21. Peninsula-East Coast   13 26,067.89 WRO 10 
22. Tapi 8 13,561.81 WRO 10 
23. Thale Sap Songkla   3 8,481.28 WRO 8 
24. Pattani 2 3,654.87 WRO 8 
25. Peninsula-West Coast 13 18,775.60 WRO 10 
Source: BUREAU OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND HYDROLOGY ( 2009, p.1-1) 
Note: *WRO: Water Resources Regional Office, Department of Water Resources  
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Appendix III 
 
List of sub-river basins in the Ping river basin 
 
 Sub-river basin Area (km
2
) Responsible unit 
1. Upper Ping 1,904.10 URCMS 
2. Mae Ngad 1,279.77 URCMS 
3. Mae Tang 1,953.90 URCMS 
4. Ping Part 2 1,527.40 URCMS 
5. Mae Rim 567.81 URCMS 
6. Mae Kuang 2,876.70 URCMS 
7. Mae Khan 1,733.04 URCMS 
8. Mae Li 2,079.65 URCMS 
9. Mae Klang 614.98 URCMS 
10. Ping Part 3 3,184.82 URCMS 
11. Upper Mae Chaem 1,963.38 URCMS 
12. Lower Mae Chaem 1,932.50 URCMS 
13. Mae Haad 517.25 URCMS 
14. Mae Teun 3,134.43 URCMS 
15. Ping Part 4 3,013.47 LRCMS 
16. Huay Mae Tor 645.17 LRCMS 
17. Klong Wang Chao 638.84 LRCMS 
18. Klong Mae Raka 880.50 LRCMS 
19. Klong Suan Mark 1,225.27 LRCMS 
20. Lower Ping 2,796.41 LRCMS 
Source: BUREAU OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND HYDROLOGY (2009, p.1-33) 
Note: URCMS:  Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (WRO 1); 
          LRCMS: Lower Ping River Basin Coordination and Management Section (WRO 1) 
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Appendix IV 
 
A. List of interviews 
 
 Interview Date 
The Ping RBC: public sector members 
1. A representative of the National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation 
Department* 
24.09.2010 
2. A representative of the Royal Irrigation Department* 22.09.2010 
3. A representative of the MNRE Permanent Secretary Office*’** 21.09.2010 
4. A representative of the Department of Local Administration* 19.08.2010 
5. A representative of the Department of Agricultural Extension 04.06.2010 
6. A representative of the Land Development Department 02.06.2010 
7. A representative of the Electric Generating Authority of Thailand 26.04.2010 
The Ping RBC:  non-public sector members 
8. A representative of LGOs from Kampaengphet 18.05.2010 
9. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture) from 
Kampaengphet 
16.05.2010 
10. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture) from                
Chiang Mai 
06.05.2010 
11. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture) from 
Lamphun 
06.05.2010 
12. A representative of water user organizations (agriculture) from Tak 23.04.2010 
13. A representative of water user organizations (industry) from           
Chiang Mai 
31.08.2010 
14. A representative of water user organizations (industry) from Tak 24.04.2010 
15. A representative of water user organizations (commerce, service, and 
tourism) from Kampaengphet 
17.05.2010 
16. An expert from Kampaengphet 14.05.2010 
17. An expert from Tak 03.05.2010 
18. An expert from Lamphun 17.03.2010 
The Ping River Basin Sub-Committees: non-public sector members 
1. A representative of the civil society from Chiang Mai 16.03.2010 
2. A representative of the civil society from Chiang Mai 12.03.2010 
3. A representative of the civil society from Lamphun 30.03.2010 
4. A representative of the civil society from Lamphun 24.03.2010 
5. A representative of the civil society from Tak 24.04.2010 
6. A representative of the civil society from Tak 25.04.2010 
7. A representative of the civil society from Kampaengphet 16.05.2010 
8. A representative of the civil society from Kampaengphet 17.05.2010 
9. A representative of the civil society from Nakornsawan 01.05.2010 
10. A representative of the civil society from Nakornsawan 01.05.2010 
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A. List of interviews (continued) 
 
 Interview Date 
URCM officers 
1. A plan and policy analyst (Senior professional level) 22.09.2009 
2. A plan and policy analyst (Professional level)  16.11. 2009 
3. A plan and policy analyst (Professional level) 13.08. 2009 
4. A plan and policy analyst (Professional level) 07.08. 2009 
5. A civil work technician (Experienced level) 17.08. 2009 
6. A civil work technician (Experienced level)  11.08. 2009 
Leaders of the Mae Tang Water User Association (MWUA) 
1. Chairman of MWUA and IWUG Zone 7  10.08/11.08.2009 
2. Vice-Chairman of MWUA, and chairman of IWUG Zone 3-5 29.09.2009 
3. Vice-Chairman of MWUA, and chairman of IWUG Zone 1  18.08.2009 
4. Vice-Chairman of MWUA, and chairman of IWUG Zone 8 17.08.2009 
5. Vice-Chairman of MWUA, and chairman of IWUG Zone 11 14.08.2009 
6. Chairman of IWUG Zone 9 09.09.2009 
Leaders of the muang fai groups 
1. Chairman of Na Huek muang fai group 27.02.2009 
2. Chairman of Ton Shang muang fai group 19.02.2009 
3. Chairman of Ton Muang muang fai group 17.02.2009 
4. Chairman of Mae Lor muang fai group 16.02.2009 
Mayors and staff of TAOs 
1. Mayor of the San Payang TAO 30.06.2009 
2. Mayor of the Sop Perng TAO 23.06.2009 
3. Mayor of the San Pong TAO 18.06.2009 
4. Mayor of the Houy Sai TAO 12.06.2009 
5. Mayor of the Sa Loung TAO 04.06.2009 
6. Mayor of the Khee Lek TAO 25.05.2009 
7. An agricultural officer, the San Pong TAO 02.06.2009 
8. An agricultural officer, the Khee Lek TAO 28.05.2009 
9. An agricultural officer, the Sa Loung TAO 26.05.2009 
10. An agricultural officer, the Sop Perng TAO 18.05.2009 
Note: * Also appointed as a public sector member of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee 
** Also appointed as a member and secretary of the Lamphun Provincial River Basin 
Working Group 
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B. List of interview topics 
 
1. Main interview topics: Members of the Ping RBC and River Basin Sub-Basin 
Committee for River Basin Management and Information 
- Background information 
- Process for becoming members of the RBC/ river basin sub-committee 
- Tasks of the RBC/ river basin sub-committee 
- Activities of the RBC/ river basin sub-committee 
- Communication and interaction with the RBC secretariat, and other members of the 
river basin governing bodies 
- Outlook of the RBC framework 
2. Main interview topics: Officers of the Upper Ping River Basin Coordination and 
Management Section (URCMS) 
- Background information 
- Responsibilities of the URCMS 
- Activities relating to RBC framework implementation  
- Communication and interaction with other organizations, and the river basin governing 
bodies 
- Outlook of the RBC framework 
3. Main interview topics: Leaders of the Mae Tang Water User Association 
- Background information on the irrigation water user group (IWUG) 
- IWUG management (e.g. structure and regulations) 
- IWUG activities 
- Water allocation 
- Roles of the Mae Tang Irrigation Project regarding the IWUG 
- The Mae Tang Water User Association (e.g. establishment, management structure, and 
roles) 
4. Main interview topics: Leaders of the munag fai groups 
- Background information on the a muang fai group  
- Group management (e.g. structure and regulations) 
- Group activities 
- Water allocation 
5. Main interview topics: Mayors and staff of Sub-district (tambon) Administrative 
Organizations (TAOs)  
- Agricultural activities and water sources in the area 
- TAO policies on agriculture 
- TAO roles regarding water resources for agriculture 
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Appendix V 
 
List of the Ping RBC framework meetings observed 
 
 Activity Date 
1. A meeting to select and nominate non-public sector members for             
the Ping RBC 
10.09.2008 
2. The Ping RBC meeting  31.08.2010 
3. The Ping RBC meeting  05.03.2010 
4. The Ping RBC meeting  19.08.2009 
5. The Ping RBC meeting  06.02.2009 
6. The Ping River Basin Sub-Committee meeting  24.08.2010 
7. The Ping River Basin Sub-Committee meeting  18.02.2010 
8. The Ping River Basin Sub-Committee meeting  15.09.2009 
9. The Chiang Mai River Basin Working Group meeting  18.08.2010 
10. The Chiang Mai River Basin Working Group meeting  02.08.2010 
11. The Mae Rim Sub-River Basin Working Group meeting 15.06.2010 
12. The Mae Klang Sub-River Basin Working Group meeting 11.06.2010 
13. The Mae Khan Sub-River Basin Working Group meeting 03.06.2010 
14. A meeting to establish the Mae Khan Sub-River Basin Working Group 14.09.2009 
15. A meeting to establish the Mae Khan Sub-River Basin Working Group  29.07.2009 
16. A meeting to establish the Mae Khan Sub-River Basin Working Group 
meeting  
05.08.2009 
 
 
 
 186 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis is a result of my own work and that no other than 
the indicated aids have been used for its completion. All quotations and statements that 
have been used are indicated. I did not accept the assistance from any commercial agency 
or consulting firm. Furthermore, I assure that the work has not been used, neither 
completely nor in parts, for achieving any other academic degree. 
 
 
 
Chiang Mai/ 24.07.2015                                    
                                                                                                           Sukit Kanjina 
 
 
 
 187 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
SUKIT KANJINA 
Date of birth: February 11, 1977 
Place of birth: Chiang Rai, Thailand 
E-mail: sukit@gmx.de / sukitkjn@gmail.com 
 
EDUCATION 
University of Hohenheim      since August 2007 
Stuttgart, Germany  
Institute of Social Sciences in Agriculture (430A) 
PhD candidate 
 
University of Hohenheim       2003 - 2005 
Stuttgart, Germany 
Degree: Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Agricultural Sciences, Food Security and Natural   
Resource Management in the Tropics and Subtropics 
Master’s thesis: Participatory approaches in tropical agricultural research in German 
universities: A case study of crop science’ 
 
Chiang Mai University       1995 - 1998 
Chiang Mai, Thailand  
Degree: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Public Administration 
 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
Research project: Production and Marketing Capacity Building  2013 - 2014 
for the Phrao District Economic Organic Crop Producer Group,  
Phrao District, Chiang Mai Province, Thailand 
Researcher 
 
The Special Research Program SFB564 “Research for Sustainable 2006 - 2011 
Land Use and Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of 
Southeast Asia” 
Junior researcher 
 
The Special Research Program SFB564 “Research for Sustainable 2001 - 2003 
Land Use and Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of 
Southeast Asia” 
Research assistant 
 188 
PUBLICATION 
Kanjina, S. (2008). Participatory water resource management in Thailand: Where are the 
local communities? Paper presented at the 12th Biennial Conference of the 
International Association for the Study of Commons (IASC Conference 2008), July 
14-18, 2008, Cheltenham, England.  
 
AWARDS 
Academic Excellence Award (Bronze Medal), Academic Year 1997,    1998 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand 
 
Academic Excellence Award (Bronze Medal), Academic Year 1996,    1997 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand 
 
 
 
 
Chiang Mai/ 24.07.2015                                    
                                                                                                           Sukit Kanjina 
